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CHAPTER I. FINANCIAL STRESS IN AQUCDLTURE 
Agriculture has been forced to evolve from a way of life in viiich 
economic considerations could be subordinated to other family goals to a 
business in vihich good production and financial managonent practices are 
basic to survival. As Paarlberg (1978) states, "For better or worse, 
agriculture has entered the mainstream of economic, political, and 
social life." As a result of integration into national and 
international product, input, and money markets, the degree of self-
sufficiency and independence of the agricultural sector has declined 
dramatically. This evolution in agriculture has been precipitated by 
changes fron without and within the sector; both macroeconomic policies 
and microeconanic decisions have played iirportant roles. The factors 
inducing structural change in agriculture have also contributed to 
financial stress in agriculture and agricultural lending. 
Historical" Determinants of Farm Financial Stress 
Microeconanic factors in the 1970s 
In the early 1970s, a number of factors contributed to significant 
changes in the organization of the farm firm. Credit use became much 
more widespread as a result of lower credit costs and changes in 
attitudes about borrowing. Further, it became an inportant tool in 
adjusting to external forces. Sector ddst levels began to increase, 
more than tripling between 1970 and 1979 (Table 1). 
Asset values were appreciating over time so that investments in 
land and other assets provided a growing equity base as well as capital 
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Table 1. Agricultural sector balance sheet statistics ^  
Real 
Debts/ capital 
Assets Debts assets gains 
Year ($B)b •($B) (percent) (percent) 
1965 260.8 40.7 15.6 11.9 
1966 274.3 44.0 16.0 7.3 
1967 288.0 47.4 16.5 4.9 
1968 302.8 50.5 16.7 3.8 
1969 314.9 53.0 16.8 -0.7 
1970 326.0 54.5 16.7 -0.7 
1971 351.8 59.6 16.9 13.2 
1972 394.8 64.9 16.4 28.7 
1973 478.5 73.3 15.3 44.0 
1974 502.6 81.8 16.3 2.1 
1975 576.3 91.7 15.9 37.9 
1976 664.3 104.1 15.7 58.0 
1977 736.5 123.0 16.7 27.7 
1978 873.2 141.1 16.2 65.0 
1979 1015.3 166.1 16.4 34.1 
1980 1108.3 182.3 16.4 3.8 
1981 1111.1 202.1 18.2 -73.0 
1982 1082.0 217.2 20.1 -56.0 
1983 1061.4 216.2 20.4 -29.1 
1984 955.8 212.5 22.2 -121.0 
Rational Economics Division, 1986. 
$B means billions of dollars in all tables. 
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gains benefits (Table 1). Both asset price increases and increases in 
unrealized capital gains added to the borrowing capacity and wealth of 
fanners and yet did not contribute to increased liquidity (Plaxico, 
1979; Plaxico and Kletke, 1979). 
Off-farm incone for seme farm fairl lies became an inçortant source 
of funds for farming and family living ejçîenditures. For the farm 
sector, off-farm income nearly doubled between 1970 and 1979 (Table 2). 
Macroeconcmic factors in the 1970s 
Grcwing export demand (Table 3) boosted connodiiy prices and helped 
average farm incanes reacdi levels equal to or surpassing average urban 
incanes. The boom was fueled by the opening of the Russian grain 
market, r^id economic growth in other countries which generated more 
inccxne to buy American products, and a weak dollar which made U.S. 
products relatively inexpensive. Real interest rates were low and even 
negative for sustained periods. 
Macroecononic factors in the 1980s 
The econanic environment for agriculture changed in the 1980s. The 
U.S. arbargoed grain sales to Russia, foreign econanic growth waned, and 
debt problons restricted other nations' buying power. Monetary and 
fiscal policy coifcined to straigthen the dollar (Table 3), making U.S. 
agricultural e^çorts relatively more costly and encouraging foreign 
countries to eaçand production. Real interest rates rose to 
unprecedented hi^is, inflation slowed, and real caimodity prices fell 
(Barkana, 1986). 
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Table 2. Agricultural sector income statistics^ 
Net 
farm 
income 
Year ($B) 
1965 12.7 
1966 13.9 
1967 14.5 
1968 15.1 
1969 16.6 
1970 17.6 
1971 19.1 
1972 21.3 
1973 24.7 
1974 28.1 
1975 23.9 
1976 26.7 
1977 26.1 
1978 29.7 
1979 33.8 
1980 35.1 
1981 36.9 
1982 37.9 
1983 38.8 
1984 40.0 
Real 
Net net 
cash cash 
income income 
($B) (1972 $B) 
14.4 19.4 
16.8 21.9 
14.8 18.7 
15.6 18.9 
17.9 20.6 
18.1 19.7 
17.7 18.5 
22.7 22.7 
35.2 33.3 
34.2 29.7 
29.0 23.0 
29.4 22.2 
27.3 19.5 
34.6 23.0 
37.0 22.6 
37.2 20.9 
35.8 18.3 
38.3 18.5 
38.3 17.8 
39.2 17.6 
Interest 
Off- /gross 
farm cash 
income income 
($8) (percent) 
12.7 5.0 
13.9 5.0 
14.5 5.6 
15.5 5.8 
16.6 5.8 
17.6 6.2 
19.1 6.3 
21.3 5.9 
24.7 5.2 
28.1 6.1 
23.9 7.0 
26.7 7.6 
26.1 8.6 
29.7 8.7 
33.8 9.7 
35.1 11.3 
36.9 13.6 
37.9 14.7 
38.8 14.5 
40.0 13.8 
^National Economics Division, 1986. 
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Table 3. Macroeconomic statistics^ 
Prime Agri­
rate cultural 
charged exports Elxchange 
Year by banks" ($B) rate" 
1965 4.54 6.2 * 
1966 5.63 6.9 * 
1967 5.61 6.4 120.0 
1968 6.30 6.3 122.1 
1969 7.96 6.0 122.4 
1970 7.91 7.3 121.1 
1971 5.72 7.7 117.8 
1972 5.25 9.4 109.1 
1973 8.03 17.7 99.1 
1974 10.81 21.9 101.4 
1975 7.86 21.9 98.5 
1976 6.84 23.0 105.6 
1977 6.83 23.6 103.3 
1978 9.06 29.4 92.4 
1979 12.67 34.7 88.1 
1980 15.27 41.2 87.4 
1981 18.87 43.3 102.9 
1982 14.86 36.6 116.6 
1983 10.79 36.1 125.3 
1984 12.04 34.3® 138.2 
^.S. President, 1985. 
Percent per annum. 
^Multilateral trade-weighted value of 
the U.S. dollar (March 1973 = 100). 
(^Indicates missing value. 
Estimate for January-November. 
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Rural financing was integrated with national mon^ markets and, as 
a result/ agriculture became less insulated from fluctuations in those 
markets. The growth and development of international financial markets 
added the potential for importing risk and instabilil^ from the rest of 
the world and provided more coipetition for funds. As a result, 
interest rates were higher (Table 3) and more volatile than in the past. 
Deregulation ranoved restrictions on interest paid on savings and 
transactions accounts, raising opportunity costs for investments. 
Farmers were less able to monetize capital gains because lenders became 
more ccaiservative in extending loans with uncertainty about asset 
appreciation. 
Microeconcxnic factors in the 1980s 
Farmers vàio purchased assets in-the 1970s e:^)ecting inflation-
fueled hi^er incones to provide cash flows to service d^t were 
disappointed in the 1980s. Althou^ net farm income continued to 
increase through 1984, real net cash income peaked in 1978 and in 1984 
was at pre-1970 levels (Table 2). Average real estate values stopped 
increasing, peaked nationally in 1981 and began falling (Economic 
Research Service, 1985a). Land prices fell dramatically in many 
regions, eroding agriculture's equity base and contributing to increased 
collateral risk and the unavailability of refinancing in sane cases. 
Growth in net farm incane did not keep pace with the rate of dd3t 
accumulation farm borrowers. In 1970, the sector d^t-to-net cash 
incOTie ratio was about 3.0; in 1980, it was 4.9, and in 1984, it was 
5.4. Debt servicing began to consume a larger share of income — 
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interest as a percent of gross cash income rose from 6.2 in 1970 to 11.3 
in 1980 and peaked at 14.7 percent in 1982 (Table 2). Hi^ interest 
rates and production expenses contributed to financial stress. 
In many cases, a changed microeconomic financial structure 
contributed to farm liquidity problems and made the farm more vulnerable 
to risk frcan income variability, collateral and equity erosion, interest 
rate volatility, and changes in lenders' policies. The maturity 
structure on debt shortened. In sane areas this was partially the 
result of financing economic and physical losses. Land and other fixed 
assets increased relative to financial assets and crop and livestock 
inventories. Because asset values were also declining, the option of 
refinancing existing debt by borrowing against appreciating asset values 
was significantly reduced. 
In other cases, liquidity problems were due, not to a change in the 
microeconomic structure but, to the nature of returns to agriculture's 
assets. Melichar (1979) discussed capital gains versus current income 
in the farm sector, the tradeoff that traditionally leads farmers to 
"live poor and die rich." He concluded that low current rates of return 
to assets combined with significant real capital gains have "serious 
implications for the structure of the farming sector and for public farm 
policy." They contribute to cash flow problems, large increases in 
debt, entry prcAlems for beginning farmers, and attract outside 
investment for tax purposes. 
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Financial Condition of Farm Operators 
Measuring financial stress 
According to Jolly et al. (1985) financial stress occurs vdien the 
forces causing stress exceed the capacity of an individual or firm or a 
specific sector of the economy to adjust. They point out that some of 
the factors contributing to stress, low returns to assets or the absence 
of profits, are signals to resource owners and are basic to the 
allocative mechanism of the market economy. Financial stress becomes 
counter-productive vdien misallocation of resources, undesirable 
structural change, and losses of economic and human capital become 
excessive. 
Negative cash flows, high debt-to-asset ratios (DAR), and low rates 
of return on equity (ROE) are camnonly identified synç>toms of financial 
stress. Negative cash flows are evidence of liquidity problems — that 
is, operators are unable to obtain cash to pay debts as they come due in 
the short run. Given time and extended credit, these farms may remain 
viable in the long run. The debt-to-asset ratio is typically used as an 
indicator of solvency. Solvency is a long-run relationship between 
total debts and assets and reflects the ability to pay off debts with 
proceeds from asset sales. A farm is technically insolvent if the debt 
of the farm exceeds the current market value of its assets — the DAR 
exceeds one. The ROE also indicates the operator's ability to meet 
payment (^ligations and coital replacement needs and weather asset 
value declines. A negative R(£ indicates that net cash flow is 
negative. If the cash shortfall is aided to debt, the negative net cash 
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flow reduces operator equity by an equivalent amount. Thus, large 
negative net cash flows can rapidly eliminated an operator's equity. A 
ROE of less than -5 percent indicates the farm is failing at a modest to 
rapid rate. 
Incidence and intensity of farm financial stress 
The U.S.D.A. estimates that about 214,000 farmers out of 1.7 
million farms (12.6 percent) covered in the 1985 Farm Costs and Returns 
survey (FCRS) are financially stressed due to a combination of a high 
debt load (a OAR exceeding 40 percent) and an inability to generate 
enough cash to pay bills (National Economics Division, 1985b}. FCRS 
results are based on a multiframe probability based survey sample of 
23,386 rural residents. Farms were defined as operations producing 
agricultural commodities which either had actual annual sales or 
purchases of $1,000 or more in 1984. The survey was conducted by 
enumerators in February and March of 1985. FCRS results reflect farm 
income data from 1984 and asset values at the beginning of 1985. 
Nearly 19 percent of all farm operators had OAR exceeding 40 
percent and 3 percent of all operators were technically insolvent (Jolly 
et al., 1985). About half of all farm operators, 50.3 percent, had 
negative cash flows. A large proportion of outstanding farm operator 
debt (62 percent) is owed by farmers in the highly leveraged (DAR > 40 
percent and less than 70 percent) and very highly leveraged (DAR >= 70 
percent) categories. About 66 percent of the debt owed by highly and 
very highly leveraged operators is owed by ccmnercial farm operators 
where commercial farms are farms with sales of more than $40,000. 
The U.S.D.A. survey results also indicate financially stressed 
farms are concentrated in certain types of fauns and in geographic 
areas. More than three-fourths of the stressed farms are cash grain, 
general livestock, or dairy farms. Three regions contain 44 percait of 
the farm operators and a majority (60 percent) of the stressed farmers: 
the com Belt, Lake States, and Northern Plains (Figure 1). These three 
regions also contained the largest number of technically insolvent 
operators. A larger proportion of the commercial farms had both high 
debt loads and negative cash flows, almost 20 percent, while an 
additional 10 percent were categorized as at risk because of high debt 
loads even though they indicated positive cash flows in the year of the 
survey. 
Jolly et al. (1985) report that although the incidence of farm 
financial stress is greatest in the midwest, the intensity of financial 
stress is greatest in the Delta, Southeast, Southern Plains, Northeast, 
and the Pacific regions (Figure 1). Using as a stress measure, they 
show that more of the debt in these regions is controlled by insolvent 
operators and more operators have returns cm equity (ROE) of less than -
5 percent. Larger operations generally showed a lower than average 
concentration of operators with a negative ROE. 
Other farm and farm operator characteristics provide different 
insights into the problem. Results of another national survey showed a 
decreasing DAR as age of the operator increased (Jolly and Doye, 1985). 
This indicates that financial stress is, to some extent, a 
Northeast 
jtorthem 
SElains—^ Mountain 
States 
Piqûre 1. U.S.D.A. production regions 
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characteristic of younger farm operators. In this survey, the largest 
farms were generally owned by operators in the 55-64 age group. 
A survey in Iowa pointed out the interrelatedness of financial 
problems among farmers (Jolly and Doye, 1984). The farm operators 
surveyed were asked »rtiether or not they were receiving or providing 
financial assistance to a relative engaged in farming. Six percent 
reported receiving financial assistance and 16 percent reported 
providing aid. Older farmers were more likely to have commitments to 
relatives to provide financial assistance while younger operators 
generally received aid. The lower debt farmers who had the financial 
capability to purchase land and other assets were on average close to 
retiranent. Their willingness to invest in land would seem doubtful. 
Financial Condition of Agricultural Lenders 
Measuring financial stress 
Irwin (1984) points out that stress on even a modest number of 
farmers creates severe stress on the financial system serving them. The 
most immediate problem for larders is the loss in income from interest 
earnings when a borrower becomes delinquent. Lenders are especially 
affected because they often have relatively small provisions for loan 
losses in the interest rates they charge (Melichar and Irwin, 1985). 
Reserves can be eroded quickly when credit repayment problems are 
widespread. To compensate for losses, the agricultural lender may 
increase rates charged paying borrowers, creating indirect stress on 
farmer-borrowers vho are otherwise financially healthy. 
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Generalizations about agricultural lenders* responses to farm 
financial stress are hampered by differences in the size, degree of 
specialization, geogra^ïic scope, and regulatory environment of the 
lenders. Some agricultural lenders find a large proportion of farm debt 
is owed by customers who require partial or total liquidation at a time 
when asset prices have fallen sharply and markets are not expected to 
improve significantly soon. Other lenders, because of their 
diversification or conservative lending practices, may have relatively 
few problem loans. 
Measuring financial stress 
Statistics vrfiich are typically reported to indicate stress in 
financial institutions include net income (or loss), percent of 
nonperforming loans, nonaccrual loans, loan chargeoffs, loans in 
liquidation, value of property acquired, and bank or branch office 
liquidations and mergers. Nonperforming loans are all delinquent loans, 
including nonaccrual loans, renegotiated loans, and accruing loans that 
are past due 90 days or more. Nonaccrual loans are the most delinquent 
loans — loans vrtiidi are more than 90 days past due on which full 
payment of principal and interest is not expected. The value of 
property acquired shows the value of assets accumulated by a lender 
through foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure. 
Melichar and Irwin (1985) report that the loan delinquencies and 
losses resulting from farm financial stress far exceed risk premiums 
incorporated in interest rates. The loss reserves and coital positions 
of some lenders are being eroded at a time when the financial 
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institutions themselves are more highly leveraged than normal. Three 
institutions, the Farm Credit Systan (PCS), commercial banks, and the 
Farmer's Hrane Administration (FnHA), hold about two-thirds of the $212 
billion in agricultural debt. All three institutions have .seen their 
loan portfolios deteriorate because of farm financial problans in recent 
years. 
Farm Credit System 
The ECS is the largest single source of credit for agriculture and 
holds about one-third of farm dd3t (Econanic Research Service, 1985c). 
The net inccxne of the systan declined to $441.6 million in 1984 fran a 
peak of $993.9 million in 1982 (Conptroller General of the United 
States, 1985). In 1985, the PCS resorted a $2.7 billion dollar loss 
(ïfâjster, 1986). At the Federal Land Banks (FLB) and Production Credit 
Associations (PCA), noiçerforming loans were 11 percent of their 
portfolio on June 30, 1985 (Conptroller General of the Itaited States, 
1985). These loans are likely to becane losses and decrease future net 
income given financial trends in agriculture. Loan charge-off s totaled 
$1.1 billion, nonaccrual loans amounted to $5.3 billion, and the value 
of acquired property increased to $900 million (Duncan, 1986). 
Maiy FCS local institutions have been liquidated or consolidated as 
a result of financial stress. From August, 1983, to January, 1985, 11 
FIB and PCAs were liquidated and 35 were projected to fail between June 
1985 and 1987 (Cbnptroller General of the United States, 1985). All 12 
FCS districts have brought their FIBs, intermediate credit banks, and 
banks for cooperatives under a single district managsnent. Seven 
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districts which suffered losses in 1985 have merged local FLBs and PCAs 
to increase efficiency and provide lower, more uniform loan rates to 
borrowers. 
Both borrowers' and investors' confidence in the FCS has been 
shaken. The dramatic increase in nonaccrual loans, loan chargeoffs, and 
the net loss of the FCS system provided disincentives for investment in 
FCS bonds. Borrower support was eroded by tençxsrary halts in borrower 
stock repayment, local FLB and PCA liquidations and mergers, and 
increased foreclosures. Concern about the future of the FCS prompted 
federal legislation to restore borrowers* and investors' faith in the 
system. Federal legislation amending the laws governing the FCS 
provided initiatives for change in four areas: rights of applicants, 
restructuring the FCA, rechartering the coital corporation, and 
provisions for federal assistance (Duncan, 1986). The Farm Credit 
Administration projects serious financial problems in several FCS 
districts during 1985-1989 but maintains that the system as a whole has 
the capacity to manage its credit and financial problems. 
Commercial banks 
Federally regulated and insured commercial banks hold 23.9 percent 
of farm debt (Economic Research Service, 1985c). Agricultural banks, 
those with an above average ratio of farm loans to total loans, are 
concentrated in the midwestem states and are usually small. "Oiey had 
been relatively profitable but now, because of their specialization in 
agricultural loans and in some cases marginal or poor management, are 
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severely stressed by nonperforming loans, increased loan losses, and 
decreasing profits. 
Delinquent loans have increased by nearly 20 percent and are now 
significantly higher than at nonagricultural banks. Agriculture bank 
failures are running at ten times their average annual rate for the past 
thirty years (Economic Research Service, 1985c). Bank closings can have 
in^aortant impacts on local communities and financially troubled 
borrowers but federal deposit insurance generally limits losses to 
individual savers. Although many agricultural banks are have financial 
problems, the Federal Reserve System believes that potential losses and 
bank failures do not threaten the banking systan nationally (Controller 
General of the United States, 1985}. 
Farmer's Home Administration 
FtaHA has historically been the lender of last resort, serving 
farmers unable to obtain loans through commercial outlets. The public 
safety net for farm lending provided by FmHA and price support loans 
from the Conmodity Credit Corporation (CCC) absorbed much of the risk 
and alleviated many problem loan situations for the commercial banks and 
FCS in recent years (Barry, 1984). Critics maintain that although 
bankntcies may have been reduced in the short run, more credit under 
concessionary terms has needlessly delayed the departure of some farmers 
from agriculture and worsened the conditims of others. 
Approximately twelve percent of farm debt is held by the FmHA 
(Economic Research Service, 1985c). Its portfolio has grown rapidly 
indicating that growing numbers of farmers are no longer deemed 
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creditworthy by other lenders — FmHA's debt holdings tripled from 1978 
to 1985. %e agency's loan portfolio has also shown significant 
deterioration with loan delinquencies increasing fivefold over the past 
four years. Loan delinquencies were $6.7 billion in June, 1985, and 
^^proximately 70 percent of delinquent loans are 3 or more years past 
due (Comptroller General of the United States, 1985). Severe FmHA loan 
delinquencies are largely concentrated in southern states with three 
states — Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi — accounting for nearly one-
third of délinquant FtaHA drfjt (Economic Research Service, 1985c). 
In addition to direct lending, F&HA guarantees loans made by 
commercial lenders to farmers. Under the debt adjustment program, FmHA 
may provide commercial lenders with a guarantee of up to 90 percent of 
loss of principal and interest on loans made to eligible farm operators. 
The program was announced in September, 1984, and through July 31, 1985, 
$52.5 million in loans was guaranteed (ConptroUer General of the United 
States, 1985). 
Consequences of Farm Financial Stress 
Changes in individual balance sheets — more debt, larger 
percentages of short term debt, and larger percentages of fixed assets 
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— have made farms vulnerable to liquidity problans. Lower net cash 
incomes resulting from lower farm or off-farm earnings are particularly 
stressful to farms with large debt service obligations. Approximately 
one-third of U.S. farm operators have little or no ddst, one-third have 
manageable levels of debt, and one-third of the operators have DAR in 
excess of 40 percent and control two-thirds of the outstanding debt of 
farm operators. With returns to agricultural assets at current levels, 
a majority of farm operators with debt have trouble paying all interest 
and principal due. Estimates by Jolly and Ooye (1985) indicate national 
annual delinquency rates of 50 percent of total debt volume lAen either 
principal or interest payment shortfalls constitute delinquency. 
A farm's inability to service debt has direct effects on the 
financial position of the farm and the farm's lender. Loan 
delinquencies lead to increasing debt-to-asset ratios on the farm, and 
increase the farm's susceptibility to financial failure and foreclosure 
or bankruptcy. At laiding institutions, loan defaults and delinquencies 
have raised loan-loss ratios to levels whicA have forced seme lenders to 
close their doors, others to raise interest rates and freeze stocks. In 
areas tdiere financial stress is particularly severe, lenders have also 
been liquidated or declared bankrupt. 
Business failures result in economic and human costs both to the 
individuals directly involved and to other firms whose operations depend 
on the businesses that fail. If failures are concentrated in certain 
geogragAic areas, sale of the assets of liquidated farms may depress 
land and machinery markets. Severe stress in a region may also 
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precipitate unemployment problans, followed by adverse effects on the 
tax base and revenue structure of the community. 
The partial or complete liquidation of large numbers of farms 
raises questions about the intacts of financial stress on the structure 
of agriculture. Sasmussen (Batie and Marshall, 1984) defines farm 
structure as "simply the control and organization of resources needed 
for farm production. Its dimensions include the numbers and sizes of 
farms by commodities and regions; the degree of specialization in 
production and the technologies employed; the ownership and control of 
the productive resources; the barriers to eitry and exit in farming; and 
the social, economic, and political situations of farmers." 
Farms often change the control and organization of resources as 
part of the restructuring process in response to financial stress, thus 
changing the structure of agriculture. Size and numbers of farms may 
remain constant if farms give up ownership yet retain control of assets 
using sale/leasdaack agreements. However, given the number of severely 
stressed farmers, it is unlikely that all stressed farms would be able 
to retain ownership of farm assets. Many, in fact, may be liquidated 
completely. Changes in farm structure in response to financial stress 
would be expected to vary by region and farm type since the incidence 
and intensity of financial stress vary by region and farm type. 
Several techniques have been used to estimate structural changes in 
the ag sector and relate those dianges to impacts on the community. 
Early espirical estimates of changes in farm structure used Markov chain 
techniques to project farm numbers and size distributions (Krenz, 1964; 
Hallberg, 1969). Byerlee and Halter (1974) used a simulation model 
built on an input-output framework so that interactions in the product 
markets and labor market with the ag sector could be considered. 
Gardner (1974) used simple regressions to relate farm population loss to 
income of rural families and found that the rate of a state's farm 
pc^sulation loss is positively associated with rate of growth of average 
income. He found no evidence of long term adverse effects on family 
incomes in rural areas due to a decline in farm population. 
Heady and Sonka (1974) found that a structure of small farms would 
lead to greater income generation in rural ccxnmunities, though families 
on the small farms would have farm incomes characterized as poverty 
level. Their study of farm size, rural community income and consumer 
welfare was based on a national linear programming model incorporating 
interregional comparative advantage analysis, a transportation submodel, 
and an ii^nit-output submodel. Heady and Sonka (1974) conclude that "an 
effort on behalf of a medium farm size would be more compatible with 
adequate farm family inc«nes, generation of nonfarm rural income, and 
reasonable consumer food costs." 
Market resiliency 
The ^ ility of existing markets to handle financial restructuring 
depends on the extent of the restructuring that occurs and the 
resiliency of the institutions involved. Financial asset markets will 
perform much of the restructuring. The Federal Reserve system has 
indicated that it believes that potential losses and bank failures are 
not a threat to the banking system nationally (Controller General of 
the United States, 1985). Likewise, Farm Credit Administration 
officials, the federal regulators of the Farm Credit System maintain 
that the FCS, though experiencing huge losses and facing a tough battle 
in restoring the confidence of their borrowers, is not close to failing 
(Webster, 1986). And, since the FmHA is a government agency, its 
existence is not threatened by its troubled portfolio. 
Less is known about the financial strength of other lenders — life 
insurance companies, agricultural merchants and dealers, and individuals 
— holding the remaining third of agricultural debt. Agricultural debt 
(primarily real estate debt) is generally a small portion of the life 
insurance company portfolio, and so life insurance companies are less 
vulnerable to agricultural financial stress. Individuals and local 
merchants who have extended credit to farmers, though, could suffer 
immensely when farm loans deteriorate. The retired farmer or farm widow 
who expected to receive a steady income from loans made with the sale of 
assets may find themselves with a returned farm rather than a pension 
fund. 
Evidence of impacts of agricultural financial stress on farm real 
estate maricets appeared in the results of the annual Farmland Markets 
Survey by the Economic Research Service (1985a). Apparently, the need 
for cash has spurred farmland sales. Acres of farmland sold by farmers 
increased by an estimated 22 percent and the acres sold by operators as 
a percentage of total acres of farmland purchased by curators jumped 
from 72 percent in 1983 to 91 percent in 1984 (National Economics 
Division, 1985a). Although the acreage of land for sale increased. 
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respondents to the Farmland Markets Survey indicated a decrease in the 
number of actual sales. The number of sales reported for the past year 
was the lowest since 1981. For land expected to remain in agriculture, 
prices per acre sold were 24 percent lower in 1985 than in 1984 on 
average. The proportion of land sales financed with credit dropped 
slightly to 82 percent, with sellers providing one-third of the credit 
extended. 
Farmland sales seem to have stagnated and asset prices have fallen 
dramatically. It may be that it is a ten^rary downturn and that lower 
asset prices will spur investment in agricultural assets so that sales 
increase. If, on the other hand, the market is saturated, the financial 
stress of farm operators trying to restructure the farm by selling 
assets may be exacerbated. 
Public Policies to Alleviate Farm Financial Stress 
The directicMî in government programs has been to shift the 
responsibility for managing risk from the public to the private sector. 
However, the scope of financial problems in agriculture and potential 
costs to society in economic and human terms has precipitated discussion 
of govemmait intervention to alleviate financial stress. Creditors and 
borrowers, the financially secure and the potential insolvents, have 
different perspectives on the stress problem and consequently differ on 
recommendations for financial assistance for stressed farmers. 
Different solutions may be recommended depending on the perception of 
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vAio or vdiat is responsible for the problem and v4io should bear the costs 
of aid programs. 
Several new policies have been suggested to minimize the social and • 
economic costs associated with liquidating large numbers of farms: 
interest rate buydcwns, principal write-offs, loan guarantees, and land 
holding conpanies. An interest rate buydcwn is a program in vMch the 
farmer or lender receives an interest subsi^, that is, some portion of 
interest due is paid by saneone other than the borrower. Principal 
write-offs reduce the amount of outstanding ddst for a farm. Loan 
guarantees by the federal government ensure credit availability for 
borrcwers Wio mic^t otherwise be refused a loan. Land holding conpanies 
purchase assets of stressed farmers, thus si:pporting asset markets and 
providing funds to the farmer for debt reduction. 
An interest rate buydcwn and a new Cùngressionally-chartered 
Capital Corporation to help deal with troubled loans are included in 
1985 legislation. Debt moratoriums have also been suggested and 
foreclosure moratoriums have been applied in some states. Some programs 
require direct public subsidies vfeLle some can be integrated into 
existing programs and markets. 
Research Issues 
An eaamination of the financial status of U.S. farms suggests that 
stress on asset markets, financial institutions and other lenders 
serving agriculture, and farm families is not eiçected to abate soon. 
Continued shifts in asset and ddst holdings are eigected as the sector 
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moves toward a new economic equilibrium. A number of questions about 
the process arise: What will continued agricultural adjustment to the 
economic environment imply for change at the farm and sector levels? 
How long will adjustment take? What will it mean for rural communities, 
agribusinesses, and lenders? If financial stress continues, will there 
be macroeconomic repercussions because of large scale bank failures? 
Would government intervention be appropriate and, if so, what are the 
expected costs of programs to alleviate farm financial stress? 
These questions point out the critical need for research on farm 
financial adjustment to identify issues relevant to policy formation. 
Although researchers have identified methods for adjusting to financial 
stress, the adjustment process itself is a relative unknown, as are the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the population making major 
adjustments. Knowing more about the process on individual farms would 
help in predicting the extent and duration of adjustment for the sector 
and in identifying the most efficient and equitable means of providing 
financial aid to fara operators, if deemed necessary. 
A better idea of the sectoral dianges required for financial 
stability in agriculture would help in predicting the ability of markets 
and institutions to handle adjustments and the value of intervention on 
behalf of stressed farmers and agricultural lenders. If the extent of 
changes in production agriculture is large, changes can also be expected 
in agriculture related industries and in rural communities. If, in 
addition to farms failing, Easinesses in an area begin to fail, the 
economic and social costs of farm financial stress are compounded. 
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Thus, the long run inçjlications of changes in the structure of 
agriculture for agriculture dependent businesses and geogr^hic areas 
also need to be addressed. 
Goals of Research 
The goal of this research is to provide information which can be 
used in policy analysis and in answering questions about the effects of 
farm financial stress. A model of farm financial decisions will be 
developed to provide empirical estimates of the transition needed to 
achieve more stable asset and distributions in agriculture. In 
modeling agriculture's response to changing economic conditions, there 
are several objectives: 
1. Integrate important elements of microeconomic and macroeconomic 
modeling which have historically been separated. 
2. Retain the individual firm as the decision-making unit vdiile 
using a logically valid algorithm flexible enough to encompass 
different types and sizes of farms. 
3. Explore theoretical frameworks that allow for movement and 
change in characteristics of the farm population as a whole. 
The focus will be on the financial adjustment path of U.S. 
commercial farms and the stressed individuals within that group. To 
model the transition, information from microeconomic and macroeconomic 
data and projections will be combined. Survey data from individual farm 
operators, agricultural sector income projections, and a simple adaptive 
decision hierarchy for individual operators will be used. The 
collective effects of microeconomic responses over time will be used to 
provide insights into potential population dynamics. The sector 
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response will link macroeconomic policies to the financial structure and 
organization of agriculture. An attempt is made to capture aiough of 
the social dynamics so that projections resemble the actual outcomes. 
Variables reflecting change in the financial status of farms under 
stress alleviation policies with different assumptions about the general 
state of the economy will be measured. The aggregate effects of 
adjustment that will be measured include: number of farmers leaving 
agriculture (selling out), changes in levels and percentages of owned 
assets, magnitude of annual principal and interest payment shortfalls 
and unrecovered debts, and the volume of assets sold or sold and leased 
back or purchased. The geogr^Aic distribution of responses will be 
highlighted by measuring the adjustment for four regions of the U.S.: 
East, South, Central, and West (Figure 2). 
The goal is to get "ball park" figures for the magnitudes of debts 
and assets changing hands because of restructuring within the sector to 
determine vrtiether existing maricets are sufficient or maricet failure will 
occur. By varying assumptions in the model, upper and lower bounds on 
restructuring needs will be estimated and the sensitivity of reactions 
to changes in econanic conditions will be evaluated. These results 
should shed light on some of the questions raised above regarding the 
financially stressed farm's sensitivity to alternative agricultural 
policies, the aggregate effects of microecwiomic adjustments, and the 
differences in total responses for subgroups such as geogra#iic regions. 
By modeling potential financial transitions in the ag sector, I hope to 
make a specific contribution to policy analysis and a gaieral 
West 
Figure 2. Regions used in analysis of financial conditions of U.S. aariculture 
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contribution to better specification of a micro-, macro- economic 
linkage. 
Thesis Organization 
In the remainder of the thesis, the work done in pursuing the 
research objectives is summarized. In Chapter II, previous research on 
financial stress and adjustment in agriculture is discussed and 
theoretical developments in ad^Jtive economics are presented. Chapter 
III describes the specification and estimation of a firm level financial 
adjustment model. Baseline program estimates of restructuring 
requirements and sensitivity tests of exogenous parameters are presented 
in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, the results from simulations of stress 
alleviation policies are tabulated and discussed. Finally, in Chapter 
VI, the research results are summarized and recommendations for further 
research are listed. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The factors contributing to financial stress have created an 
environment and problem which do not fit neatly into traditional 
economic frameworks. Production and consumption decisions for the farm 
household are often more interrelated (or at least, less separate) than 
for nonfarm households. Firm and farm growth, optimal portfolios and 
capital structure, decisions under risk and uncertainty are issues that 
have been recently addressed and for which a rather extensive literature 
exists. But, stressed farms, rather than choosing among expansion and 
investment opportunities, are faced with choosing disinvestment 
strategies. Optimization becomes a moot point or at best, a goal 
secondary to survival. Since farms have not faced such dire straits in 
decades, little attention has been devoted to developing a theory of 
disinvestment or liquidation vrtiich would serve as a basis for empirical 
work. A survey of the literature indicates that en^irical research has 
been largely descriptive with some analysis of survivability and policy 
impacts on typical or representative farms. 
Firm Survivability 
AUman (1984) analyzed the dramatic increase in the number of U.S. 
business failures since 1978 and concluded that public concern is 
legitimate when business failures deviate from their long-run trend. 
His examination of data on business failures occurring from 1952 to 1983 
led him to believe that the pervasiveness of business failures resulted 
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from economy-wide causal factors. He identified the influence of the 
business cycle, changes in interest rates and other financial market 
conditions, and the reform of the bankn^cy laws. AUman suggests that 
policy makers should take heed if the surge in bankruptcies is viewed as 
permanent in nature and should consider legislative or macroeconomic 
policy ranedies to minimize the social costs of business failures. 
Similar concerns about farm failure costs and geographical 
concentrations and the repercussions of farm liquidations have been 
raised in both political and academic circles. Shepard and Collins 
(1982) list five theoretical determinants of farm bankruptcy: 
increasing scale of farm size and inputs, capital structure of farms, 
farm incmne fluctuation, U.S. agricultural policy, and macroeconomic 
factors. Using an econometric analysis of aggregate time-series (1910-
1978) farm sector data, they found that farm bankruptcy rates were 
associated with leverage and farm size prior to World War II and were 
strongly associated with variation in farm income after World War II. 
Shepard and Collins find that the "profound increase in leverage has not 
been associated with greater incidence of farm failure." But, they add 
that the data give reason to believe that policies encouraging growth in 
farm size may contribute to bankruptcy. It should be noted that their 
data fails to account for the increase in debt from 1978-1982 and 
changes in macroeconomic policy over the same period. 
Barkema and Doye (1985) used an empirical model to assess the 
probability of a cash flow crisis under different financial scenarios 
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for a large cash grain farm.l They found that the model farm's 
susceptibility to a payments crisis increased with financial leverage 
and the interest rate. Deterministic simulation of a hi^ily leveraged 
firm (DAR of 0.67) indicated that these firms have virtually no chance 
of making timely principal and interest payments over a ten year period. 
Stochastic simulation of a farm model with a lower DAR (0.33) in a 
realistic scenario of lew conmodity prices and land values indicated a 
low probability (12 percent) of failing to meet all financial 
obligations. These results siçport the commonly held belief that firms 
with relatively lew DAR are on safe ground financially whereas the 
survivability of more highly leveraged firms m^ be much less likely. 
A nuirber of other studies have been undertaken to assess the firm's 
survival ability or financial behavior under varied econanic scenarios 
(Richardson and Côndra, 1981; Musser, White, and Snith, 1984; Thcmpson 
and Hanson, 1980; Barkema, 1985; Tweeten et al., 1984; Baum and 
Richardson, 1983; Schertz, Calvin, and Willett, 1983). Like the stucfy 
by Barkana and Dpye (1985), these researchers give detailed information 
about the potential for liquidity and solvency problens and possible 
firm-level responses to stress given a specific farm description. These 
microeconomic models can be used for controlled experiments to isolate 
the iitpacts of policy or environmental changes. They provide a 
cash flew crisis was assumed to occur when the average dâ>t 
service coverage ratio, the three year moving average of the debt 
service coverage ratio (DSCR), falls belcw one. The DSCR is defined as: 
DSCR = (inccxne + interest due - family living expenses - taxes 
paid) / (interest due + principal due on intermediate and long 
term d^t). 
32 
quantitative understanding of likely responses and details that are 
complementary to information provided by macroeconomic models. However, 
inferences about sectoral changes are not possible because these 
microeconomic studies are based on simulations using typical or 
representative farms. This approach is inadequate for estimating a 
sector response because initial farm financial and tenure conditions 
influence the outcome as do feedback and interaction effects. 
Financial Adjustment Process 
Microdvnamics 
Recent work on microdynamics, micro-macro linkages, and adaptive 
economics seem to provide a better foundation for modeling financial 
transition in the agricultural sector. At the 1984 American 
Agricultural Economics meetings, several papers relating to 
microdynamics were presented (Gladwin and Zabawa, 1984; Barlett, 1984; 
Ehrensaft et al., 1984). Ehrensaft et al. discuss changes in farm 
structure in North America, primarily Canada, with S(xne comparisons to 
the U.S. Using results of longitudinal micro-based survey data they are 
able to compare proportional changes to gross and net flows of farms in 
specified categories over time. Their work provides information on 
mobility patterns, entry-exit rates, and changes in cohorts^ over time. 
Ehrensaft et al. (1984) show that higtfi entry and exit rates for 
Canadian agriculture as a tAole are due to sizeable turnovers in 
ownership of smaller farms. Entry and exit rates vary by farm type: 
^GroiQss of individuals with a common characteristic, such as age. 
dairy farms have a low entry rate, poultry farms a high entry rate. 
Census data indicated only slight cgiward mobility over the size scale 
over either a five year period or a fifteen year period for age cohorts 
— they conclude that "the best way to get big is to start big." They 
find that the net effect of large gross flows is gradual changes in land 
ownership patterns and economic concentration. This kind of information 
— changes in distributions of farm operators, assets, and debts and 
entry and exit rates by size of farm, farm type, and age of operator — 
would be useful in examining the effects of financial stress over time 
in the U.S. But, an ex-post examination of survey data provides little 
insight into the causes of change and may not be useful in projecting 
future distributions of farm resources. 
Gladwin and Zabawa (1984) focus on the decision process in reaction 
to changes in technology and product markets, making use of detailed 
farm history and decision data from a set of farmers in a county in 
Florida. Decision criteria and the hierarchy for a decision tree model 
were developed from interviews with shade tobacco farmers. The 
sequential and deterministic process in their model was subjected to 
qualitative and quantitative constraints at different nodes of the tree. 
Gladwin and Zabawa's results showed that after the collapse of the local 
market for shade tobacco, the full-time farmers adapted by remaining in 
farming on a larger scale, scaling back to part-time farming, or leaving 
the farm. Their results support the hypothesis that financial stress 
contributes to concentration of assets in the larger farms. 
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By using fanners' actual responses, Gladwin and Zabawa's results 
provide a sound foundation for realistic microeconomic projections of 
structural change. The application of this procedure on a large scale, 
however, is not practical because of the costs of eliciting responses 
over time for a population. The procedure also seems most suitable for 
a fairly homogeneous grow. It is likely that a detailed decision tree 
for crop versus livestock farms would be more dissimilar than similar. 
A model that could represent many different types of farms would require 
extensive information collection, a more ccxnplex model, and some means 
of aggregating the results. 
Barlett (1984) examines the microdynamics of debt, drought, and 
default on farms in south Georgia. Like Gladwin and Zabawa (1984), the 
data presented are the result of an in-depth survey and open-ended 
interviews combining anthropological, economic, and sociological 
methods. Full-time farmers are found to be most likely to lose the 
family farm. Among the full-time farmers, disproportionate amounts of 
debt are carried by renters and large scale farms. The youngest renters 
group had the most critical circumstances with 71 percent reporting 
criM^ling debt burdens. Family and farm life-cycle considerations were 
found to be important variables in understanding currait farm financial 
stress. Operators who inherited property or began farming in time to 
pay off real estate ddat and accumulate some savings are now less 
vulnerable to drought or other extenuating circumstances. 
The criticisms of Gladwin and Zabawa (1984) and EArensaft et al. 
(1984) also aRïly to the Barlett (1984) article. Although the interview 
process provides valuable insights into farm conditions for a localized 
population, it is not a tool that can be used widely without substantial 
financial commitment and community support. None of the articles 
directly links the housshcld=farm decision model to the forces behind 
change to determine causality of changes in structure. Instead, the 
surveys provide a detailed response to financial stress in a possibly 
unique setting. The articles neglect the evaluation of financial 
strategies as solutions to financial problems. They do not lend 
themselves readily to an analysis of the effects of financial stress on 
U.S agriculture and no suggestions for appropriate public policy 
response to changes in farm structure are made. 
The U.S.D.A. is probably the only agency with the resources to do 
detailed microdynamic survey work on a national scale. They already 
conduct fairly detailed annual surveys of farm costs and returns. Time 
series data for individual farms are not available, which limits the use 
of the results to descriptions of existing conditions. In general, 
survey results are not a dynamic tool but can provide a base reflecting 
current circumstances for projections of future conditions. 
Micro-, macro- linkages 
Micro-, macro- linkages were discussed at a conference in 1981 on 
modeling farm decisions for policy analysis (Baum and Schertz, 1983) and 
have been developed in work by Day (1984b). Day asserts that developing 
a better understanding of how the economy works depends on formulating a 
theory that explains structural change and instabilities. He continues 
by saying that complicated dynamics make formulating effective policy in 
36 
the face of uncertainty inçwrtant. He enphasizes three properties of 
micro-macro dynamics: 
"First, micro structure matters in the sense that differences in micro-
conditions among individual agents in the economy lead to different 
behavior. Second, differences in long run behavior can differ 
qualitatively among micro-units with some firms gradually converging to 
a stable, stationary path vAile others continue to exhibit changing 
behavior of possibly a quite erratic nature. Third, behavior in the 
short-run can be quite inconsistent with the long-run tendencies of the 
system" (Day, 1984b). 
Day also suggests that the economist may conclude that the economy is 
inherently unpredictable unless specific stabilizing mechanisms can be 
discovered and introduced. He concludes that "it is likely only to be 
from studies of micro-macro linkages in dynamic models of economic 
behavior that combine micro- structure with market feedback that an 
effective understanding of how the economy works can be built" (Day, 
1984b). 
Caldwell (1985) develops the subject of micro-, macro- linkages in 
a discussion of policy development and analysis. He points out that in 
the policy formation process several questions often arise in debate on 
the efficacy of particular policy tools: Does a particular micro- level 
response generalize to the population as a %Aole? What is the 
distribution of responses across large subgroups? How sensitive are the 
reactions to changes in the economic enviroiment? What will be the 
collective effect of heterogeneous responses over time? 
Evaluations of proposed or existing agricultural policy have 
historically either featured macroeconomic data or microeconomic models 
in (Aich the degree of impact on the typical farm is hypothesized. "Riis 
dichotomous ai^roach to policy analysis fails to adequately link 
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mîcroeconomîc and macroeconomîc responses. As Caldwell (1985) points 
out, the effectiveness of a given policy depends on the interaction of 
the policy with characteristics of the individuals in the target groi^, 
and aggregate outcomes depend oti the composition of the affected 
population. Only rarely can aggregate parameters be interpreted in the 
naively appealing terms of a representative individual. Caldwell (1985) 
stresses the importance of including sufficient accurate social dynamics 
in the model so that economic projections may resemble actual outcomes. 
Benefits and Costs of Stress Alleviation Policies 
Although the financial condition of farms and farm lenders has been 
documented, only a few researchers have analyzed policy proposals tAich 
address financial stress problems. Costs to lending institutions of 
debt assistance programs for Pennsylvania dairy farms were estimated by 
Grisley (1985). He uses a selected sample of dairy farmers to project 
financial positions to 1985 using a budget technique. Alternative 
principal and interest payment reduction policies are then as^lied to 
determine sample statistics on the number of farmers who would benefit 
frcHD programs and the average payment per farm. In Grisley's analysis, 
off-farm income was ignored and no eligibility criterion for the 
programs were specified. Extrapolation from the sample results was used 
to estimate costs of the financial assistance programs for the state. 
Only a few researchers have attempted to provide enqpirical results 
reflecting costs of financial stress on the agricultural sector. The 
aggregate analyses in Boehlje et al. (1985) were ca%)leted using an 
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econometric simulation model of the agricultural sector. The policies 
to alleviate financial stress in all cases were assumed to be available 
to all farmers. There was no attendit made to develop the linkage 
between microeconomic responses and aggregate effects. 
An interest rate buydown in lAich interest rates on real estate 
debt were reduced by three percentage points and interest rates on 
nonreal estate debt were reduced by four percentage points for four 
years was analyzed. The interest rate buydown was found to improve net 
farm income and cash flow in the short run. Additional cash provided by 
the buydown was used to r^aay part of the nonreal estate debt, leading 
to lower liabilities and higher equity over time. In the long run, the 
interest rate buydown resulted in slightly higher incomes and cash 
flows, largely because of decreased debt. If interest buydown payments 
were used to inqprove family living rather than retire principal, Boehlje 
et al. found the financial condition of the agricultural sector 
deteriorated rather than improved. 
Boehlje et al. (1985) also evaluated the in^ct of reducing the 
principal repayment rate. The annual repayment rate on both real estate 
and nonreal estate debt was reduced by 25 percent, or essentially 
deferred for four years. This policy led to increased cash flow but 
lower farm income because liabilities were being repaid at a slower 
rate, thus increasing interest costs. Another scaiario analyzed by 
Boehlje et al. (1985) assumed a reduction in the size of the government 
deficit and the demands of the federal government on coital markets. 
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Aggregate short run income and cash flow prtAlems were solved and long 
run problems were alleviated. 
Theoretical Framework for Farm Financial Adjustment and Policy Analysis 
Theoretical production/investment frameworks which incorporate firm 
survival cons iderat icxis are developed in Leathers and Chavas (1984) and 
Boehlje and Eidman (1983). But, a framework for individual firm 
disinvestment and a model of the agricultural sector response is needed. 
A review of the literature produced no previous modeling of the 
financial adjustment path of the U.S. agricultural sector incorporating 
individuals as decision makers. There are no models tdiich show changes 
in distributions of debts and assets of farm operators and the farm 
sector over time due to financial stress. On one hand, most 
macroeconomic models make use of aggregate data to formulate an overall 
sectoral response. Some national or international models combine 
econometric systems with demogr^hic accounting and input-output models 
to show potential changes in income and en^loyment by geogr^Aic region 
(Day and Singh, 1977; Heady, 1983; Moreland, 1984). These models are 
not however based on microeconomic responses to economic circumstances. 
The effects of interaction of the policy with heterogenous farms 
included in the program remains an unresolved issue. 
On the other hand, most microeconomic models in agricultural 
economics focus on determining the profit maximizing use of a firm's 
resources under different conditions or assessing the impact of a 
specific policy on a typical or representative farm. Traditional models 
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Wiich rely totally on maximizations of a single objective function do 
not allow for information processing, problem redefinition, and 
evolution or economic adaptation over time. Though useful in a limited 
context, these micro- models provide little insight into aggregate 
inçacts of responses by dissimilar firms. Thus, the linkage between 
firm level responses to stress and the agricultural sector response is 
missing. 
And so, changes in the distribution of socioeconomic and financial 
characteristics resulting from adaptation to changes in the economic 
environment of the farm population remain unknown. It may seem now that 
it is mostly young farmers who are forced out of business leaving older 
operators in control of agriculture's assets, or that crop farmers are 
in worse shape financially than livestock farmers, or that individuals 
in the central region of the U.S. are more severely financially stressed 
than other regions, or that stressful conditions could continue for 
several years, but it remains to be shown if an anpirical model would 
validate these hypotheses. 
Research is needed to provide estimates of the extent of 
restructuring needed and the expected duration of the restructuring 
process. The responses of individual farm to financial stress need to 
be linked to a sector response. If microeconomic and sector effects can 
be determined, impacts on the rest of the economy can be determined. 
Policies to alleviate financial stress could be judged for 
appropriateness and effectiveness. 
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Model features needed 
A theory of financial adjustment should integrate the economic, 
technical and hdiavioral forces at work into a simulation of the 
dynamics which captures the dominant features of a changing industry. 
Forrester (1979) proposes that a successful approach to economic 
behavior emerges from : 
"1. Starting, not with limited modification to equilibrium theory, 
but with an alternative conceptual structure that permits a 
full range of dynamic behavior; 
2. Adopting a #iilosophical perception of the scientific method 
that starts, not with a priori principles from tAich general 
b^iavior is deduced, but with broad and careful observation of 
the real world of econonic and managerial practice to 
determine the structure, organization, ^ ysical restrictions, 
psychological attitudes, information sources, and policies 
from which actual economic behavior arises; 
3. Organizing a group effort large enough to unify the many 
aspects of economic structure and behavior and directed toward 
understanding the economy as a whole; 
4. Giving w simplicity when it stands in the way of reality; 
5. Replacing optimization assumptions with representation of 
decision-making based on locally available information and on 
realistic decision-making constraints that impose uncertainty 
and exclude knowledge of the future except as it is 
imperfectly deduced from the past; 
6. Abandoning conventional economic prediction as the objective 
of economic modeling, and substituting the objective of 
developing alternative policies for improving the character of 
economic behavior; 
7. Developing the microstructure that generates macrobehavior; 
8. Realizing that no sharp boundary s^arates structure from 
parameters, and that both structure and parameters can be 
drawn directly from observation of real economic activity to 
form a comprehensive theory of behavior; 
9. Approaching validation as a imiltidimensional process in ^ ich 
a wide variety of testable assertions can be compared with 
many different kinds of characteristics of the real world; and 
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10. Creating an approach that places little restriction on 
incorporating nonlinear relationships." 
Adaptive Eccmomics 
Hie search for theory which integrates economic, technical, and 
behavioral forces led to adaptive economics, that is, the study of the 
economic process using concepts of adaptation (Day, 1983). The adaptive 
economics ^ sproach has developed through efforts to better characterize 
and understand the dynamic processes that bring about or fail to bring 
about equilibrium as it exists in the traditional economic paradigms. 
Adaptive economics is a synthesis of ideas from behavioral economics, 
system dynamics, recursive programming, adaptive or dual control 
theories, and evolutionary models. It is not purported to be a 
replacement for conventional economics but is "a way of thinking about 
and an approadi for understanding economic change both in terms of 
explanations and of policy design" (Day, 1983). 
Day (1983) reports that behavioral scientists have suggested that 
decision makers, vrtien they can, choose solutions that are good enough. 
They work to achieve " sat isficing" rather than maximizing levels of 
behavior with bdiavior determined by many different goals arranged 
according to some hierarchy or priority order. Satisficing refers to 
the psychological theory of aspiration level, the performance level 
which an individual intends to attain. The overall process of achieving 
objectives can be broken down into a set of decisions solved more or 
less sequentially. 
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Decision makers are said to be "boundedly rational" rather than 
strict optimizers because the individual is assumed to have incomplete 
or imperfect knowledge, leading to inqperfect decisions- %e econrany is 
defined as a system of these "boundedly rational" eccmanizers who 
interact with each other and with their environment, or as a set of 
interacting adaptive processes (Day, 1983). The planning process 
delineates feasible and desired goals while control systems guide 
behavior toward goal achievement *Aile adapting to current conditions. 
Actions result in flows of resources and information and changes in 
stocks of resources controlled by the farm operator. 
The adaptive economics approach regards economic change as a 
disequilibrium process and as a result, the analytical approach 
emc^sizes flows, stocks, and the time paths of adjustment of endogenous 
variables and the nonlinear feedback effects from information flows 
(Baum in Baum and Schertz, 1983). As in other economic approaches, the 
feasible activity set may be constrained by technology or physical or 
financial resource availability. The range of allowable activités may 
be modified over time as constraining factors, the environment, and the 
characteristics of the farm and farm operator also change each period. 
An organism or economic agent is said to be adaptive if it behaves 
in a way that favors its own survival. The farm family, for example, 
may adapt as is necessary to ensure the viability of the farming 
operation by cutting back on family living expenditures, taking off-farm 
jobs, and improving management or cutting costs. Behavior may be 
modified in response to self-evaluation (autofeedback) or as a result of 
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interactions with other individuals or the environment (autofeedback). 
The farm operator respœids to internal and external stimuli in his 
environment and in so doing, modifies the environment. An individual's 
behavior over time can be modeled as a sequence of component and 
feedback effects. 
An adaptive economics model as applied to farm decision makers 
might be more formally expressed as follows (ad^ed from Day and 
Singh, 1977). Let x^ be a micro-economic unit within a population of 
i=l...n individuals. Each x^ bases operating decisions on a decision 
vector vAich contains variables representing the perceived situation of 
the individual's internal and external enviixHiment and the results of 
previous decisions. The decisions made by xj at time t can be 
represented by: 
Di = a(Ei, i=l-..n (13) 
(Aere a = functional operator 
Di = n-dimaisional activity level or decision vector for a micro-
unit 
Ei = vectors of internal and external factors influencing and 
constraining the decision process 
Dipt-1 = variables representing previous decisions of the operator. 
A feedback relation linking the microeconomic unit to the influence of 
his own and other farmers' past reactions, economic environment and 
other exogenous forces is specified as: 
Ei = b{ t_s(E, D)t_i, Zt) i=l...n (14) 
with b = functional operator 
E = vector of perceived internal and external environment 
variables for all micro-units 
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D = vector of variables representing previous decisions of 
all operators 
Zt = vector of exogenous variables 
t-s(E, D)t-1 = sequence of vectors from t-s to t-1 
where t-1 is the most recent time period and t-s is the most distant 
time period affecting decision-making. %e two equations together 
represent the dynamic micro- structure of the agricultural sector and 
its environment. The first equation describes in general terms the 
underlying decision process, that is, conversion of data into current 
decisions resulting in current activities. The second equation allows 
interaction among micro-units and relates past experience, data, and 
exogenous variables of all micro-units in the sector to the current 
individual choice prtAlem. 
Both internal and external environments vary with the individual 
either because of inherent qualities, geographical location, or chance. 
Internal factors influencing the decision-making process include family 
goals, individual preferences, socioeconomic characteristics, and 
personal constraints. One individual may choose to expand his farm 
operation using debt financing while another will use only retained 
earnings for asset purchases. The farm operator's age, education, and 
family size could affect both consuiqption and resource managemait 
decisions. Elxtemal factors may provide incentives for certain behavior 
or may limit the feasible activities. Government incentives to 
participate in commodity programs would be one example of an external 
influence and credit constraints imposed by lenders would be another. 
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Past decisions are also important because of commitments that remain 
significant over time; debt repayment obligations and investments in 
specialized facilities, for instance, tend to be long-term resource 
commitments. 
Decisions are made at the microeconomic level and vdien inqplemented 
result in actions at the micro- level. As a consequence of these 
activities, changes in the financial status and economic characteristics 
of the farm occur over time. Asset holdings or debt levels may increase 
or decrease leading to changes in farm size and changes in the equity 
position of the farm. For a given farm, changes in financial structure 
over time might be represented by the trajectory shown in Figure 3. In 
this case, the farm begins relatively small with a low DAR then, over 
time, both size and DAR increase. Finally the farm reaches a size 
plateau and a DAR near the initial value. Another farm showing growth 
over time using no ddat might exhibit a different path (Figure 4). The 
financial transition paths of individual farms are important because 
they may vary with individual farm characteristics and they contribute 
to the sector response. Both of these factors are inportant in policy 
analysis. 
If we assume that there exist aggregate data vectors E^, zs that 
can be obtained from an appropriate aggregation of individual agent data 
and that sectoral functional operators a^ and b^ exist, then the 
sectoral analogues of equations (13) and (14) are: 
DS = aS(ES, DS|._2) (15) 
ES = bS( t-s(E, D)t-l, ZS) (16) 
Size 
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Debt/asset 
Figure 3. Hypothetical farm grcwth path using credit 
Size 
Debt/asset 
Figure 4. Hypothetical farm grcwtii path using no credit 
where = the summation of Dj, i = 
Interagent feedback effects underly this adaptive macrosystem with 
structural equations. The sector response in an empirical model will be 
reflected in changes in the distribution of farms, perh^s by farm size 
or type. Figure 5 shows one hypothetical sectoral change over time by 
debt-to-asset ratio. The initial distribution of operators (tg) shows 
approximately one-third of the operators have low debt-to-asset ratios, 
one-third have higher debt-to-asset ratios of 10 to 40 percent, and one-
third have debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 40 percent. Almost half of 
the operators with debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 40 percent have debt-
to-asset ratios greater than 70 percent. The final distribution of 
operators in Figure 5 (ti) shows a similar distribution but with fewer 
very higg^y leveraged operators. 
If panel data of farm operator family decisions were available, the 
actual transition paths could be derived and causal relations tested 
using mathematical sociology techniques (Land and Rogers, 1982; Leik and 
Meeker, 1975; Keyfitz, 1985; Tuma and Hannan, 1984). In the absence of 
time series data on the financial position of farmers, decision making 
must be simulated and results used to develop projected paths of growth 
and adjustment. 
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Nimber 
of 
farms 
Figure 5. Change in distribution of farms by debt-to-asset 
ratio over time 
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CHAPTER III. DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To model the financial adjustment path of individuals within the 
agricultural sector, reliable estimates of cash flow, income, and 
balance sheet figures are needed. The financial picture drawn from the 
firm's financial statements indicates the stability and growth potential 
of the firm. A positive net farm income together with a positive net 
cash flow and a modest equity position provide the foundation for farm 
expansion or an increase in family living expenditures. A negative cash 
flow and low owner equity signal the need for changes in the farm 
operation if it is to remain viable. 
In terms of adaptive economics, the farm sector can be viewed as a 
system of decentralized and basically independent decision makers. 
Given a focus on the farm operator family as an econtMoic entity, a 
graphical representation of the economic system containing farm 
operators is shown in Figure 6. In total, farm decisions are a function 
of the internal and exteimal environment and past decisons. 
External environment 
The agricultural ii^nit and output markets, government, nonfarm 
sector, financial institutions and other farm households make up the 
external environment for an individual producer. The important inçjacts 
of the external environment on farms can be incorporated in an empirical 
model through exogenous financial variables such as rates of return on 
assets, interest rates, and off-farm income levels. Farm households in 
the aggregate are shown to have an effect on the financial institutions. 
Farm 
operator 
Past 
decisions 
Government 
Agricultural 
input 
market 
Community 
norms, 
beliefs 
Financial 
intermediary 
Agricultural 
output 
market 
Agricultural 
sector 
Nonfarm 
sector . 
Farm 
operator 
Figure 6. Graphical representation of mcxJel relationships 
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Tîie lender serves as a source of credit or as a repository for 
savings or both. In a normal economic environment, principal and 
interest payments fran the agricultural sector provide incrane to the 
lender. Farmers experiencing financial stress may become delinquent on 
loans or even default, adversely affecting financial intermediary 
profits and portfolio quality. Lenders are assumed to impact farm 
operators primarily through credit constraints, loan repayment terms, 
and participation in financial stress alleviation programs. 
Internal environment 
The internal environment in Figure 6 is signified in community 
structure, norms, and beliefs. The decision hierarchy, rules, and goals 
used in an empirical model represent the internal environment. A system 
of heuristic behavior mechanisms could be developed vdiich is compatible 
with assumed farm family goals — namely, remain in business, maintain a 
minimum level of family consumption, and increase net worth. Threshold 
levels for some variables, consumption for instance, might be specified 
to ensure that satisficing of hi^est order goals is achieved. 
Past decisions 
Past decisions of the farm operator also directly influence the 
farm household. Existing debt and asset levels, enterprise mixes, and 
land rental/ownership combinations reflect the results of past 
decisions. Using results of a survey of farm operators as the basis for 
an empirical model of financial adjustment is one means of incorporating 
indirectly the actual past decisions of farmers in estimates of future 
changes. 
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Model Specification 
The cash flew model used in this research is derived from earlier 
work by Jolly and Dcye (1985, 1986). Net cash flow (NCF) for the farm 
operator family conbines farm and nonfarm sources and uses of funds. 
NCF may be egiresssd as: 
NCF = Rop*(Ao + Ar) - c*Ar " (i+P)*D - CONS + OPI - TAX (5) 
where B^p = cash rate of return to operated assets 
AQ = value of owned assets 
c = cash rental rate on rented assets 
Ar = value of rented assets 
i = average rate of interest paid on outstanding debt 
p = average rate of principal r^ayment on outstanding ddst 
D = level of outstanding ddat 
CCNS = consumption e^qsenditures for the farm family 
OFI = off-farm income earned ty the <^)erator and spouse 
TAX = federal incone taxes paid by the farm family. 
Farm income, the sum of earnings attributable to owned and rented 
assets, equals Rqp*(Ao + A^) - c*Ar and so is a function of the 
operator's tenure position. Financing costs are reflected in the i and 
p values. CCNS and TAX use cash from the operation viiile OFI 
contributes cash to the operation. Note that noncash costs, capital 
consunption and d^reciation for instance, are not included. 
Firm level responses to financial stress 
If the projected net cash flow is negative, the farming operation 
together with nonfarm earnings does not generate enou^ revenue to cover 
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the family's cost of living and financial obligations. The potential 
for financial stress as indicated by a negative NCF is particularly 
acute for farms with no off-farm income. Equation (5) can be 
manipulated to show that the farm operator with no OFI, $15,000 in 
family living expenses, no rented assets, and no debt must own assets of 
$200,000 to project a positive cash flow with cash rates of return of 
7.5 percent and must own $272,727 worth of assets if low (5.5 percent) 
rates of return prevail. 
If cash flow is negative, the farm family is forced to make changes 
in the farm's financial structure to meet cash flow demands and 
reconcile differences between income and expenses. Traditional means of 
correcting financial problems include debt and asset restructuring, 
negotiation of debt repayment terms, recapitalization through outside 
equity infusion, cost control, and inçïroved management. 
Financial restructuring 
The amount of financial restructuring (ignoring taxes) necessary 
for operators with negative NCF to break even in cash flow terms can be 
derived from the NCF equation: 
@NCF = B*Rop*(Ao + Ar) + (1 + B)*Rop*(@Ao + gA^) -c«@Ar -
(i + p)*0D - @CONS + 0OFI (6) 
where @NCF = the change in net cash flow required to service all debt 
and pay for family living expaiditures 
B = the percentage change in R^p 
0Ao = the change in owned assets occurring in the restructuring 
process 
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@Aj = the change in rented assets 
@D = the change in outstanding ddat as a result of debt 
retirement from asset sales or debt discharge by the lender 
@CONS = the change in family living expenditures 
@OFI = the change in off-farm income 
@TAX = the change in incmne tax with changes in income. 
The necessary restructuring could theoretically be achieved by a change 
in any one of the decision variables. The effects of various 
restructuring techniques using an average size farm with an average rate 
of return! will be illustrated. In the examples that follow, the farm 
operator is assumed to own assets valued at $700,000 which earn an 
average cash rate of return of 6 percent. Debts of $200,000 for the 
farm have an average interest rate of 10 percent and a principal 
repayment rate of 5 percent. The farm family allows $15,000 for family 
living expenses, earns no off-farm income, and does not rent additional 
land. 
Cash outflows could be reduced by decreasing family living 
expenditures or reducing production costs or rents. If only the level 
of family consumption was changed then the change in CONS required, 
@CONS, would be: 
0CONS = NCF. (7) 
The required reduction in CONS would be equal to the cash shortfall, 
here the negative NCF. For the illustrative farmer, family living 
!Statistics for farm size and rates of return are presented in 
discussion of data and parameter estimation later in this chapter. 
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expenditures would be reduced by $3,000 (from $15,000 to $12,000} to 
eliminate the cash shortfall. 
Cash inflows might be increased through improved resource 
management, leading to higher rates of returns. Off-farm income could 
be augmented by increasing the hours worked off-farm, changing jobs to 
receive a higher salary, or ensuring that nonfarm financial investments 
earn the highest possible rate of return. %us, a negative NCF could be 
offset by a corresponding increase in OFI: 
eOFI = -NCF. (8) 
Asset restructuring 
Asset restructuring alternatives include; 
1. Changing the amount of owned and rented assets. %e number of 
acres operated could be increased by renting additional land, 
thus increasing farm income as long as earnings from the 
additional acres exceeds rental costs. 
2. Trading low return assets for higher return ones. 
3. Giving asset title to the contract holder or lender. 
Eliminating a debt obligation by giving (jqp an asset with a lien 
could be an easy way to eliminate cash flow problems. 
4. Selling highly leveraged assets (partial liquidation). 
5. Sale-leasebacks of assets. 
"Die amount of assets to be sold to reduce d^t to a serviceable level 
depends on the size of the cash shortfall, the rate of return earned by 
the assets, the cash recovery rate, and the debt servicing costs. 
Ihe extent of scaling back of the operation that would occur if the 
sale of assets were the only means of restructuring is: 
@Ao = NCF/(Rop - alpba*(i + p)) (9) 
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vdiere @Ao = assets liquidated 
alpha = @D/@Ao 
= average cash recovery rate from liquidated assets. 
The cash recovery rate, alpha, also reflects transaction costs such as 
taxes and broker's fees incurred in the liquidation process. If assets 
are sold for an amount less than listed on the balance sheet, then the 
amount of debt that can be retired fran the sale of assets is less than 
a dollar for dollar exchange, i.e., aljiia is less than one. 
The illustrative farm operator vâio owns assets valued at $700,000 
and has a cash shortfall of $3,000 would be required to sell $44,444 of 
asset to break even if the cash recovery rate is 85 percent: 
= -$3,000/(0.06 - 0.85*( 0.10 + 0.05)) 
= $44,444. 
The Scile of assets reduces the income generating capacity of the farm 
and results in a loss of incone of $2,667 (0.06*$44,444) and thus an 
addition to the cash shortfall. Since assets valued at $44,444 sell for 
a lesser amount given a cash recovery rate less than one, $37,777 in 
cash is raised (alpha*@fio) with asset sales. Reducing d^t by $37,777 
reduces interest and principal due, (0.10+0.05) *D, by $5,667 and so 
eliminates the cash shortfall. 
If the assets could be sold and leased back, thus ranaining under 
the control of the operator and earning income for the farm, then the 
asset sale requiranent is less (assuming the cash rental rate, c, is 
less than the rate of return to the asset, R^p) : 
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@Ao = NCr/( c - alpha*(i + p)) (10) 
where c is the cash rental rate. @Ao gives the amount of assets that 
would have to be sold and leased back at a positive net rate of return 
to exactly meet cash flow needs. Using the example of the farm operator 
with a cash shortfall of $3,000, if cash rental rates are 5 percent of 
the asset's value then: 
0Ao = -$3,000/(0.05-(0.85*(0.10 +0.05)) 
= $38,710. 
Note that future incone earnings are lowered by the difference in 
earnings from owned and rented assets: 
Debt restructuring 
Debt restructuring might involve negotiation with the lender for a 
longer repayment period, deferred principal or interest payments, 
addition of unpaid operating loans into real estate mortgages, lower 
interest rates, or a write-down in outstanding loan principal. If the 
operator were able to convince the lender to write down or discharge 
some of the outstanding debt, the amount of d^3t that would have to be 
discharged for the operator to break even is: 
@FI = c*eAr (11) 
@D = NCF/(-(i + p)) (12) 
For the illustrative farmer, the change in debt required is: 
§D = -$3,000/(-(0.10 + 0.05)) 
= $20,000 
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With a write down of principal from $200,000 to $180,000, interest and 
principal due is reduced by $3,000, the amount of the cash shortfall. 
Debt restructuring possibilities may be limited by disincentives to the 
lender. If additional credit is imprudently extended to insolvent farm 
debtors and liquidation is delayed, the total loss to creditors at 
liquidation may be greater. 
"Hie feasibility of restructuring alternatives depends on individual 
circumstances and the initial allocation of resources in the firm. The 
alternatives are viable only if the opportunity for change exists. In 
some situations, the farm family having been financially pressed for 
several years, may have availed themselves of most opportunities to 
change. If family consumption has already been decreased to a minimum, 
all debt restructuring possibilities have been exhausted, and rental 
land is not profitable then the only remaining alternative, sale of farm 
assets to retire outstanding debt, may be forced on the farm family. If 
debt and asset restructuring have been atteoqpted and still the farm 
business is financially failing then total liquidation or bankn^tcy can 
be used to exit farming. 
Firm growth 
Farms with cash surpluses, instead of being forced to restructure, 
may have the OK»rtunity to expand the asset base of the firm. From 
equation (5), the amount of assets that a firm with a positive cash flow 
can theoretically acquire is expressed as: 
gAo = NCF/ ({i + p) - Rop)). (13) 
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This assumes the operator willingly takes on debt to purchase as many 
assets as projected income and cash flow constraints allow. A farm with 
a cash surplus of $3,000, an average rate of return of 6 percent, an 
average interest rate of 10 percent, and a principal repayment rate of 5 
percent could purchase $33,333 in assets: 
@Ao = $3,000/{(0.10 + 0.05) - 0.06) 
= $33,333. 
Simulation 
The cash flow model is used in simulating farm operators adaptation 
and response to changes in economic conditions or government policy. 
Simulation is an empirical technique used to assess or predict the 
outcome of different courses of action or policies and does not require 
an objective function to be optimized. It consists of a logical-display 
of decision processes and decision criteria. Agrawal and Heady (1972) 
list 7 essential features of a problem formulated in a simulation 
framework: 
1. Specification of a mathematical and logical model representing 
the real world situation. 
2. Collection and processing of data to be fed into the model. 
3. Estimation of parameters from data and evaluation of both the 
parameter estimates and the as suctions underlying the model. 
4. Testing the validity of the mathematical model. 
5. Development and testing of the ccxnputer model. 
6. Conducting experiments by operating the model. 
7. Analyzing the results and evaluation of policies. 
61 
Steps 1-4 as applied to this research project are detailed in this 
chapter. Results from computer runs are summarized and discussed in 
Chapter IV and more analysis and evaluation of policies is presented in 
Chapter V. 
Program Hierarchy 
Individnals with projected negative net cash flows 
In reality, the adjustment possible through one component of NCF 
may be bounded and the adjustments might follow a general sequence which 
holds for all operators (Figure 7). For instance, a reduction in family 
living expenditures might be the first adjustment made and the sale of 
assets might be the measure of last resort in all cases. In the 
computer program, individuals with negative NCF and insufficient equity 
for attaining new loans to cover shortfalls restructure assets and/or 
debt so that interest payments can be made. In each case the minimum 
amount of restructuring needed to break even is assumed to occur — the 
required amount allows them to achieve a satisficing level. 
The assumed sequence of restructuring events for farms with 
negative NCF is as follows (Figure 7): 
1. CONS is reduced to a minimum vdiich varies by geographic region. 
2. OFI is increased. This assumes that the (^rator or some 
member of the family of wodcing age is initially underanployed 
and could find an off-farm job or could increase hours or 
salary in other cases to improve OFI. Or, it could mean that 
the rate of return on off-farm investments increases. 
3. Rates of return (R^) are improved through cost control and 
improved management. 
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Assets 
Net faim cash inccme Off-fann inccme 
Total cash income 
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rates of return 
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Increased asset rentals 
- Asset purchases 
Sale/leaseback of assets 
Sale of assets 
Bid-of-year assessnent 
Continue Exit 
Figure 7. Outline of model hierarchy 
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4. Additional assets are rented to increase farm earnings if rates 
of return to operated assets exceed cash rental rates. 
5. Assets are sold and leased back with proceeds from asset sales 
used to retire debts if it is profitable to maintain control of 
the assets. 
6. Assets are sold and the operator leaves farming if all efforts 
to restructure fail and the operation shows no immediate 
potential for a financial turnaround. 
Uie sequence itself (up to sale of assets) does not constrain 
restructuring. The outcome would be the same if each of the 
restructuring options occurred simultaneously. The only difference 
would be in the source of additional funds for individual farms. 
Lenders are assumed to refrain from foreclosing if the farm is not 
failing financially. Farm financial failure in the simulation occurs if 
any one of three criteria are met: 
1. The current market value of assets is less than outstanding 
debt, or equivalently, the debt-to-asset ratio exceeds alpha, 
the cash recovery rate reflecting asset values at the time of 
sale. These farms are technically insolvent. 
2. All operator owned assets are sold to project a positive cash 
flow. 
3. The ratio of NCF to equity is less than -0.2. A negative NCF 
of this size would quickly add to debt and erode remaining 
equity. The farm would be expected to fail financially within 
several years. 
These farms which are technically insolvent, own no assets, or have 
severe financial prcrfDlems as indicated by the NCF to equity ratio are 
assumed to exit the industry at the end of the year in vdiich they are 
defined as financial failures. 
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Policy targets 
From NCF calculations, operators can be classified into three 
categories: 
1. Farms with positive cash flow. 
2. Farms with negative cash flow who are able to make full 
interest payments but not full principal payments 
3. Farms with negative cash flow who are unable to make full 
interest payments and make no principal payments. 
Interest payments are assumed to take first priority after rental and 
family living expenses and so principal payments are a residual. 
Financial aid programs are targeted at the third category of operators 
— those farms not making interest or principal payments. Figure 8 
shows the hierarchy incorporating eligibility requirements and 
intervention policies. If restructuring opportunities exist, farms 
avail themselves of those opportunities before eligibility for programs 
is determined. If they still have negative NCF and are not paying 
interest, then they may be able to benefit from public intervention to 
alleviate financial stress. 
Individuals with projected positive net cash flows 
A different series of steps is assumed for the operators with 
positive cash flow. Federal income taxes are paid first. Then family 
living expenditures increase at a rate determined by a regional marginal 
propensity to consume (Richardson, 1981) up to a maximum of $30,000. 
Cash remaining after taxes are paid and additional family living 
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Figure 8. Outline of model hierardy fcr operators with negative NCF 
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expenses are paid is invested in farm assets, adding to the income 
generating potential of the firm. 
End-of-vear assessment 
At year's end, an individual * s principal payments are deducted from 
beginning debt. If restructuring and policy benefits have not generated 
enough income for the farm to cash flow, interest or family living 
expense shortfalls are added to debt. Farms in the survey which fail 
financially are removed from the sample at the end of the year of 
simulation in which they fail. 
NCT calculations for the individual operators are summed to 
determine sample estimates of principal and interest shortfalls and 
percentages of operators, assets, and debts falling in a particular 
category. Sector interest shortfalls are estimates of the difference 
between interest due and interest paid based on the summation of the 
differences on individual farms. Similarly, principal shortfalls for 
the conmiercial farm sector indicate the difference in principal due and 
principal paid based on the percentage difference projected from the 
sample. Total credit repayment shortfalls are the sum of interest and 
principal payment shortfalls. Principal shortfalls are always larger 
than interest shortfalls since interest payment is assumed to take 
priority over principal repayment in the model. 
Sector results 
Asset percentage figures are expressed as a percent of total sample 
assets, debt figures as a percent of total sample debt, and operator 
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figures as a percent of total sanç)le operators within a region. The 
sampip percentages are multiplied by sector estimates of the number of 
commercial operators and the value of assets and debts owned by them to 
project number of operators or dollar value of assets and debts in a 
given category. 
Statistics reported in the tables in Chapters IV and V are defined 
below: 
1. The percent of assets sold includes assets sold by farms 
that fail financially and assets sold by farms as part of the 
restructuring process to remain viable. 
2. "Hie percent of debt liquidated is debt held by financially 
failing farms and debt retired as part of the restructuring or 
repayment process. 
3. Debt written off is the amount of debt that remains after 
proceeds from asset sales are applied to debt retiraient on 
financially failing farms. 
4. T5ie percent of operators selling out shows the fraction of 
total operators which are operators of financially failing 
farms, farms that cannot be restructured. 
5. The percent of operators scaling back includes operators who 
sell assets to reduce debt but maintain ownership of at least 
some assets. 
6. Operators with negative NCF before selling assets is the sum of 
operators selling out and operators scaling back to project a 
positive cash flow. 
7. The percent of operators with negative NCF after restructuring 
indicates the perçant of operators who are unable to meet all 
financial obligations even after restructuring and includes the 
percent of operators selling out. 
8. The percent of operators with positive NCF after restructuring 
indicates the portion of the population that is able to pay all 
current obligations given an oRiortunity for restructuring. 
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9. The fraction of financially stressed operators (operators with 
negative NCF) who are able to make timely payment of current 
expenses after restructuring can be calculated by dividing the 
percent of operators with positive NCF after restructuring in 
any restructuring scenario by the percent of operators with 
negative NCF after restructuring in the ZERO scenario. 
Limitations of the Model 
The model looks at the effects of leverage, cash flow constraints, 
and income on survivability. Observation of real world tactics serves 
as the basis for hypotheses about economic behavior. No real decision 
theory for individuals is involved since the strategies for 
restructuring do not vary individually. Changes in financial position 
are restricted to responses to stress for individuals with negative NCF 
and to accumulation of assets for operators with positive NCF. 
Operators do not otherwise change tenancy positions or management 
procedures. 
For expediency and simplicity, the farm sector environment and non-
agricultural economy is treated coarsely. Interactions among farm 
operators and several feedback relationships depicted in Figure 6 are 
excluded from the model, reducing the endogeneity of the micro-, macro-
linkage. Most other relationships are greatly simplified. The ii#acts 
of the agricultural input maricet and output market are reflected in the 
rates of returns and asset appreciation (devaluation) estimates. The 
nonfarm sector impacts OFI, while norms and beliefs affect CONS and 
initial debt levels. The federal government influences rates of return, 
taxes, and may implement stress alleviation policies. Financial 
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institutions impacts on the farmer are included in costs of credit and 
repayment terms. Asset markets are assumed to function regardless of 
volume of assets sold and rental markets are assumed to provide rentals 
as needed for increasing the size of operation as a response to stress. 
an attaipt was made to estimate equations analogous to profit 
equations developed in duality theory. Equations were estimated fran 
survey data to project cash profit with cash income above variable costs 
hypothesized to be a function of fixed ii^ts, namely, assets, manage­
ment skills, geograjiiic location, farm type, and demographic 
characteristics of the farm. D^jendsit variables tested included net 
cash income, net cash rate of return to owned assets, net cash income 
per acre operated, and net cash income per acre owned. The two 
conponents of net cash income, gross sales and cash operating eqsenses 
were also estimated s^sarately and on a per acre basis. Attenpts were 
made to estimate incone by farm type and by sales class. Linear, 
quadratic, and Cobb-Douglas functions were fitted. 
It was h(%)ed that equations could be estimated ^ diich would indicate 
returns to assets by type. These estimates, could have been used to 
determine vMch assets would be liquidated first or v^ch assets would 
provide the biggest return on investment for growing farms. However, 
the estimated equations proved unsatisfactory for use in modeling the 
dynamics of financial transition in agriculture (see the J^ça^dix for 
more detail). It may be that the survey sample was too small to provide 
the information needed to specif equations reflecting differences in 
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incane by type of farm, location, or size of farm. Or, the inherent 
heterogeneity of the farms in the cross-sectional sanple may have 
prevented the statistical capture of the significance of certain 
characteristics. 
Data and Parameter Estimation 
Rather than construct representative farms that reflect typical 
debt and asset positions for different types and sizes of farms, a 
sample of U.S. farm operators is used as a basis for analysis. NCF is 
projected for individual farms using information frcm the survey on 
value of assets owned, assets rented, d^t, and off-farm income, using 
actual surv^ data provides a single practical method for embodying the 
heterogaieous attributes of the farm peculation. Because each 
operator's currait asset holdings and financial position play an 
important role in determining future business pEçortunities, especially 
in the short run, it is important to begin with a unique mix of d^ts, 
assets, and socioecononic characteristics r^resentative of individual 
farm hous^olds. By typifying farm units or assuming honogeneous -firms, 
responses to financial stress could be grossly miscalculated and the 
costs to individuals would likely be lost in the aggregation. 
The farm enterprise mix as indicated in the surv^ responses is 
maintained throu^out the simulation. This seems reasonable in the 
short run because of potentially large investments in assets v^ch are 
enterprise specific and could not be readily exchanged or converted to 
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different capital investments. Producers have assumingly chosen the 
utility maximizing enterprise combination and will be forced to live 
with it even if economic conditions change in the short run. 
Farm Journal survey results 
In the NCF equation, initial values for AQ, d, aid OîT are taken 
from survey responses. Data used are the results of a random sample of 
U.S. farmers surveyed in January, 1985, by Farm Journal, Iowa State 
University, and the University of Missouri (Farm Journal Magazine and 
FAPRI Staff, 1985). The sample of 8,000 operators was drawn from the 
Farm Journal data base of 1.3 million active farmers. Equal numbers of 
operators were sampled from the four regions: East, South, Central, and 
West (Figure 2). Information on the financial maketp of the farm was 
limited to the 1983 value of gross sales, cash operating expenses, 
percentage of sales from various enterprises, off-farm income, stocks of 
owned real estate, machinery, livestock and other assets, outstanding 
liabilities, acres owned and acres operated. Approximately 20 percent 
of the surveys were returned. For this project, the data from 731 valid 
responses from commercial farm operators (those with sales of $40,000 or 
more) are used. 
The usual caveats on survey data are ^jplicable to the Farm Journal 
data. Biases in survey data may occur because of the sampling 
procedure, a respondent's lack of information, a biased survey 
instrument or because of a lack of respondence by individuals. A random 
sampling procedure was used to minimize bias in the sampling procedure. 
Information bias may exist because of errors in the operator's estimate 
of the current market value of assets or past income and expenses, or 
because the survey question was misinterpreted. A comparison of the 
Farm Journal survey results to Farm Costs and Returns Survey results 
(National Economics Division, 1985b) indicates that the Farm Journal 
survey respondents are most representative of commercial U.S. farm 
operators (those with sales exceeding $40,000). Tables 4 and 5 provide 
information on the Farm Journal (FJ) survey data for commercial farms 
where conanercial farms are defined as farms with gross sales of $40,000 
or more from farm sources. 
Balance sheet statistics Table 4 lists balance sheet 
statistics by region and by debt-to-asset ratio (see Figure 1 for 
regional boundaries). Because the sample was drawn equally from the 
four regions and is not a random U.S. sample, regional FJ output is 
weighted using U.S.D.A. numbers of commercial operators, assets and 
debts by region to derive a U.S. value. A column labeled FCRS lists 
balance sheet statistics for comnercial farms by region as calculated 
from the U.S.D.A.'s 1985 Farm Cost and Return survey results. Within a 
region, farms in the FJ data set control more assets and have higher 
debt levels on average than FCRS farms. Average debt-to-asset ratios by 
region for the two samples are similar. Table 4 indicates that farms in 
the West region are significantly larger than farms in other regions in 
terms of the average asset value per farm. Farms in the South are 
generally larger than farms in the East or Central regions. Average 
Table 4. Average financial position of commercial operators in Farm Journal sample 
by debt-to-asset ratio (DAR) 
Debt-to-asset ratio (percent) 
Region 0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ All F.C.R.S.a 
EAST 
Assets $598,851 $535,688 $527,690 $373,625 $555,000 $419,049 
Debts $16,969 $135,129 $261,206 $334,484 $111,327 $96,565 
Net worth $581,882 $400,559 $266,484 $39,141 $443,673 $322,484 
DAR (%) 2.83 25.23 49.50 89.52 20.06 23.04 
SOUTH 
Assets $870,659 $846,759 $465,673 $216,683 $716,101 $627,844 
Debts $12,045 $205,247 $248,189 $218,583 $152,756 $127,496 
Net worth $858,614 $641,512 $217,484 ($1,900) $563,345 $500,348 
DAR (%) 1,38 24.24 53.30 100.88 21.33 20.31 
CENTRAL 
Assets $599,895 $657,841 $616,603 $350,580 $572,991 $496,404 
Debts $11,823 $165,527 $333,188 $341,602 $197,302 $157,207 
Net worth $588,072 $492,314 $283,415 $8,978 $375,689 $339,197 
DAR (%) 1.97 25.16 54.04 97.44 34.43 31.67 
WEST 
Assets $1,047,738 $1,264,257 $1,144,096 $542,933 $1,098,232 $978,628 
Debts $42,215 $267,189 $626,789 $465,444 $274,987 $246,890 
Net worth $1,005,523 $997,068 $517,307 $77,489 $823,245 $731,738 
DAR (%) 
tl C 
4.03 21.13 54.78 85.73 25.04 25.23 
U # w # 
Assets $763,815 $827,129 $684,080 $358,247 $719,540 $581,844 
Debts $18,147 $191,821 $371,261 $341,959 $199,726 $156,446 
Net worth $745,668 $635,308 $312,819 $16,288 $519,814 $425,398 
DAR (%) 2.38 23.19 54.27 95.45 27.76 26.89 
^Baum, 1986. 
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Table 5. Distribution of conmercial operators^ assets, and ddsts in 
Farm Journal sairple 
Region Debt-to-asset ratio (percent) 
Percent 
0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ of U.S.' 
EAST 
Operator 45.57 33.54 15.82 5.06 8.19 
Assets 49,17 32.38 15.04 3.40 5.90 
Debts 6.95 40.72 37.12 15.21 5.05 
SODIH 
Operator 32.20 38.14 19.49 10.17 23.76 
Assets 39.15 45.09 12.68 3.08 25.63 
Debts 2.54 51.24 31.67 14.55 19.36 
CEETTRAL 
Operator 26.85 30.56 23.15 19.44 55.50 
Assets 28.11 35.08 24.91 11.90 47.35 
Debts 1.61 25.63 39.09 33.67 55.78 
WEST 
Operator 33.47 38.91 17.57 10.04 12.56 
Assets 31.93 44.79 18.31 4.96 21.12 
Debts 5.14 37.81 40.06 17.00 19.81 
U.S. 
Operator 30.49 33.66 20.98 14.88 100.00 
Assets 32.99 39.54 19.80 7.67 100.00 
Debts 2.76 33.76 37.75 25.73 100.00 
'• h F.C.R.S.° 
Operator 34.55 34.44 19.08 11.92 100.00 
Assets 38.56 36.26 17.33 7.86 100.00 
Debts 3.27 32.78 34.18 29.79 100.00 
^aum, 1986. 
Ttooncmic Research. Service, 1985c. 
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debt levels are also hic^est in the West but the Central region's 
average exceeds that of the South and East. The debt-to-asset ratio 
average is hi^est for the Central region at about 34 percent compared 
to 20 to 25 percent for other regions. The weic^ited d^t-to-asset ratio 
for the U.S. from the sanple is 27.76 percent. 
Operator, asset, and dd3t distributions Table 5 shows the 
distributions of ccximercial operators and the assets and debts 
controlled by commercial operators in the FJ sample fcy region and by 
debt-to-asset ratio. Since the sanple was drawn equally from the four 
regions, the regional estimates are wei^ted using FCRS data to derive 
national estimates. As can be seen from this table more than half of 
the nation's cmmercial farms, nearly half of the assets held 
ccmnercial farm cçerators, and more than half of the d^t held 
ccmmercial farm operators is in the Central region. As a result, 
national statistics are heavily influenced by conditions in the Central 
region. %e sample shews a larger share of the operators, assets and 
ddsts in the Central region fall in the financially stressed 
dd3t-to-asset ratio category (40 to 70) and in the severely stressed 
category (70+). More than 42 percent of the operators in the Central 
region fall in the two financially stressed categories and these 
cçerators control 72 percent of the ddDt in this region. 
For the U.S., 35 percent of the comnercial operators fall in the 
stressed categories and control 63 percent of the farm debt held by 
commercial operators. The debt held ty financially stressed operators 
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is backed by 27 percent of the assets held by commercial operators. 
Almost no debt is held by 30 percent of commercial operators in the U.S. 
and they own 33 percent of the assets held by commercial operators. 
Assets rented FJ sample results indicated the number of acres 
rented but not the value of acres rented. As a proxy for the value of 
rented assets, the number of acres rented was multiplied by an average 
real estate value. The average real estate value was either the farm's 
average real estate value or the state average real estate value. The 
farm's average real estate value was calculated by dividing the value of 
real estate assets owned by the number of owned acres. Some farms had 
high valued real estate assets (for instance, a house) and few acres 
owned, causing a very high average real estate value. Rented land would 
not be expected to have this same high value on average. Therefore, the 
farm's average real estate value was compared to the state average value 
per acre of land and buildings (Economic Research Service, 1984a}. If 
the farm's average real estate value.was twice the state average or less 
than one-half of the state average, then the state average value per 
acre of land and buildings was used in calculating the value of assets 
ranted. If the farm's average real estate value fell within these 
bounds, then the farm's average value was used in calculating the value 
of assets rented. 
Rates of return to operated assets Both the FJ sample and FCRS 
data yield average cash rates of return before principal and interest to 
owned assets of ccmnercial operators of about 6 percent. Rqp, the rate 
of return to operated assets before principal and interest, is estimated 
from income and asset data in the FJ survey along with cash rental rates 
reported in Farm Real Estate Market Developments; Outlook and Situation 
Report (Economic Research Service, 1985a): 
Rop = (FI + c*Ar)/(Ao + Ar) (14) 
where FI = farm income 
= gross sales - cash operating expenses. 
Thus, the costs of production are assumed to be the same on owned and 
rented land. Differaices in income depend on the land acquisition cost, 
either (i + p) for owned land if purchased with borrowed money or c, the 
cash rental rate, if land is leased. The average cash rate of return to 
operated assets for the U.S. was 6.58 perçait. 
Rop averages were estimated by region (ELast, South, Central, and 
West) and by size of farm in an attempt to develop relatively 
homogeneous groups for which income aggregation bias is minimized (Table 
6). Two to four size classes per region were used depending on the 
number of observations per region. Rgp was highest on average in the 
Central region at 7.35 percent and was lowest in the West at 5.16 
percent. In all regions, as the size of operation increased, average 
R(^ declined. This result is somewhat unexpected since most studies of 
farm income show constant or increasing returns to size. Declining 
average rates of return could reflect decreasing income per unit or 
increasing costs per unit, perh^s due to labor and management 
constraints. Or perhaps the average rate of return to operated assets 
Table 6. Estimated cash rates of return to operated assets by region 
and size of operation^ 
Assets 
operated Number of 
(thousands observations 
Region of dollars) in sample Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
East < 450 54 7.56 7.11 6.65 
450-700 55 5.24 4.93 4.61 
> 700 49 4.61 4.34 4.05 
South < 063 59 6.46 6.00 5.60 
> 063 59 5.07 4.77 4.46 
Central < 457 54 9.05 8.51 7.96 
457-730 54 7.57 7.12 6.66 
730-1239 54 7.33 6.09 6.45 
> 1,239 54 5.46 5.14 4.80 
West < 506 60 6.63 6.24 5.83 
506-1,019 60 5.96 5.61 5.24 
1,019-1,964 60 4.05 4.56 4.27 
> 1,964 59 3.19 3.00 2.01 
^Rates of return for Year 1 are estimated frcxn FJ sample data. 
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is declining even though the farm rate of return increases as operated 
assets increase. Another possible explanation is that the smaller farms 
are a different type of farm than the larger farms. For instance, 
livestock farms might be smaller than crop farms in terms of assets 
operated and might generate higher rates of return. Finally, some 
previous studies may have attributed income earned by rented assets to 
woned assets, thus overstating income to owned assets and perhaps 
leading to increasing income with farm size. 
In projections over time, rates of return are tied to FAPRI 
projections of cash inccwne before interest (Runewicz, 1985). Net cash 
income is more stable over time.than net farm income and is a better 
predictor of the sector's ability to meet current financial obligations. 
Net cash income before interest for the agricultural sector was 
projected to be $59.2 billion for 1985, $55.4 billion for 1986, and 
$51.8 billion for 1987. Rates of return for a given farm are assumed to 
decline at the same rate as net cash income before interest for the 
sector. For instance, an Rgp of 6 percent in 1985 falls to 5.6 percent 
in 1986 and to 5.2 percent in 1987. 
Off-farm income OFI for commercial operators in the FJ sample 
averaged $8000. The average OFI figure declined as farm size measured 
by gross sales from farm products increased. For farms with sales of 
$40,000-9100,000, the mean OFI figure was $10,295 while farms with sales 
of more than $500,000 reported an average of $4,290 OFI. This contrasts 
with U.S.D.A. statistics (Economic Research Service, 1985b) which show 
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OFI increasing from $9,298 for farms with sales of $40,000-100,000 to 
$14,126 on farms with sales exceeding $500,000. 
Ebcogenous parameters 
Cash rental rates Cash rental rates were estimated from the 
Agricultural Land Values and Markets Outlook and Situation Report 
{Economic Research Service, 1985a) for ten production regions used by 
the U.S.O.A.: Northeast, Lake States, Com Belt, Northern Plains, 
Appalachia, Southeast, Delta, Southern Plains, Mountain, and Pacific. 
Rental rates are expressed as a percentage of land value (Table 7). The 
rates ranged from 3.2 percent in the Northeast to 8.3 percent in the 
Northern Plains. When used in the model for projections over time, cash 
rental rates remained the same, or declined if they exceeded R^p to one 
percentage point less than the cash rate of return. Although many of 
the farms may have had "share rents", there are no regional statistics 
on average costs per acre and so cash rental rates were used as a best 
estimate of rental costs. 
Cash recovery rates AlfAa, the cash recovery rate, determines 
the market value of farm assets when sold and is based on the change in 
farm real estate values reported by the U.S.O.A. (Economic Research 
Service, 1985a). AlgAa values used in the model are listed in Table 7. 
In the first year, alphas ranged frcm 95 percent in the East to 76 
percent in the Central region. In projections over time (except when a 
land holding company exists), the cash recovery rate was assumed to 
decline by 10 percentage points from the original value in the second 
Table 7. Estimated cash rental rates, cash recovery rates, and marginal 
propensities to consume by region (percents) 
Cash recovery rates Marginal 
Cash propensity 
rental to, 
U.S.D.A. region rates3 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 consume 
Northeast 3.20 94.09 84.09 79.09 41.8 
Lake States 6.53 61.00 71.00 66.00 14.1 
Corn Belt 7.36 75.60 65.60 60.60 24.6 
Northern Plains 8.33 77.00 67.00 62.00 39.9 
Appalachia 3.75 91.00 81.00 76.00 43.6 
Southeast 4.17 95.50 85.50 80.50 40.4 
Delta 5.80 91.00 81.00 76.00 17.5 
Southern Plains 3.92 85.50 75.50 70.50 18.8 
Mountain States 4.72 89.87 79.87 74.87 56.2 
Pacific 5.31 89.67 79.67 - 74.67 23.1 
ëCash rental rates are expressed as a percent of asset value. 
"Richardson, 1981. 
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year and an additional 5 percentage points from the original value in 
the third year of the projection. Thus, moderate declines in land 
values (or increases in transactions costs) are assumed for 1986 and 
smaller declines are assumed for 1987, reasonable assunptions if the 
land market has stabilized. When a land holding company is in place, 
land values are assumed to be stabilized by the reac^ buyer, arei cash 
recovery rates are constant over time. 
Interest and principal repayment rates Since the maturities and 
other terms of existing debt are not kncwn, the average interest rate 
and principal repayment rates are set at a constant 10 percent and 5 
percent, respectively. The 5 percent principal repayment rate implies 
that the average life of all loans not r^said in the year in ;Aich they 
are made is 20 years. An example from Jolly and Dqye (1985) helps 
clari^ this point: Suppose 75 percent of an operator's total d^t is 
intermediate or long term ddot with the other 25 percent to be repaid in 
the current year. Assume that one-third of the intermediate and long 
term debt (25 percent of the total) is intermediate ddst with a term of 
seven years and the remaining two-thirds (50 percKit of the total) is 
lœg term debt with a term of 35 years. The average principal repayment 
rate is .25/7 + .50/35 = .05. 
Consumption Family living ejçsenditures are assumed to be a 
minimum of $15,000 in all cases. For farms with a positive cash flew; 
family living açenses can increase up to $30,000 at rates determined by 
regional marginal prcpensities to consume estimated Richardson 
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(1981). Regional marginal propensities to consume are listed in Table 
7. The marginal propensities to consume range fran 14.1 percent in the 
Lake States to 56.2 percent in the Mountain States. 
Taxes Federal income tax estimates are made only for operators 
with positive NCF. Other operators are assumed to have no federal 
income tax liability. Taxable income for the farm in the computer 
program is defined as farm income less rental and interest expenses and 
deductions plus OFI. Tax rates were taken from 1985 Package X tables 
(Department of the Treasury, 1985). Four dependents were assumed for 
operators less than 45 years old or more than 65 years old; two 
dependents were assumed in other cases. 
Sector estimates of operators, assets, and debts on commercial farms 
The values for assets owned and debt held by commercial operators 
play an important role in this study since they are applied to sangle 
percentages from the simulation model to determine magnitudes of 
interest and principal shortfalls and volumes of assets being sold and 
debt being liquidated. Because of the in^rtance of the sector values, 
some discussion about the uncertainty of the total amounts is pertinent. 
Sector estimates of the number of farm operators, dollar value of 
assets, and amount of outstanding debt are subject to some measurement 
and sample error since they typically are based on the results of a 
nationwide survey. Since the U.S.O.A. annually contacts a large sample 
from the population of farm operators for its Farm Costs and Returns 
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Survey (FCRS), the statistics compiled by that agency are logical 
choices for use as sectoral estimates. 
The total number of commercial farm operators based on U.S.D.A. 
estimates is 636,456 (National Economics Division, 1985b). Total farm 
liabilities are approximately $210.8 billion and farm assets are valued 
at $951.7 billion (National Economics Division, 1985b). The sector 
figures contain both operator and landlord farm debt and assets. "Rie 
debt and assets of commercial farm operators is some portion of the 
total debt and assets of all farm operators, trtiich in turn is some 
portiMi of the sector figure. The results of the FCRS (National 
Economics Division, 1985b) indicate total assets of commercial operators 
are approximately $370 billion and total ddats of commercial farm 
operators sum to about $100 billion. These figures indicate that less 
than 40 percent of agriculture's assets and slightly less than half of 
the sector's debts are held by commercial operators. 
But, in the last Farm Finance Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
1982), 90 percent of the agricultural sector's debt is attributed to the 
operator and FCRS results indicate 82.92 percent of the farm operator 
debt is held by commercial farms (Jolly et al., 1985). Thus, the 
aggregate debt figure for commercial farm operators could be estimated 
as $210.8 X 0.9 x 0.8292 = $157.3 billion. Here, commercial farm 
operator debt is nearly 75 percent (0.9*0.8292) of the sector total. 
The figure for total assets owned by commercial operators can be 
determined in a similar fashion. 1984 agricultural assets totalled 
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$951.7 billion. The 1979 Farm Finance Survey (Bureau of the Census, 
1982) estimates that farm operators owned ^ {proximately 71 percent of 
agriculture's assets and FCRS results indicate 67.85 percent of operator 
assets are controlled by commercial farmers (Jolly et al., 1985). And 
so, the aggregate figure for assets owned by commercial farm operators 
is $995.8 X 0.71 x 0.6785 = $480 billion, or half of the sector total. 
Both of these estimates are significantly higher than the figures 
extracted from A.I.B. 495 (National Economics Division, 1985b). 
Given the uncertainty about aggregate figures for commercial farms, 
a third method of estimating the total value of assets and debts for 
commercial farmers was chosen. The average balance sheets from the FJ 
survey provide estimates of an average value of assets and debts 
controlled by a commercial farm operator in the U.S. Multiplying up 
from the balance sheet values by the number of commercial farm operators 
in the U.S. gives a value of $127 billion for debt ($199,726 x 636,456) 
and $458 billion for assets ($719,540 x 636,456). This method of 
estimating the aggregate values is consistent with the underlying sanqple 
values and falls within the range of other estimates. 
The sector values for assets and debts estimated from the FJ sample 
are applied to regional percentages to get regional values. Regional 
percentage distributions of commercial operators, assets, and debts are 
based CHI FCRS results (Baum, 1986). Table 8 lists the percent and 
number of commercial operators by region and the percent and value of 
assets and debts by region. 
Table 8. Sector estimates of operators, assets, and debts of commercial 
operators by region 
Elast South Central West U.S. 
Operators 
Percent a 8.19 23.76 55.50 12.56 100 
Number 52,126 151,222 353,233 79,939 636,456 
Assets 
Percent a 5.90 25.63 47.35 21.12 100 
Amount ($B) 27 117 217 98 458 
Debt 
Percent a 5.05 19.36 55.78 19.81 100 
Amount ($B) 6 25 71 25 127 
^Baum, 1986. 
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CHAPTEB IV. RESTRUCTURING REQUIREMENTS: SENSITIVITY TESTS 
AND BASELINE PROGRAM RESULTS 
A simulation program was designed to estimate likely magnitudes of 
restructuring in the agricultural sector resulting from the efforts of 
individuals to achieve a positive or breakeven cash flow. A number of 
scenarios were developed to examine the impact of various restructuring 
options — changes in off-farm income, rates of return earned, amount of 
assets owned and rented — on restructuring requirements. A baseline 
scenario is defined and used with interest rate and rate of return 
parameterizations and in projections over time of restructuring without 
public intervention. 
National Restructuring Requirements 
Table 9 gives national restructuring requirements required for 
commercial farms required to achieve some sustainable financial position 
assuming the only individual farm adjustment which can be made is 
partial or complete asset liquidation.1 Because of the focus on short 
run financial problems, the criterion in making these estimates was to 
achieve positive net cash flow. NCF is the net cash flow after all 
variable costs, debt service, family consumption, and off-farm income. 
In the longer run, income levels would have to be sufficient to replace 
coital and allow for savings or risk reserves. Because restructuring 
1 Statistics reported in the tables are defined in the section on 
sector results in Chapter III. 
Table 9. Liquidation required to service remaining debt from prolected cash flows under 
different cash recovery rate and rate of return assumptions and ZERO scenario 
(percents) 
Operators 
Debt Operators Operators with 
Assets Debt written selling scaling negative Assets 
Region sold liquidated off out back NCF purchased 
High rates of return to operated assets, high cash recovery rates 
East 5.77 29.84 0.82 1.90 27.85 29.75 11.60 
South 
Central 
West 
5.68 
24.44 
15.13 
28.09 
62.98 
60.08 
2.12 
4.34 
0.82 
6.78 
13.89 
3.35 
27.12 
31.94 
37.24 
33.90 
45.83 
40.59 
15.05 
16.27 
8.97 
U.S. 16.56 53.98 3.04 9.59 31.44 41.03 14.14 
Expected rates of return to operated assets, expected cash recovery rates 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
8.13 
8.07 
32.17 
19.45 
38.21 
35.39 
77.14 
69.70 
1.08 
2.71 
7.69 
1.13 
3.16 
9.32 
18.98 
5.44 
31.01 
27.12 
33.80 
39.33 
34.18 
36.44 
52.78 
44.77 
9.75 
12.57 
12.95 
7.47 
U.S. 21.89 65.62 5.09 13.38 32.99 46.37 11.51 
Low rates of return to operated assets, low cash recovery rates 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
11.59 
11.66 
40.94 
24.50 
48.65 
45.30 
89.07 
79.10 
1.62 
3.53 
10.10 
1.80 
5.06 
13.56 
20.83 
9.21 
37.34 
34.75 
40.28 
40.59 
42.41 
49.79 
8.06 
10.41 
10.45 
6.03 
U.S. 28.23 76.58 6.75 16.05 39.07 55.12 9.37 
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requirements are influenced fay rates of return to farm assets, the 
results are presented in a sensitivity table. 
%e estimates of total restructuring needs of the agricultural 
sector in Table 9 provide a "worst case" scenario in vrtiich operators, 
because of market conditions or individual circumstances cannot improve 
their financial position through changes in management, off-farm 
employment, or negotiations with the lender. Farms with negative NCF 
use proceeds from sale of assets to eliminate cash shortfalls. Cash 
proceeds from liquidation of assets after all transaction costs are 
equal to the cash recovery rate (Table 7) times the balance sheet value 
of the assets. Farm financial failure in the simulations occurs if any 
one of the three criteria listed earlier are met: 
1. The debt-to-asset ratio exceeds the cash recovery rate, i.e. 
the farm is technically insolvent. 
2. All operator owned assets would have to be sold to repay debt 
in a timely fashion. 
3. The ratio of NCF to equity is less than -0.2. 
Three cash rates of return to operated assets and cash recovery 
rate scenarios are simulated. A sing)le capitalization formula can be 
used to show that the recovery rate changes in direct proportion to 
changes in rates of return to the asset. Hence the assumed percentage 
changes in alpha and R^p are equivalent. The scenario with high rates 
of return to operated assets and high cash recovery rates uses rates 
that are ten percent higher than the expected rates listed in Tables 6 
and 7. The low return, low cash recovery rate scenario uses rates that 
are ten percent lower than the expected rates. 
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Given ejçjected rates of return and cash recovery rates, 
approximately 22 percent of the nation's cannercial agricultural assets 
would be liquidated so that operators could eliminate cash shortfalls 
(Table 9). The amount of assets sold (an estimated $100 billion) 
greatly e%:eeds historical sector annual average asset turnover rates. 
In 1984, farmland purchases were sli^tly more than $6 billion (BconcmLc 
Research Service, 1985a). 
Only half of the assets liquidated could be purchased other 
commercial farms given their capacity to eiçand and service ddat. Two-
thirds of the outstanding debt of ccnmercial operators would be retired, 
assumed by purchasers, or discharged. Approximately five percent of 
cocimercial operator d^t would be discharged following liquidation of 
failing farm businesses. 
About 46 percent of the operators have negative NCF. These 
operators sell assets to achieve a positive cash flew, either scaling 
bade or selling out. Althou^ the percentage of operators with a 
negative ÎCP seans quite hi^, statistics from the D.S.D.A. FCRS sançle 
are similar. Jolly et al. (1985) indicate 43 percent of coimercial 
farms have negative cash flows. 
More than 13 percent of the operators would have to liquidate 
ccxtpletely to resolve ddst and cash flow problems. The estimate of 
number of operators selling out due to farm failures is quite sensitive 
to the technical insolvency criterion. Since one of the criterion for 
farm failure is a ddst-to-asset ratio greater than the cash recovery 
rate, the assumptions about current market value of assets help 
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determine the number of farm failures. The cash recovery rate reflects 
the assumptions about the current market value of land. If, rather than 
using the cash recovery rate as the determinant of technical insolvency, 
a debt-to-asset ratio greater than one is used (a conservative 
criterion), the number of financially failing farms drops from 13 
percent to approximately 7.4 percent nationally. The U.S.D.Â. estimate 
of the percent of commercial farms with debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 
one is lower at 4.8 percent (Jolly et al., 1985). 
Restructuring requirements for the Central region are much more 
severe than the national average (Table 9). The Central region has the 
highest regional average cash rate of return to operated assets, but the 
lowest regional average cash recovery rate on sale of assets. With 
expected rates of return and cash recovery rates, nearly one-third of 
the assets of commercial operators are sold and more than three-fourths 
of the debt are liquidated in the Central region. More than half of the 
operators have a negative cash flow and almost 19 percent of the 
operators would have to be totally liquidated. 
Although the South and Vest regions initially have comparable 
percentages in stressed and severely stressed debt-to-asset ratio 
categories (Table 5), lower average rates of return and lower cash 
recovery rates make liquidation requirements greater in the West. In 
the West region, many operators (45 percent) have cash flow problems, 
but relatively few must sell out (Table 9), indicating that few 
operators are technically insolvent. 
Lower rates of return and cash recovery rates reduce the ability of 
farmers to service debt and increase the potential volume of liquidated 
assets. The amount of assets sold in restructuring increases from 22 
percent to 28 percent given a more pessimistic outlook for farm income 
(Table 9). The fraction of assets liquidated that could be purchased by 
existing farms drops to less than one-third (9.37 percent divided by 
28.23 percent). More than half of the operators are projected to have 
negative net cash flows (55 percent). An additional six percent of the 
farms would have to scale back and an additional three percent would 
sell out to project a positive cash flow. The amount of debt liquidated 
increases from two-thirds to three-fourths, with nearly 90 percent of 
commercial debt retired or assumed in the Central region. 
The combined impact of higher incomes and cash recovery rates is to 
improve cash flow, increase the debt servicing capability of the farm 
operator, and reduce the amount of assets sold to retire debt in 
restructuring (Table 9). The asset liquidation value falls to 16.56 
percent nationally and most of the assets liquidated could be purchased 
by existing commercial farm operators (14.14 percent). Nationally 41 
percent of the operators would have negative net cash flows before 
selling assets — nine percent of the operators would sell out and 32 
percent would scale back to eliminate cash shortfalls. 
These results indicate the magnitude of transition expected over 
time and demonstrate the sensitivity of results to assumed rates of 
return and cash recovery rates. Most financially stressed operators can 
attain a positive cash flow by scaling back (73 percent or more). With 
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higher rates of return, the ability of financially stressed operators to 
service debt is improved as is the ability of financially stable 
operators to purchase assets. But, even with optimistic income 
expectations, large amounts of assets and debts are expected to change 
hands when sale of assets is the only restructuring option. 
The restructuring requirements are underestimated if the 
assumptions that land values are maintained and that markets continue to 
function are not reasonable. The volume of assets changing bands when 
financially stressed farms sell assets as needed to cash flow suggest 
that market failure could occur and that assets would not sell. %ese 
results indicate the need for buying time for operators to restructure 
using existing markets and provide reason for public programs to ease 
farm transition while preventing agricultural market failures. 
Incremental Changes in Farm Controlled Variables 
No farm-level adjustments allowed 
In the ZERO scenario (Table 10), no iMividual farm adjustments to 
correct financial problems were allowed. Operators, because of maricet 
conditions or individual circumstances, cannot restructure the farm's 
debts or assets or otherwise inprove the farm's financial picture. 
Here, only financially falling farms sell assets or retire more debt 
than is annually retired throuçtfi timely principal repayment. (The 
simulation results in Table 9 assumed that all farms could sell assets 
to reduce debt to serviceable levels.) Farms with negative NCF but not 
classified as failing.have interest shortfalls added to outstanding 
Table 10. Effects of farm financial restructuring in the U.S. using a single means 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
ZERO 
8.71 
39.879 
27.82 
35.333 
7.06 
8.964 
17.09 
108,753 
Operators with negative NCF 
after restructuring 
Percent 46.37 
Number 295,139 
Operators with positive NCF 
because of restructuring 
Percent 0.00 
Number 0 
Interest shortfall($B) $3.874 
Principal shortfall($B) $4.255 
Total shortfall($B) $8.128 
OFIIO 
8.68 
39.739 
27.73 
35.216 
7.02 
8.917 
16.83 
107,117 
45.35 
288,616 
1 . 0 2  
6,522 
$3.835 
$4.229 
$8.065 
0FI5 
8.09 
37.073 
26.43 
33.568 
6.80 
8.634 
2.15 
13,699 
$3,467 
$4.115 
$7.582 
ROPIO 
7.63 
34.945 
25.25 
32.061 
6.45 
8.194 
ARENTIO 
8.61 
39.427 
27.65 
35.115 
7.02 
8.913 
5.35 
34,029 
$2.845 
$3.899 
$6.744 
0.51 
3,223 
$3.797 
$4.229 
$8.026 
AOWNIO 
10.74 
49.172 
34.23 
43.473 
6.68 
8.479 
15.44 14.56 16.32 16.05 
98,272 92,697 103,847 102,174 
44.22 41.03 45.87 41.95 
281,440 261,110 291,916 266,993 
4.42 
28,117 
$2.591 
$3.785 
$6.375 
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debt. Thus, not all farms end with a positive cash flow. These results 
then provide estimates of expected changes in the coming year as opposed 
to the total restructuring requirements of the sector*^-: 
The exit of 17 percent of commercial farms because of financial 
problems would result in the sale of 8.7 percent of the assets of 
commercial operators, nearly 6 percent of the agriculture sector's 
assets. This rate of turnover exceeds historical annual asset turnover 
rates of 3 to 4 percent, and, could result in a glut of land and 
machinery markets, downward pressure on asset prices, and problems in 
finding ready buyers for farm assets, contributing to additional 
financial stress on all farms. 
If 17 percent of the financially troubled farms exit the industry, 
nearly 28 percent of the outstanding debt of commercial operators is 
retired or shifted (Table 10). One-fourth of the debt liquidated (7 of 
28 percent) is written off because asset sales from failing businesses 
do not yield enough cash to retire debt. These debts vrtiich must be 
written off are a substantial loss to lenders, both in terms of 
immediate and future inccxne. In addition to the losses associated with 
written off debt, the lender's profits and return on assets decline 
because of interest and principal payment shortfalls. In the ZERO 
scenario, interest shortfalls are projected to be $3.8 billion and 
principal payment shortfalls are projected to be $4.3 billion, a total 
shortfall of $8.1 billion. 
Table 10 also provides estimates of projected shortfalls, debt and 
asset liquidations and the number of stressed operators assuming one 
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restructuring option at a time is allowed or occurs. Moderate changes 
in cash rates of return to operated assets, off-farm income, assets 
rented, and assets owned are individually tested to demonstrate the 
marginal impact of changes in these parameters on the projected results. 
Only operators with an initial negative NCF are allowed to increase OFI, 
farm earnings, or change the farm's control of assets in the simulation. 
Off-farm income 
Two changes in off-farm income (OFI) were tested for their impact 
on financially stressed farms. The OFIIO column in Table 10 shows 
results of allowing OFI on farms with a negative NCF initially to 
increase up to 10 percent or to the point at vrtiich the farm cash flows, 
whichever is least. The 0FI5 column demonstrates the impact of allowing 
OFI to increase by 5 percent or to $3,500 or to the cash flow point, 
whichever is least. Principal and interest shortfalls are only 
minimally reduced from those estimated in the ZERO case — from $8,128 
billion in the ZERO scenario to $8,065 billion in the OFIIO scenario to 
$7,582 in the 0FI5 scenario. Only a few operators (1 to 2 percent) are 
able to project a positive cash flow because of either of these changes. 
The percent of assets sold, debt liquidated, and debt written off 
decrease less than one percent with the allowed changes in OFI. 
An interesting note is that the 0FI5 allowance (a 5 percent 
increase in OFI or $3,500) does more to reduce shortfalls and provide 
positive cash flows than does a 10 percent increase in OFI (OFIIO). 
Hiis indicates that a significant number of the farms in the sample with 
negative cash flows have no OFI. A small OFI sum (a half-time job at 
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minimum wage) does more to improve the farm's finances than does a 10 
percent increase from an initial on of zero dollars. Thus, creation of 
jobs or off-farm job training in rural areas could be more valuable in 
terms of alleviating financial stress than higher wages in those areas. 
Cash rates of return to operated assets 
Improved cash rates of return to operated assets (Hop) on farms 
with a negative cash flow provide substantially more cash relief than a 
conçsarable percentage change in OFI. In RCFIO (Table 10), Rgp was 
allowed to increase up to 10 percent, equivalent to a 10 percent 
increase in net farm income before principal and interest payments. If 
a farmer owns and operates assets valued at $700,000 and earns an 
average rate of return of 6.5 percent on the assets, then farm income is 
$45,500. A ten percent increase in the RQP is equal to an increase of 
$4,550 in farm income. If the farmer operates 700 acres, the ten 
percent increase in R^p is equal to a $6.50 per acre increase in income. 
This result could presumably be achieved through cost control and 
improved farm management. If such an improvement were possible, an 
additional 5 percent of the operators would have breakeven or positive 
cash flows. 
Although the differential from the ZEM scenario is small, fewer 
assets are sold (7.6 percent versus 8.7 percent). Less debt is 
liquidated (25 percent versus 28 percent) and written off (6.45 percent 
versus 7.06 percent) than in the ZERO scenario. Fewer operators sell 
out (2.5 percent of the total number of operators) because fewer farms 
are financial failures by the NCF/equity criterion. The improved R^p 
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reduces the cash shortfall to less than 20 percent of equity on at least 
a few farms. Principal and interest shortfalls are reduced by almost 17 
percent ($1.4 billion) to approximately $6.7 billion. 
Asset rentals 
In the AREMTIO scenario (Table 10), farms with a negative NCF were 
allowed to increase assets rented by 10 percent of assets operated. A 
ten percent annual increase in the size of the farm operation was used 
to restrict growth to allow management skills to keep pace. A larger 
operated asset base allows some farm operators, those in regions where 
estimated rates of return to operated assets exceed cash rental rates, 
to generate more income vdiich can be used to service debt or cover 
family living expenditures. Because estimated cash rental rates are 
higher than rates of return on some farms in several of the more 
severely stressed regions (Table 7), the value of asset rentals as a 
restructuring tool is limited. 
The percent of assets and debt liquidated, debt written off, and 
operators selling out are quite similar to those in the OFIIO scenario 
and so are only sli^tly lower than those in the ZERO scenario. 8.6 
percent of ccmmercial farm assets are sold in AREliTlO compared to 8.7 
percent in ZE30. The percent of operators selling out is 16 percent in 
ARENTIO, one percent less than in the ZERO scenario. Very few operators 
are "made whole" with this change (approximately 0.5 percent). 
Asset sales 
To determine the effectiveness of limited asset sales in correcting 
financial problems, farms not cash flowing were allowed to sell a 
maximum of 10 percent of owned assets to reduce debt obligations and 
cover cash shortfalls in AONNIO (Table 10). Total asset sales in AOWNIO 
increase to almost 11 percent of the assets held by commercial 
operators. The percent of assets sold includes assets sold by failing 
farms (which is 100 percent of the farm's owned assets) and assets sold 
by farms that are restructuring (which will be less than or equal to 10 
percent of the farm's owned assets). An additional 4.4 percent of the 
commercial operators are able to project a positive cash flow by 
reducing debt and thus principal and interest obligations. The number 
of operators technically insolvent drops by one percent as some farms 
failing financially in the ZERO scenario are able to reduce negative 
NCF. Interest shortfalls decline to $2.6 billion and principal 
shortfalls to $3.8 billion. 
Note that these results are valid only if asset sales occur and 
current market values are maintained regardless of the volume of assets 
sold in a particular region. Financial improvements for farms and the 
farm sector would be smaller if assets either did not sell or received a 
lower price when sold because of a saturated market. 
Regional credit repayment shortfalls 
Table 11 breaks down the principal and interest shortfalls by 
region for the scenarios incorporating incremental changes. More than 
half of both principal and interest shortfalls occur in the Central 
region. This is not unexpected given that a majority of the farms are 
in the Central region and that average balance sheets and debt and asset 
distributions (Tables 4 and 5} indicate conditions are most severe in 
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Table 11. Credit repayment shortfalls by region 
(billions of dollars) 
Scenario 
ZERO 
OFIIO 
0FI5 
ROPIO 
ARENTIO 
AOWNIO 
Region 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
East 
South 
Central 
West 
U.S. 
Interest Principal 
$0.101 $0.445 $2.428 $0.900 $3.875 
SO.100 $0.435 $2.407 $0.893 $3.835 
$0.078 $0.380 $2.173 
SO.838 $3.468 
$0.071 
SO.310 
SI.740 $0.733 $2.845 
50.153 
50.413 
52.414 
50.890 
53.870 
$0.071 $0.310 $1.740 $0.733 $2.591 
SO.163 
SO.548 $2.634 $0.923 $4.267 
SO. 160 $0.540 $2.613 
SO.915 $4.228 
$0.150 
$0.520 
$2.535 
$0.905 $4.110 
SO. 137 
SO.480 $2.400 $0.873 $3.899 
$0.089 $0.535 $2.620 $0.918 $4.161 
30.137 
?0.480 
52.400 
50.873 
53.890 
Total 
$0.265 $0.993 $5.062 $1.823 $8.142 
$0,260 $0.975 $5.020 
$1.808 $8.063 
$0.228 $0.900 $4.707 $1.743 $7.578 
$0.209 $0.790 $4.139 $1.605 $6.744 
$0.242 $0.948 $5.034 
$1.808 
$8.031 
$0.182 $0.768 
S4.097 $1.338 $6.375 
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this region. Similar regional disparaties are evidenced in the 
condition of agricultural lenders. Melichar (1986) reports that the 
quality of loans at agricultural banks has deteriorated most r^idly in 
12 contiguous states in the western Com Belt, Great Plains (excluding 
Texas), and northern Rocky Mountain region. Seven of these 12 states 
are in the Central region used in this study. Losses at agricultural 
banks in this 12 state region were substantially higher than at similar 
banks nationally, with 2.7 percent of total loans being charged off. 
The number of potentially vulnerable agricultural banks rose noticeably 
in seven states in the Central region in 1985 (Melichar, 1986). Farm 
Credit System's losses have also largely been concentrated in the 
Central region (Omaha district) and the West (Spokane district)-
From Table 11, it appears to be true across regions that asset 
sales of 10 percent at market value do the most to reduce interest 
shortfalls of the incremental changes evaluated. Likewise, across 
regions a 10 percent increase in the rate of return to operated assets 
reduces the interest and principal shortfalls substantially while other 
incremental changes are similar in that only a few farms' financial 
problems are cured. A 5 percent increase in OFI or an increase to 
$3,500 is more beneficial than a 10 percent increase in OFI in all four 
regions. 
Restructuring Combinations of Farm Controlled Variables 
The combined effects of the external and internal environments and 
past decisions of the farm operator contribute to the current financial 
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condition of the farm firm. The availability of restructuring 
alternatives varies with general economic conditions. Given uncertainty 
about future farm incrane, market conditions, and availability of off-
farm jobs, some analysis of the sensitivity of results to assumed 
availability of restructuring alternatives is appropriate. Table 12 
reports the results from scenarios in which two or more changes in 
parameters as part of the restructuring process are allowed on farms 
with negative cash flows. These results demonstrate the expected 
magnitudes of change for the first year of the projection. 
Since the additional cash generated by restructuring is applied 
first to interest payments, interest shortfalls are significantly 
reduced. Some financially stressed farms not on the verge of failure 
may in^prove cash flow significantly with moderate restructuring changes 
but the financial condition of farms near failure are not significantly 
changed. The amount of assets sold, debt liquidated, and debt written 
off generally change only slightly regardless of the restructuring 
combination because most of the farms which were insolvent or failing in 
2ES0 are still insolvent, and their assets and debts are liquidated as 
before. Only in the case vrtiere restructuring is not constrained do the 
percentages of assets sold, debt liquidated, and operators with positive 
NCF because of restructuring change drastically. 
Increases in off-farm income and cash rates of return to operated assets 
In OFISROP (Table 12), OFI was allowed to increase as it was in the 
0FI5 scenario (a maximum of a 5 percent increase or a fixed OFI of 
$3,500) and the cash rate of return to operated assets was allowed to 
Table 12. Effects of farm financial restructuring in the U.S. using one or more means 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount{$B) 
ZERO 
8.71 
39.079 
OFI&ROP 
7.20 
32.961 
7.06 
8.964 
6.25 
7.938 
Operators with negative NCF 
after restructuring 
Percent 46.37 
Number 295,139 
Operators with positive NCF 
because of restructuring 
Percent 0.00 
Number 0 
Interest shortfall($B) $3.874 
Principal shortfall($B) $4.255 
Total shortfall($B) $8.128 
10.88 
69,220 
$2.515 
$3.683 
$6.198 
OFI&AR 
8.06 
36.933 
ROP&AR 
7.46 
34.170 
BASE BASE&AO 
7.17 
32.829 
6.77 
8.592 
Operators selling out 
Percent 17.09 13.43 15.18 
Number 108,753 85,487 96,636 
4.05 
25,771 
$3.404 
$4.064 
$7.468 
6.40 
8.127 
6.21 
7.880 
6.63 
42,177 
$2.781 
$3.823 
$6.604 
$2.464 
$3.620 
$6.083 
8.69 
39.796 
27.82 24.14 26.35 24.78 24.05 28.96 
35.333 30.654 33.460 31.469 30.538 36.775 
5.88 
7.464 
14.00 13.17 12.05 
89,092 83,851 83,851 
35.50 42.32 39.75 33.91 29.85 
225,918 269,367 252,962 215,824 189,998 
12.46 16.52 
79,315 105,139 
$1.638 
$3.035 
$4.674 
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increase a maximum of 10 percent as needed to cash flow. With more OFI 
and higher returns to farming, an additional 11 percent of the operators 
have positive cash flows and failure of a few farms (4 percent) is 
prevented, or at least postponed. Interest shortfalls are reduced by 
more than $1.3 billion to $2.5 billion, and principal payment shortfalls 
are reduced by nearly $0.6 billion to $3.7 billion. 
Increases in off-farm income and assets rented 
The OFI&AR column in Table 12 lists estimates of restructuring and 
remaining shortfalls when 0FI5 and ÂOP10 marginal changes can both 
occur. In this analysis, OFI increases by 5 percent or to $3,500. In 
addition, producers increase assets operated up to 10 percent by renting 
additional land and other assets to generate additional farm income and 
add to cash flow. Only 4 percent of the operators end the year with a 
positive NCF because of these moderate changes in OFI and assets rented. 
These two improvements are less effective in diminishing cash flow 
problems than either improved rates of returns (ROPIO) or limited assets 
sales (ÂOUN10) individually. Interest shortfalls fall by $0.5 billion 
to $3.4 billion and principal payment shortfalls decline from $4.3 in 
the ZERO scenario to $4.1 billion. 
Increases in cash rates of return and assets rented 
Operators with negative cash flows are able to increase the rate of 
return to operated assets up to 10 percent and to increase operated 
assets up to 10 percent by renting assets in the scenario labelled 
ROF&AR (Table 12). Since higher farm eaimings are one of the most 
effective single methods of responding to financial stress, and 
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increased asset rentals are one of the least effective methods, the 
combined effectiveness of the two methods is somewhat less than other 
combinations. Still in terms of number of operators with positive NCF 
after restructuring, the impact of the combination is larger than the 
sum of the two methods individually. An additional 6.6 percent of the 
operators have positive cash flows after having managed to improve rates 
of return and increase assets rented. Interest shortfalls are reduced 
by about $1 billion, principal shortfalls by $0.5 billion. 
Increases in off-farm income, cash rates of return, and assets rented 
Allowing incremental changes in OFI, and Ay further reduces 
the amount of restructuring that occurs at the sector level in terms of 
assets and debts liquidated and operators selling out (BASE in Table 
12). This combination of changes at the farm level comprises the 
baseline scenario and is used in comparisons with projections 
incorporating stress alleviation policies. Asset sales are not included 
as part of the process because selling assets is a more drastic measure. 
Given the projected amount of assets on the market due to the exit of 
failing farms, it is assumed that farms that can survive will hold on to 
assets in hopes of stabilizing the operation or receiving higher prices 
for assets sold. 
Regional results of BASE run 
From the BASE run, regional differences in numbers of operators in 
a given category and on restructuring needs are estimated (Table 13). 
Because of the concentration of farms, farm assets, and farm debt in the 
Central region, nearly half of the assets sold and two-thirds of the 
Table 13. Information on regional differences in expected restructuring for year 1 
with no intervention 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount {$B) 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
East 
3.44 
0.929 
15.21 
0.913 
1.68 
0.101 
5.70 
2,969 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 22.78 
Number 11,874 
Interest shortfall $0.047 
Principal shortfall $0.112 
Total shortfall $0.158 
South 
3.41 
3.990 
15.25 
3.813 
3.40 
0.850 
12.71 
19,223 
25.42 
38,441 
Central 
10.05 
21.809 
29.26 
20.775 
9.01 
6.397 
15.28 
53,966 
38.43 
135,747 
$0.238 $1.505 
$0.413 $2.258 
$0.650 $3.763 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount 
9.75 
2.633 
12.57 
14.707 
12.95 
28.102 
West 
6.32 
6.194 
20.20 
5.050 
2.19 
0.548 
9.62 
7,693 
37.24 
29,769 
$0.673 
$0.840 
$1.513 
7.47 
7.321 
U.S. 
7.17 
32.839 
24.04 
30.531 
6 .21  
7.887 
13.17 
83,821 
33.91 
215,822 
$2.464 
$3.620 
$6.083 
11.51 
52.716 
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agricultural debt retired with U.S. farm financial failures occurs in 
the Central region. As in the ZERO run, more than half of the total 
dd3t repayment shortfalls occur in the Central region. 
In addition to hi^ili^ting the incidoice of financial stress in 
the Central region. Table 13 makes apparaît the relative severity of 
conditions. In the Central region, one-tenth of the assets and 29 
percent of the debt of ccmnercial operators are liquidated as a result 
of operators leaving farming while in the East and South approximately 3 
percent of the assets are sold and 15 percent of the dd3t is liquidated. 
The West region shews intermediate percentages with 6 percent of the 
assets of connercial operators sold and 20 percent of the ââ>t 
discharged. The highest percentage of d^t written off (9 percent) is 
also in the Central region and in dollar terms, most of the canmercial 
agricultural d^t writtai off is in the Central region. 
Although the Central and South regions have the hi^est percentage 
of operators selling out, 15.28 and 12.71 percent respectively, and the 
largest nuirber of operators selling out, the Central and West regions 
have the highest percentage of operators with negative NCF (37-38 
percent). Once the percent of insolvent operators is subtracted from 
the percent of operators with cash shortfalls, the West region has the 
largest percent of operators remaining in business with cash shortfalls, 
perh^js indicating future solvency problems for a significant nunfcer of 
operators in the West region. 
The assets purchased figure (Table 13) indicates the potential of 
the sector to absorb agricultural asset sales within the sector. It 
108 
reflects the ability of solvent operators to purchase assets based on 
their current cash flew and equity position. Cie calculation is made 
using equation (13) for theoretical asset purchases. The figure 
r^xjrted nay represent an içper bound since it assumes all fanners would 
use debt to purchase assets when, in fact, many operators prefer not to 
use dd3t to ei^aand their operations. It also assumes that regardless of 
the age of the farm operator or his desire to retire, if finances 
permit, the operator will purchase assets. 
Assets sold by commercial farms failing financially could 
theoretically be purchased by existing catmercial farms in all regions. 
In all regions the percent of assets that could be purchased exceeds the 
percent of assets sold as insolvent operators exit the industry. The 
differential between assets purchased and assets sold is relatively 
small in the Central and West regions — three percent in the Central 
region and one percent in the West. 
Increases in off-farm income, cash rates of return, assets rented, and 
assets sold 
Asset sales of vç> to 10 percent in conjunction with the BASE run 
(6ASE&A0 in Table 12) means more assets sold and debt liquidated and 
more operators with a positive or break-even cash flow. 8.69 percent of 
the commercial operators' assets are sold, a percentage similar to that 
of the ZERO scenario. Fewer farms fail and so faer assets are sold ty 
farms exiting agriculture, but other farms are now selling assets {up to 
10 percent of owned assets) to correct financial problens. More than 
one-third of the financially stressed operators are able to project 
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positive cash flows after selling assets and reducing debt. Estimated 
interest shortfalls are half of ZE3%0 estimates at $1.6 billion and 
estimated principal shortfalls also drop significantly ($1 billion). 
Sensitivity of BASE Results to Cash Rates of Return 
Table 14 indicates the sensitivity of results to assumptions about 
prevailing cash rates of return to operated assets. %e first three 
columns show projections under low, expected, and high rates of return 
with no restructuring (the ZERO scenario) where low rates of return are 
90 percent and high rates of return are 110 percent of expected rates of 
return. The ZEROL column lists results for low rates of returns ; the 
ZEROH column shows results for high rates of returns. The percent of 
operators with negative NŒ~increases to 55 percent with low rates of 
return and decreases to 41 percent with higher rates of return. The 
biggest effect of lower (higher) rates of return is in higher (lower) 
numbers of operators with cash shortfalls and larger (smaller) interest 
and principal payment shortfalls. 
Like the results of incremental changes in farm controlled 
variables, this indicates that for stressed farmers, the farmers near 
breakeven are most affected by changes in economic conditions and that 
the biggest inçjact is on their ability to make interest payments. 
Insolvent farmers or those near insolvency are rarely saved financially 
by either improved returns or realistically bounded restructuring 
efforts. Changes in the returns to the farm sector also affect the 
Table 14. Rate of return sensitivity in ZERO and BASE scenarios 
LZERO ZERO HZERO LBASE BASE HBASE 
Assets sold 
Percent 9.92 8.71 7.63 8.09 7.17 6.35 
Amount($B) 45.436 39.879 34.945 37.073 32.829 29.083 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 30.50 27.82 25.25 26.44 24.04 22.07 
Amount($B) 38.737 35.333 32.061 33.576 30.537 28.027 
Debt written off 
Percent 7.83 7.06 6.45 6.83 6.21 5.67 
Amount($B) 9.943 8.964 8.192 8.671 7.880 7.202 
Operators selling out 
Percent 19.50 17.09 14.56 15.44 13.17 11.74 
Number 124,101 108,753 92,697 98,272 83,851 74,710 
Operators with negative NCF 
after restructuring 
Percent 55.12 46.37 41.03 43.92 33.91 28.11 
Number 350,819 295,139 261,110 279,542 215,824 178,926 
Operators with positive NCF 
because of restructuring 
Percent 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.20 12.46 12.91 
Number 0 0 0 71,277 79,315 82,184 
Interest shortfalKÇB) $4.940 $3.874 $2.845 $3.518 $2.464 $1.664 
Principal shortfall($B) $4.661 $4.255 $3.886 $4.115 $3.620 $3.048 
Total shortfall($B) $9.601 $8.128 $6.731 $7.633 $6.083 $4.712 
Assets purchased . 
Percent 9.37 11.51 14.14 9.37 11.51 14.14 
Amount($B) 42.915 52.716 64.761 42.915 52.716 64.761 
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purchasing power of solvent operators by reducing their ability to use 
and service debt. With low rates of return in the ZERO scenario, assets 
sold exceed the assets potentially purchased within the sector. In 
these circumstances, outside investment might be required to keep assets 
from failing farms in production. 
The last three columns in Table 14 show differences due to rate of 
return assumptions when financial restructuring except for asset sales 
is undertaken (the BASE scenario). Low rates of return (LEASE) increase 
the estimates of interest shortfalls by about $1 billion and principal 
shortfalls by about $0.5 billion. Conversely, high rates of return 
reduce interest shortfalls by $1 billion and principal shortfalls by 
$0.5 billion. Although higher average rates of return to operated 
assets benefit all farms, the farms which have positive cash flows 
because of higher rates of returns are those which were experiencing 
moderate and not severe financial stress. Other farms with negative NCF 
reduce accrued interest. Higher rates of return to failing farms merely 
reduce the losses to the lender in terms of debt and interest written 
off. 
Sensitivity of BASE Results to Interest Rates 
Sensitivity to changes in the interest rate assumption are 
demonstrated in Table 15 for the BASE run. Average interest rates of 8 
and 12 percent are compared to the BASE assumption of 10 percent. The 
percent of operators with negative NCF appears to be less sensitive to 
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Table 15. BASE scenario sensitivity to interest rates 
Interest rate 
i = 8 i = 10 i = 12 
Assets sold 
Percent 6.05 7.17 8.65 
Amount ($B) 27.709 32.839 39.617 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 21.16 24.04 27.82 
Amount($B) 26.873 30.531 35.331 
Debt written off-
Percent 5.70 6.21 6.87 
Amount($B) 7.233 7.887 8.725 
Operators selling out 
Percent 11.84 13.17 15.14 
Number 75,346 83,821 96,329 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 30.06 33.91 39.03 
Number 191,319 215,822 248,409 
Interest shortfall $1.461 $2.464 $3.785 
Principal shortfall $3.289 $3.620 $4.013 
Total shortfall $4.750 $6.083 $7.798 
Assets purchased 
Percent 15.84 11.48 8.95 
Amount ($B) 72.547 52.578 40.991 
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changes in the interest rate than to the rate of return to operated 
assets. The range for the percent of operators with cash shortfalls is 
30-39 percent for interest rates from -20 percent to +20 percent of the 
average interest rate of 10 percent; the range is 28-44 percent for 
rates of return ranging from -10 percent to +10 percent. 
Not surprisingly, interest shortfalls are larger with high interest 
rates than with low rates of return and lower with low interest rates 
than with high rates of return. Using average interest rates of 8 
percent rather than 10 percent in the simulation, interest and principal 
shortfalls are projected to be $4.75 billion, or $1.3 billion lower than 
the BASE shortfalls. Higher interest rates of 12 percent inçjly a $1.7 
billion increase in total shortfalls from the BASE shortfalls to $7.8 
billion. Obviously, changes in interest rates above or below the mean 
of 10 are not symmetric with higher interest rates increasing the 
financial burden of stressed farmers. 
National Restructuring Requirements 
Table 16 gives national restructuring requirements for commercial 
farms attempting to correct cash flow problems using BASE scenario 
assumptions. Financially stressed farms are able to isprove cash rates 
of return to operated assets, earn or increase off-farm income, increase 
assets rented by moderate amounts, and sell as many assets as needed to 
eliminate cash shortfalls. At the end of the year, farms are either 
able to project a positive cash flow or sell out, so debts and assets 
Table 16. Liquidation required to service remaining debt from projected cash flows under 
different cash recovery rate and rate of return assumptions and BASE scenario 
(percents) 
Debt Operators Operators 
Assets Debt written selling scaling 
sold liquidated off out back 
rates of return to operated assets, high cash recovery 
Region 
High 
East 3.23 
South 3.25 
Central 17.46 
West 11.95 
U.S. 11.01 
Expected rates 
East 4.76 
South 5.52 
Central 24.68 
West 16.05 
17.19 0.79 
16.49 1.27 
45.75 3.26 
47.71 0.74 
39.03 2.25 
of return to operated 
22.99 1.04 
23.91 2.38 
59.53 5.30 
58.36 0.97 
1.27 15.82 
3.39 16.95 
7.41 24.54 
2.51 30.54 
5.34 22.78 
Operators 
with 
negative Assets 
NCF purchased 
rates 
17.09 11.60 
20.34 15.05 
31.94 16.27 
33.05 8.97 
28.11 14.14 
assets, expected cash recovery rates 
1.90 20.89 22.78 9.75 
7.63 17.80 25.42 12.57 
12.04 26.39 38.43 12.95 
3.35 33.89 37.24 7.47 
9.07 24.84 33.91 11.51 
low cash recovery rates 
3.16 24.68 27.85 6.06 
9.32 22.03 31.1.. 10.41 
15.74 36.11 51.85 10.45 
5.02 38.08 43.10 6.03 
11.53 32.39 43.92 9.37 
U.S. 16.68 50.56 3.67 
Low rates of return to operated assets, 
East 7.25 31.68 1.44 
South 7.85 32.18 2.96 
Central 33.83 76.07 9.23 
West 21.25 69.32 1.55 
U.S. 22.95 63.99 6.10 
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liquidated are estimates of the total restructuring needs with a 
continuation of current economic conditions. If economic conditions 
deteriorate, some farmers may require additional restructuring in future 
years. As in Table 9, a sensitivity table format is used which 
incorporates three cash rates of return to operated assets and cash 
recovery rates. The rates are the same as those used in Table 9 — high 
and low values are ten percent higher or lower than expected rates of 
return and cash recovery rates. 
Comparisons of results in Table 9 and Table 16 indicate the 
reduction in operator, asset, and debt liquidations due to the 
availability of restructuring opportunités in addition to asset sales. 
Although liquidations are reduced, the magnitudes of required 
liquidations are ..still quite high. Given expected rates of return and 
cash recovery rates, 12 percent fewer operators have negative net cash 
flows (34 percent versus 46 percent). One-fourth of the operators with 
negative NCF initially now have a positive cash flow. One-third fewer 
operators sell out because of financial failure (9 percent compared to 
13.4 percent). 
Approximately 17 percent of the ccaamercial agricultural sector's 
assets are sold compared to 22 percent in the ZERO scenario in Table 9. 
The amount of assets potentially purchased by solvent operators does not 
change since the financial position of operators not financially 
stressed does not change with the availability of restructuring 
alternatives. 
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The amount of debt liquidated falls from 66 percent (Table 9) to 51 
percent (Table 16) with BASE assumptions and unlimited asset sales. 
Thus, the availability of off-farm work and the ability to increase farm 
income by moderate amounts can reduce the total volume of debt 
liquidated by a substantial amount. Debt written off decreases from 5.1 
percent to 3.7 percent. 
Restructuring Requirements Over Time Using the BASE Scenario 
Table 17 provides estimates of the volume of changes in asset and 
debt holdings over time using the BASE scenario. Asset sales are 
allowed only with the exit of failing farms. Some farms not failing may 
have negative NCF at the end of the year. Hence, the results show 
movement toward an equilibrium rather than the end results of 
restructuring. Rates of return and cash recovery rates were assumed to 
decline over time as outlined in Chuter III (Tables 6 and 7). Total 
commercial operator debt in the second year was assumed to equal total 
commercial operator debt in the first year less debt liquidated in the 
first year. Total debt for the third year was calculated similarly. 
Since no attempt was made to model the asset purchasing patterns of 
solvent and financially stable operators, the value of total commercial 
operator assets was assumed to remain constant over time. This in^lies 
that assets being sold as part of the restructuring or liquidation 
process are purchased by other commercial farm operators, so that total 
assets owned by commercial farm operators remains constant. 
117 
Table 17. Information on expected changes over time in 
response to financial stress with BASE scenario 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Assets sold 
Percent 7.17 3.09 2.76 
Amount ($B) 32.839 14.152 12.641 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 24.04 9.31 8.68 
Amount($B) 30.531 8.981 7.594 
Debt written off 
Percent 6.21 0.43 0.35 
Amount($B) 7.880 0.415 0.306 
Operators selling out 
Percent 13.17 2.96 2.21 
Number 83,821 16,358 11,852 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 33.91 21.03 22.09 
Number 215,822 116,219 118,464 
Interest shortfall ($B) 2.464 0.415 0.341 
Principal shortfall ($B) 3.620 1.736 1.365 
Total shortfall ($B) 6.083 2.151 1.706 
Assets purchased 
Percent 11.51 11.48 10.66 
Amount ($B) 52.716 52.578 48.823 
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The largest transition occurs in the first year when a large number 
of insolvent operators sell out. Only three percent of the remaining 
operators are technically insolvent or financial failures in the second 
year and even fewer are classified as insolvent or failing in the third 
year. Under these conditions and with the most stressed farms quitting 
in earlier years, 22 percent of the operators have negative NCF in the 
third year. Interest shortfalls drop off dramatically after the first 
year but principal shortfalls remain significant even after 3 years of 
limited restructuring. 
Table 18 shows the distribution of commercial operators, assets and 
debts of solvent farms at the end of the third year but observations 
should be made with caution. Since no attempt was made to model asset 
purchases of firms, the only increase in the asset base of a farm occurs 
when excess cash is invested in assets. Assets are accumulated only 
when cash flow is positive and are not purchased using leverage. 
Likewise, the debt distribution generally reflects maintenance of the 
status quo — no new debts are added unless interest shortfalls occur on 
farms that are not failing. 
In contrast with the initial distributions shown in Table 5, 
relatively few operators are in the high leverage class (Figure 9). 
Smaller percentages of the outstanding debt are in the risky categories 
(debt-to-asset ratios exceeding 40 percent). Still, more than one-third 
of the debt in all regions is held by operators with debt-to-asset 
ratios greater than 40 percent. These highly leveraged operators are a 
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Table 18. Distribution of commercial operators, assets, 
and debts held by commercial operators at end of 
third year of BASE projection 
Region Debt-to-asset ratio (percent) 
0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ 
EAST 
Operators 47.65 36.24 16.11 0.00 
Assets 51.79 33.17 15.04 0.00 
Debts 8.40 47.87 43.72 0.00 
SOUTH 
Operators 36.89 45.63 17.47 0.00 
Assets 42.11 46.31 11.58 0.00 
Debts 3.05 61.75 35.20 0.00 
CENTRAL 
Operators 34.52 41.67 21.43 2.38 
Assets 36.19 44.24 18.95 0.62 
Debts 3.05 51.03 43.17 2.75 
WEST 
Operators 38.16 45.41 15.94 0.48 
Assets 36.55 50.09 13.27 0.09 
Debts 7.55 55.46 36.64 0.34 
U.S. 
Operators 36.62 42.64 19.37 1.38 
Assets 38.70 45.35 15.63 0.31 
Debts 4.21 53.82 40.36 1.60 
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Year 1 Year 3 
Percent Percent 
0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ DAR 
Percent T Percent 
of of 
assets 40 t assets 40 
30 
20 
10 
0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ DAR 0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ DAR 
Percent Percent 
debts debts 40 
30 • 30 
20 • 20 
10 10 
0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ DAR 0-10 10-40 40-70 70+ DAR 
Figure 9. Gcnparisons of initial and projected ending distributions of 
operators, assets, and debts 
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small percent of the operators who own an even smaller percent of the 
assets. 
The average financial position at the end of year 3 by debt-to-
asset ratio class and region is listed in Table 19. Again, these 
results assume that no new debt is taken on except to cover interest 
shortfalls on farms not insolvent. The only assets purchased are bought 
with excess cash on farms with positive cash flows. Since many of the 
severely stressed farms have exited because of insolvency, average debt 
positions and debt-to-asset ratios are generally lower. In the low 
debt-to-asset ratio class, average debt levels are higher at the end of 
three years. The hi^er average debt levels may result from accrued 
cash shortfalls or because farmers with higher average debt loads change 
debt-to-asset ratio class over time. %e few farms remaining in the 
high debt-to-asset ratio class are quite small compared to other farms 
in the region. Farms in the South increase average assets owned most 
although farms in the West remain the largest on average. 
Summary 
Estimates of national restructuring requirements are large, even 
with optimistic as suctions about farm incomes, interest rates, asset 
market resiliency, and off-farm income availability. Financial 
conditions are particularly severe in the Central region and 
consequently restructuring requirements in that region are extensive. 
Although regional and sectoral results show some sensitivity to changes 
in econcHDic conditions, the most dramatic impacts are on the magnitude 
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Table 19. Average financial position at end of third year of BASE 
projection by debt-to-asset ratio fDAR) 
Region 
EAST 
Assets 
Debts 
Net worth 
DAR (%) 
0-10 
$638,335 
$17,397 
$620,938 
2.73 
Debt-to-asset ratio (percent) 
10-40 40-70 
$537,539 
$130,354 
$407,185 
24.25 
$548,204 
$267,872 
$280,332 
48.86 
70+ 
* 
* 
* 
* 
All 
$587,287 
$98,679 
$488,608 
16.80 
SOUTH 
Assets 
Debts 
Net worth 
DAR C%) 
$941,444 
$12,156 
$929,288 
1.29 
$837,168 
$199,137 
$638,031 
23.79 
$546,801 
$296,363 
$250,438 
54.20 
* 
* 
* 
* 
$824,895 
$147,145 
$677,750 
17.84 
CENTRAL 
Assets 
Debts 
Net worth 
DAR {%) 
$651,099 
$11,841 
$639,258 
1.82 
$659,482 
$164,223 
$495,259 
24.90 
$549,284 
$270,140 
$279,144 
49.18 
$162,619 
$154,980 
$7,639 
95.30 
$621,144 
$134,092 
$487,052 
21.59 
WEST 
Assets $1,105,882 
Debts $42,663 
Net worth $1,063,219 
DAR (%) 3.86 
$1,273,482 
$263,339 
$1,010,143 
20.68 
$961,076 
$495,557 
$465,519 
51.56 
$209,405 
$153,000 
$56,405 
73.06 
$1,154,574 
$215,607 
$938,967 
18.67 
U.S. 
Assets $820,812 $827,505 $635,554 $121,226 $784,028 
Debts $18,288 $188,907 $319,757 $116,757 $150,979 
Net worth $802,523 $638,598 $315,797 $4,469 $633,049 
DAR (%) 2.23 22.83 50.31 96.31 19.26 
%o operators in category. 
122b 
of interest and principal payment shortfalls. Farms who are near 
failure financially are not substantially helped fay moderate restructuring. 
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CHAPTER V. SIMULATION OF FINANCIAL STRESS ALLEVIATION POLICIES 
In the previous chapter, farm financial restructuring methods were 
individually and collectively evaluated. Their impacts on changes in 
the number of commercial farm operators and changes in asset and debt 
holdings over time were empirically estimated. In this chapter, the 
goals of intervention and results of simulations of public policies are 
discussed. Estimates of the changes in asset and debt distributions 
with financial stress alleviation policies indicate costs and 
effectiveness of various programs. 
Goals of Intervention 
Federal intervention is not new to U.S. agriculture — the 
U.S.D.A.'s concern with price-support and adjustment has been carried 
out under a series of interrelated laws passed by Congress from 1933-
1986 (Economic Research Service, 1984c). But, traditional price and 
income suj^rt policies may not channel funds efficiently or equitably 
to financially stressed farmers in amounts needed to prevent asset 
liquidation or loan default. These government programs may in fact have 
heightened the financial crisis by contributing to inflated land prices 
and encouraging debt utilization and growth in firm size. 
One objective of intervention to alleviate financial stress is to 
buy time for the operator and lender to make needed long term financial 
adjustments. Since there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the 
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exit of large numbers of farmers because of financial problems will, in 
itself, lead to significant changes in food production or higher food 
costs, the best interests of the public are served if programs to 
alleviate financial stress facilitate the farm transition process. 
Farmers should be encouraged to develop realistic cash flow and 
reorganization plans to stabilize the firm if it is able to remain in 
business. 
A secondary goal of public intervention is to share the costs of 
financial stress. Hacroeconomic conditions have contributed to 
financial stress and may increase the magnitude of needed restructuring. 
Therefore, financial policy should be used to minimize the economic and 
human costs of adjustments to changing macroeconomic conditions. 
Given these goals, the important aspects of policy development are 
to determine how aid can be provided in an efficient, equitable, and 
effective manner. The financial diversity of the farm population makes 
an efficient and equitable public policy difficult to formulate and 
implement. Ideally, the policy response should be targeted to the 
problems of financial stress and should facilitate the long-term 
adjustments needed at a minimum federal cost. 
Equity issues 
Equity issues may play an important role in determining the 
acceptability and practicality of different programs. Some analogs 
exist in debate on tax equity, where two levels of equity, horizont^ 
and vertical, are considered. Horizontal equity exists if "equal 
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treatment for equals" occurs (Aile vertical equity depends on the degree 
to which the treatment of unequals differs. If program benefits accrue 
equally to farms with similar financial positions in terms of cash flow, 
income, and net worth regardless of geographic location or type of farm, 
the program could be said to be equitable in horizontal terms. Vertical 
equity is determined by the differences in aid received by severely 
stressed farms as opposed to moderately stressed farms and non-stressed 
farms. The perception of vdiat is and is not equitable may depend on the 
vested interests of the party making the judgement. Farmers who were 
conservative in their use of credit may not have financial problems and 
see no reason to "bail out" other farmers vrtio were, in retrospect, 
myopic. 
One approach for targeting the benefits of public programs could be 
likened to a "triage" strategy in medicine. Those who likely can be 
saved with some help would be the beneficiaries of financial aid. Those 
who are likely to make it on their own and those who probably cannot be 
saved without great costs do not receive aid. Targeted programs may 
seem inequitable to those bordering on eligibility who do not qualify 
and may provide incentives to distort farm financial statements to 
qualify for financial aid. 
Another approach for determining who should benefit from public 
programs is to use general programs. This eases the administrative 
burden of making judgement calls on who does and does not qualify by 
making any financially stressed farmer eligible for payments. Most 
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income and price support programs are general programs in which any 
farmer can participate. 
Principles for governing intervention 
Efficiency and effectiveness goals are best met fay directing 
programs to the intended target group and by making the programs 
flexible enough to change with economic conditions. With flexible, 
targeted programs, costs of intervention can be contained (a necessity 
given U.S. budget considerations) and the public investment can be 
protected. If in fact some farms will exit the industry because of 
inefficiencies beyond cash flow problems, it could be a disservice to 
the operator and lender to keep that farm in operation. In some cases, 
the best policy for all concerned may be to help the operator of a 
financially failing farm find other employment. 
Harl (1986) proposes a number of principles for governing financial 
intervention: 
1. Intervention should be as broad as the problem giving rise to 
the intervention effort. 
2. Intervention should be directed at stabilizing farmers as 
borrowers, thus indirectly stabilizing the credit institutions 
serving them. 
3. Benefits should be targeted to limit the cost of intervention 
and to avoid perceptions of unfair treatment of farmers over 
nonf armers. 
4. Programs should be flexible in nature so that if economic 
circumstances change, the program could be altered or 
terminated, protecting the public's investment in intervention. 
5. Public intervention should not interfere unreasonably with 
market adjustment and economic efficiency. 
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Harl suggests that intervention, if undertaken at the lender level, 
should not benefit one lender and exclude another. Equal treatment of 
lenders would least disturb the economic system and would promote equal 
treatment of farm borrowers with different lenders. Stabilizing 
agricultural lenders without aiding the farm borrowers does nothing to 
correct the underlying problem of financial stress, and would at most 
provide temporary improvements in financial conditions in agriculture. 
Programs that are targeted and flexible increase the likelihood of 
public approval given federal budget constraints. 
Hoffman (1984) points out another inçwrtant consideration for 
federal intervention; program consistency with other federal programs 
for agriculture. For example, if supply control was an objective of 
agricultural policy and if an interest rate buydown program was 
implemented, measures might be needed to ensure that buydown payments 
were used for interest payment and not for expansion of production. 
Cross-compliance with existing programs, conservation programs, for 
instance, could be required for eligibility for financial stress relief. 
Some caution is essential in planning massive aid programs with 
potentially dangerous consequences on the long-term economic health and 
well-being of the farm sector. Large-scale financial assistance 
programs to agriculture, especially those which call for widely 
available subsidized credit, could easily result in too much capital 
moving into agriculture, leading to increased productive c^acity, 
greater output, lower farm prices and further reductions in farm returns 
128 
(Hoffman, 1984). Well-intentioned programs designed to help individual 
farmers with special circumstances can easily have opposite the intended 
effect when applied widely. And, subsidized capital could force more 
farmers off the farm because of coital substitution for labor. 
Policy Proposals 
As financial conditions continue to erode, the opportunities for 
stressed farms to adjust fade. Tweeten (1985) concludes that if high 
real interest rates and slow increases or declines in land earnings 
persist for several more years the result would be huge capital losses 
and financial failure. He proposes that the policy options to alleviate 
financial stress ranked most to least desirable are: monetary and 
fiscal policy, targeted credit assistance, targeted commodity programs, 
and general commodity programs. Earlier results (Tables 14 and 15) 
indicate that moderate changes in the returns to agriculture and average 
interest rates on outstanding debt, the ends of monetary and fiscal 
policy designed to improve economic conditions in agriculture, would 
reduce the immediate needs for liquidation of debts and assets. But, 
changes in rates of return and interest rates would not be sufficient to 
eliminate payment shortfalls or prevent extensive asset sales for highly 
leveraged operators. 
Several new policies have been suggested to minimize the social and 
economic costs associated with liquidating large numbers of farms: 
government debt adjustment programs, interest rate buydown programs, and 
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land holding companies. An interest rate buydown and a new 
Congress ionally-chartered Coital Corporation to help deal with troubled 
loans are included in 1985 legislation. Existing and proposed programs 
for dealing with stress vary in their adherence to Harl's principles for 
governing intervention. 
Guaranteed Loans 
Objectives 
The Rural Development Act of 1972 authorizes FmHA to guarantee 
loans made by commercial lenders for farming, housing and rural business 
and industry. The primary purpose of the guarantee loan program is to 
provide credit for family farm owners who are in the "credit 
availability gap", that is, they slightly exceed the FmHA insured loan 
eligibility criteria but face a degree of financial distress because 
they cannot obtain credit from a commercial agriculture lender without a 
guarantee. 
Description 
Guaranteed loans are made, serviced, and collected by an eligible 
lender. They extend the lending potential of small rural lending 
institutions because banks are not required to apply the guaranteed 
portion of a loan against the bank's legal lending limit. In addition, 
the lender may sell the guaranteed portion in the secondary market. The 
loan guarantee reduces the risk to the lender and could encourage 
forbearance and loan restructuring. 
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The loan note guarantee constitutes an obligation by the U.S. 
Government to service the guaranteed debt in the event that the borrower 
defaults. Farm operating guaranteed loans are limited to $400,000 at 
loan closing, farm ownership guaranteed loans to $300,000 and the total 
principal outstanding per borrower to $700,000 or $650,000 if there is 
an outstanding economic emergency loan. High quality loans may be 
guaranteed up to 90 percent while loans with greater risk are guaranteed 
for a lesser amount. A one time guarantee fee is assessed at one 
percent of the guaranteed loan principal times the percent of guarantee. 
The lender may charge a rate not more than one percent above the rate it 
charges its average farm customer but ElnHA will usually guarantee a 
higher percent of the loan if the interest rate is lower than average. 
Model specification 
In the computer program, all farm operators who are unable to pay 
interest fully are assumed eligible to apply for a loan guarantee. A 
loan guarantee is provided if, with a 10 percent write-down of 
principal, the farm operator is able to show a positive cash flow. A 10 
percent write down in principal reduces cash outflows in the first year 
by the amount of principal and interest due on the remaining debt, lîiis 
can be expressed as: 
@NCF = 0.1*(i +p)*D 
where i = the average interest rate on outstanding debt 
p = the average principal repayment rate 
0 = the dollar value of outstanding debt. 
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With an interest rate of 10 percent and a principal repayment rate of 5 
percent, a farm with $200,000 debt which qualified for the loan 
guarantee would have $3,000 less in cash outlays. 
Results 
The value of the simulated loan guarantee in alleviating financial 
stress is quite limited. None of the stressed operators in the sample 
qualified for the program. Two constraints contribute to this result; 
one is an assumption of the model and the second is the program 
eligibility criterion. The assumption of the model that constrains the 
number of eligible farmers is the stipulation that only farmers who 
cannot pay interest fully are eligible for financial aid. For instance, 
the farm with $200,000 of debt, assets valued at $700,000, and a cash 
shortfall of $3,000 used in earlier examples is not eligible for 
financial aid. The farm's $3,000 shortfall is in principal repayment. 
This is true because principal payments are assumed to be the residual 
claimant on income and principal due is $10,000 (0.05*$200,000). If 
principal were paid first, then more operators would be unable to pay 
interest fully and so would be eligible for the loan guarantee. Some of 
these operators might qualify for the loan guarantee since their initial 
NCF position is less severe than other operators with negative NCF. 
The loan guarantee program requirement that firms show a positive 
cash flow after the principal write down is apparently limiting for all 
other financially stressed farms. The addition to cash flow (or 
reduction in cash outflow) in one year does not provide enough change 
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for operators to substantially improve the financial condition of the 
firm. These simulation results suggest reasons for observed low 
participation rates for the guaranteed loan program. 
Interest Rate Buydown Programs 
Objectives 
Interest buydown programs are intended to provide immediate relief 
to financially stressed farmers. Interest rate buydowns provide income 
subsidies for interest shortfalls in general, and may be broadened to 
cover other cash shortfalls. They may aid the farm in meeting current 
expenses so that income generating capabilites are not impaired. These 
subsidies help reduce interest accumulation vrtiile the operator attempts 
debt or asset restructuring. ïïie amount of the subsidy may be limited, 
either through a maximum on the buydown rate or a maximum on the 
individual payment. 
A buydown which is not limited to the amount of interest shortfall 
may provide cash for principal repayment or consumption expenditures. 
This type of program lacks limits on intervention costs to protect the 
public's investment. The taxpayer may bear the costs of not only buying 
time for the farmer by preventing interest accumulation but also may 
assist in paying off debt and providing income for family living 
expenditures. In other words, since the subsidy is large enough to pay 
interest and principal, the farm's equity can increase as a result of 
the program. 
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Buydown proposals have also varied in eligibility criterion and in 
the provisions for aid. General buydowns are available to any farm 
operator with cash flow problems. Targeted programs have a narrower 
focus, with benefits aimed at individuals with certain common 
characteristics. Targeted buydowns may be directed to specific subsets 
of the financially stressed population using equity or income 
constraints to achieve specific policy goals. 
Targeting programs 
The objective of financial intervention may influence the selection 
and use of targeting mechanisms for interest rate buydowns. If the 
objective of interest rate subsidies is to help only those with 
temporary cash flow problems, targeting can in principle direct 
financial aid to individuals with cash flow problems vrtio are not 
threatened by insolvency. For instance, farms with substantial but not 
large remaining equities could be the recipients of financial aid. 
Moderate amounts of remaining equity indicate the farm has some 
financial resiliency and could resolve cash flow problems with financial 
aid or time to restructure. Farms vtio are likely to make it on their 
own (individuals with high equities) and those who probably cannot be 
saved without great costs (farms with little or no remaining equity) 
could be excluded from the program. Thus, the "triage" approach is 
applied. If, on the other hand, the primary goal of the public program 
is to buy time for insolvent or failing farms to sell out, targeted 
programs can be directed to the farms in the most dire straits. 
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Costs of interest rate buvdown programs 
Cost sharing is an important attribute of interest rate buydown 
programs. Since causes of financial stress include macroeconomic 
policies and lenders' and farmers' financial practices, it is reasonable 
to expect the costs of financial stress to be shared by government, 
lenders, and farmers. A definitive determination of who or what is 
globally responsible for financial stress is impossible. Therefore, the 
amount of subsidy provided by an entity (federal or state government, 
agricultural lender) may depend on the financial resiliency of that 
entity. Lenders *Ao are financially vulnerable might not be in a 
position to aid their fann borrowers. Interest rate buydown programs in 
which the state or federal government participate benefit lending 
institutions, as well as farm operators. Without buydown funds from 
government sources, the lender absorias all interest payment shortfalls. 
Both the scope of the program and the number of eligible program 
recipients help determine the costs of the buydown — the more limited 
are individual payments and the fewer the number of individuals who 
qualify, the lower the costs of the buydown to the government or lender 
providing the buydown. General interest buydowns are potentially 
expensive programs because of the number of farms eligible, especially 
if no measures are taken to limit the individual payments. Establishing 
rate or payment maximums within the program limits the amount of buydown 
going to any one farm. Targeting payments to individuals with certain 
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net worth or income characteristics reduces the number of farms eligible 
for buydowns. 
Policies simulated 
Five interest buydown programs are evaluated in this section- The 
first is a FmHA-type buydown, a general buydown not limited to interest 
shortfalls but limited in amount by maximum rates for buydowns by the 
government and lender. All other buydown programs are limited to the 
extent of the interest payment shortfall. The second buydown simulated 
resembles a buydown proposed by Senator Rudy Boschwitz (R., Minnesota) 
(1985) in which the costs of interest rate buydowns may be shared three 
ways by the federal and state governments and the lender. The third 
alternative considered is a two-way buydown by the federal government 
and lender which is limited to interest payment shortfalls. This two-
way buydown is targeted to individuals by equity characteristics. 
Finally, the two-way buydown with an individual payment limitation of 
$10,000 is evaluated. In each of the simulations, the BASE assumptions 
regarding limited farm level restructuring are used in conjunction with 
policy specific criteria and assumptions. 
Costs of administering the various programs are not estimated. 
Targeted programs could be more costly to administer than a general 
buydown because a farmer's eligibility for the program would have to be 
determined. A three-way buydown would probably be more expensive to 
administer than a two-way buydown because of costs of coordinating the 
payments of three agencies or institutions. 
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FinHA interest rate buvdown 
Description In one interest buydown program, FmHA has been 
directed to aid lenders in providing credit to family farm operations 
with guaranteed loans who are temporarily unable to project a positive 
cash flow without a reduction in the interest rate. Lenders that 
participate in the program agree to reduce the interest rate paid on a 
loan or line of credit. In return, FmHA agrees to make annual interest 
rate buydown payments to the lender in an amount not to exceed 50 
percent of the cost of reducing the interest rate on the loan or 2 
percentage points. The FmHA buydown is not limited to the amount of 
interest shortfall and so may provide cash for principal repayment or 
consumption expenditures. 
Model specifications Since the FJ survey data provided no 
information on the amount of debt owed by an individual to a particular 
institution, the buydown was allowed for all individuals unable to make 
interest payments. Thus, any farmer with a cash shortfall that exceeds 
principal due is eligible for an interest rate buydown. In the 
simulation of the FmHA-type buydown, the change in interest rate 
required in order to cash flow is calculated by dividing NCF by debt. 
An example to illustrate these points follows. A farm with $200,000 
debt, a 10 percent interest rate, a 5 percent principal repayment rate, 
and a $15,000 negative NCF would be eligible for the buydown since 
interest is not being paid fully. The cash shortfall consists of 
$10,000 in delinquent principal payments (0.05*$200,000) and $5,000 in 
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interest payment shortfalls. The change in interest rate required to 
project a positive cash flow is: 
§i = $15,000/9200,000 = .075 
or 7.5 points. The federal government reduces interest rates by half of 
the points required for the farm to show a positive cash flow, or at 
most 2 points. The lender buys down interest rates by half of the 
points required to project a positive cash flow if it is less than 4 
points. If a larger buydown is needed, the lender writes off up to 4 
points for the farm to cash flow. Thus, average interest rates can be 
reduced by a maximum of 6 basis points. The maximum on effective 
fauydown rates for both the federal government and the lender limit each 
entity's liability. 
Results In the first year of the program, recipients of the 
buydown receive an average payment per farm of $24,294 (Table 20). The 
average payment is calculated as total program costs divided by the 
number of operators tdio qualify for aid. More than two-thirds of the 
operators with negative NCF qualify for this buydown. One-third of the 
operators do not qualify because they are able to pay interest fully, 
and are short only on principal repayment. After the buydown, an 
additional 3 percent of total operators (almost 9 percent of the 
operators with a negative NCF initially) show positive cash flows. 
Total costs of the program in the first year of the projection are 
$3.5 billion, basically the difference in total principal and interest 
shortfalls between this scenario and the "no intervention" BASE 
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Table 20. Information on effects of FmHA-type interest rate 
buydown over time 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Year 1 
5.60 
25.648 
Year 2 
1.26 
5.757 
Year 3 
1.93 
8.818 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
19.93 
25.306 
3.92 
3.98 
5.90 
5.77 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
5.05 
6.419 
0.15 
0.15 
0.29 
0.28 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
10.77 
68,533 
1.13 
6,390 
1.62 
9,007 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 
Number 
33.91 
215,822 
20.50 
115,644 
21.72 
121,096 
Operators with negative 
NCF who qualify for aid 
Percent 
Number 
67.58 
145,853 
32.30 
37,352 
29.84 
36,135 
Total costs ($B) 
Federal costs ($B) 
State costs ($B) 
Lender costs ($B) 
3.543 
1.194 
0.000 
2.350 
1.322 
0.447 
0.000 
0.875 
1.427 
0.489 
O.OOO 
0.938 
Average payment per farm $24,294 $35,394 $39,480 
Interest shortfall ($B) 
Principal shortfall ($B) 
Total shortfall ($B) 
0.368 
2.184 
2.553 
0.010 
1.017 
1.027 
0.010 
0.831 
0.840 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount (SB) 
11.51 
52.699 
11.34 
51.944 
10.34 
47.366 
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scenario. The federal government absorbs about one-third of the costs 
with the banks writing off the remainder. %e lender benefits from this 
program since the federal government pays $1.2 billion to operators 
which can be applied to interest and principal repayment. The interest 
buydown becomes income to the bank that would otherwise not be received. 
Over time, a smaller percentage of the operators with negative NCF 
qualify for the buydown. A larger percentage of the operators are able 
to pay interest, and so are ineligible for the buydown. These 
percentages are based on a reduced sangle population since farms 
classified as financial failures in the first year are assumed to exit 
farming and are removed from the sample. Average payments per farm get 
larger over time, increasing from $24,294 in the first year to $39,480 
in the third year. This suggests that more recipients of the buydown 
require the maximum 6 percent buydown or have larger average debt loads. 
Total costs of the program in the second and third years of the 
projection are approximately one-third of the costs of the first year at 
$1.3-1.4 billion. The split in costs remains fairly constant over time 
at one-third for the federal government and two-thirds for the bank. 
The number of operators selling out over the three year period is 
almost one-fourth less than in the BASE scenario. Fewer operators than 
in the BASE run sell out in any given year (2.5 percent less in the 
first year) indicating that the program could successfully buy time for 
some operators to continue restructuring efforts. Both the speed and 
magnitude of asset sales and debt liquidation are reduced. 
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Three-way interest rate buvdown limited to interest shortfall g 
Model specifications In the three-way buydown, costs of 
providing financial aid to farm operators are shared by the federal and 
state governments and lenders. Interest rates are reduced in a stair­
step fashion beginning with a buydown by the federal government of up to 
2 points. If additional aid is needed to cash flow, the state 
government provides funds to cover 2 points of an interest rate buydown. 
Finally, if NCF is still negative, the lender provides a one point 
reduction in interest rates. The maximum individual interest buydown 
will be the minimum of 5 percent of outstanding debt or the interest 
shortfall. Since the individual payment in all cases is limited to the 
interest payment shortfall, no operators will end with a positive cash 
flow because of the program. 
Results The average payment per farm is $12,974 (Table 21), 
substantially lower than under the FmHA-type program. The same number 
of operators qualify for the buydown in both programs in the first year 
(all operators not fully paying interest). The percentages of 
qualifying operators over time are also similar in the two programs, 
with the percentage falling to one-third of the operators with negative 
NCF in the later years as operators are able to pay interest without the 
buydown, but remain short on principal repayment. The number of 
operators selling out because of financial problems over time is fewer 
than in the BASE run, but greater than with the FmHA buydown. 
141 
Table 21. Information on effects of three-way interest 
rate buydown over time 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
.Year 1 
6.01 
27.526 
Year 2 
1.29 
5.908 
Year 3 
2.22 
10.168 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
21.14 
26.848 
4.03 
4.036 
6.87 
6.603 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount($B) 
5.19 
6.591 
0.23 
0.225 
0.41 
0.394 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
11.58 
73,702 
2.74 
15,419 
2.25 
12,315 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 
Number 
33.91 
215,822 
22.10 
124,369 
22.69 
124,190 
Operators with negative NCF 
who qualify for aid 
Percent 
Number 
67.58 
145,853 
35.66 
44,350 
35.03 
43,504 
Total costs ($B) 
Federal costs ($B) 
State costs ($B) 
Lender costs ($B) 
1.892 
1.003 
0.635 
0.254 
0.481 
0.310 
0.130 
0.040 
0.529 
0.336 
0.154 
0.038 
Average payment per farm $12,974 $10,839 $12,152 
Interest shortfall ($B) 
Principal shortfall ($B) 
Total shortfall ($B) 
0.572 
3.620 
4.191 
0.020 
1.843 
1.863 
0.029 
1.711 
1.740 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
11.51 
52.716 
11.37 
52.075 
10.38 
47.540 
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• With the buydown limited to 5 percent or the interest shortfall, 
the total costs of the program are significantly reduced (from $3.5 
billion to $1.9 billion). Here, the federal and state governments 
absorb most of the costs of the program, providing $1.6 billion in funds 
to be applied to interest shortfalls. Lenders provide a minimal 
buydown, a maximum of one point per dollar of debt, at a total cost of 
$0.25 billion. 
Two-way interest rate buydown 
Model specifications Since it seems unlikely that all states 
could or would provide funds for an interest rate buydown for 
financially stressed farmers because of budget considerations and 
program priorités, costs of a two-way buydown shared by the federal 
government and lender are estimated (Table 22). The federal government 
is assumed to buy down interest rates up to 2 points, or to the cash 
flow point if it occurs with less than the maximum 2 points. An 
additional 4 percent buydown in interest rates is provided by the banks 
as needed to eliminate cash shortfalls. Thus, the maximum buydown is 6 
points, similar to the FmHA buydown. Like the three-way buydown (and 
unlike the FmHA program), the two-way interest rate buydown is assumed 
to cover only interest shortfalls. 
Results Since the maximum rate in the FmHA program and two-way 
buydown is the same, the difference in total program costs ($1.5 
billion) indicates the amount of payment over interest shortfalls 
accruing in the EMiA program. The costs to the federal government in 
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Table 22. Information on effects of two-way interest rate 
buydown over time 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Year 1 
5.96 
27.310 
Year 2 
1.34 
6.114 
Year 3 
2.22 
10.177 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
21.04 
26.715 
4.16 
4.17 
6.88 
6.61 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
6.43 
8.163 
0.23 
0.23 
0.41 
0.40 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
11.38 
72,429 
2.97 
16,729 
2.25 
12,322 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 
Number 
33.91 
215,824 
22.29 
125,722 
22.69 
124,162 
Operators with negative NCF 
who qualify for aid 
Percent 
Number 
67.58 
145,860 
36.31 
45,647 
35.03 
43,496 
Total costs ($B) 
Federal costs ($B) 
State costs ($B) 
Lender costs ($B) 
2.096 
1.003 
0.000 
1.092 
0.491 
0.311 
0.000 
0.181 
0.548 
0.336 
0.000 
0.211 
Average payment per farm $14,367 $10,765 $12,595 
Interest shortfall ($B) 
Principal shortfall ($B) 
Total shortfall ($B) 
0.368 
3.620 
3.988 
0.010 
1.845 
1.855 
0.010 
1.701 
1.711 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
11.51 
52.699 
11.37 
52.069 
10.38 
47.540 
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the two-way buydown are the same as in the three-way buydown — all 
operators with an interest rate shortfall avail themselves of the 
maximum buydown provided by the government because they require at least 
a two point break in interest rates to cash flow. The average payment 
is generally slightly higher for the two-way as opposed to the three-way 
buydown because of the higher combined federal government/lender maximum 
rate (6 points as opposed to 5). In the first year, the average payment 
in the two-way buydown is $14,367 and in the three-way buydown is 
$12,974. 
The federal government's portion of the buydown increases after the 
first year from less than 50 percent to slightly more than 60 percent 
(Table 22). If the federal government's share was constant at 50 
percent, this would indicate that the average percentage buydown 
required by an individual to cash flow would be 4 points (2 points 
provided by the government, and 2 by the lender). Since the 
government's share grows over time, the commercial operators remaining 
in business and also qualified for the buydown require an average 
buydown that exceeds 4 points. 
Targeted two-way interest rate buydown 
Model specifications To be eligible for the two-way targeted 
buydown, farm operators were required to have equities greater than 
$50,000 but less than $250,000 and be unable to pay interest fully. 
Thus, the buydown is intended to provide funds to ease financial stress 
for farms with enough remaining equity to be considered viable. Farms 
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with substantial amounts of equity (greater than $250,000) are assumed 
to have the resources to survive financially without public aid. 
Results The equity bounds determining eligibility reduce the 
percentage of operators with negative NCF vrtio qualify from 68 percent to 
24 percent (Table 23). Since fewer farms are recipients of buydowns, 
this program does less than other buydown programs in terms of stemming 
the flow of operators out of farming because of financial problems. 
Costs of the program are also drastically reduced to almost one-
fifth of the two-way buydown costs. The average payment in the first 
year is $7,821, a little more than half of the average payment in the 
untargeted two-way buydown and one-fourth of the FmHA-type buydown. 
Obviously, many severely stressed farms with large debt loads that would 
otherwise qualify for larger buydowns have been eliminated from the 
program by the equity constraints. 
Two-way interest rate buydown with payment limitation 
A $10,000 maximum per individual payment included in the two-way 
interest rate buydown reduces program costs, but this effect is somewhat 
deceiving (Table 24). Since the $10,000 maximum rarely if ever occurs 
before the government maximum buydown of 2 points in the interest rate, 
the difference in this program and the basic two-way buydown is mostly 
in the lender's position. Here, the lender takes the loss in income as 
an interest shortfall rather than as a write-down in interest. And, 
since interest shortfalls are added to debt if the operator remains in 
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Table 23. Information on effects of targeted two-way interest 
rate buydown over time 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Year 1 
6.67 
30.554 
Year 2 
3.19 
14.620 
Year 3 
2.63 
12.045 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
22.81 
28.972 
9.58 
9.39 
8.18 
7.25 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
5.98 
7.595 
0.42 
0.42 
0.27 
0.25 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
12.15 
77,353 
3.17 
17,900 
2.08 
11,353 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 
Number 
33.91 
215,824 
21.74 
122,612 
21.97 
119,977 
Operators with negative NCF 
who qualify for aid 
Percent 
Number 
24.08 
51,964 
19.62 
24,062 
37.16 
44,589 
Total costs ($B) 
Federal costs ($B) 
State costs ($B) 
Lender costs ($B) 
0.406 
0.229 
0.000 
0.178 
0.108 
0.078 
0.000 
0.029 
0.098 
0.053 
0.000 
0.044 
Average payment per farm $7,821 $4,481 $2,187 
Interest shortfall ($B) 
Principal shortfall ($B) 
Total shortfall ($B) 
2.070 
3.620 
5.690 
0.343 
1.784 
2.127 
0.266 
1.392 
1.658 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
11.51 
52.699 
11.42 
52.303 
10.62 
48.656 
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Table 24. Information on effects of two-way interest rate buydown 
over time with payment limit 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Year 1 
6.28 
28.762 
Year 2 
3.45 
15.822 
Year 3 
1.29 
5.930 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount C$B) 
21.89 
27.800 
10.31 
10.22 
4.28 
3.80 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
5.63 
7.149 
0.41 
0.41 
0.21 
0.19 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
11.54 
73,433 
3.55 
20,012 
2.07 
11,246 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 
Number 
33.91 
215,824 
22.22 
125,353 
22.16 
120,551 
Operators with negative NCF 
who qualify for aid 
Percent 
Number 
67.58 
145,860 
36.01 
45,137 
33.01 
39,789 
Total costs (SB) 
Federal costs ($B) 
State costs ($B) 
Lender costs ($8) 
1.003 
1.003 
0.000 
0.000 
0.308 
0.308 
0.000 
0.000 
0.311 
0.311 
0.000 
0.000 
Average payment per farm $6,876 $6,824 $7,827 
Interest shortfall ($B) 
Principal shortfall f$B) 
Total shortfall ($B) 
1.461 
3.620 
5.080 
0,268 
1-825 
2.093 
0.178 
1.575 
1.753 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
11.51 
52.699 
11.39 
52.166 
10.38 
47.538 
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business, interest is accrued over time, and some of the income forgone 
may be recovered at a later date. 
Comparison of the interest rate buvdown programs over three years 
Of the interest buydown programs, the FmHA-type program does most 
to reduce the number of commercial operators selling out over the three 
year period. Compared to BASE estimates, 28,101 fewer operators (or 4.4 
percent of the total commercial farm operators in year 1) sell out given 
a FmHA-type buydown. Only 11,000 fewer operators sell out with the 
three-way or two-way buydowns. About 5,500 fewer farms sell out with 
the targeted two-way interest rate buydown, and 7,500 fewer operators 
sell out with the two-way buydown with a maximum payment. 
The FmHA-type buydown also does most to reduce the volume of assets 
sold as farms adjust to financial stress. Total assets sold drop from 
$59.6 billion in the BASE run to $40.2 billion with the FmHA-type 
program, a decrease of $19.4 billion. The total value of assets sold 
over the three year projection given a three-way or two-way interest 
buydown is $43.6 billion, or $16 billion less than in the BASE scenario. 
The amount of assets sold given a targeted two-way buydown is only $2.4 
billion less than the BASE amount. Assets sold given a two-way buydown 
with payment limitation is $9.1 billion less than in the BASE 
projection. 
The difference between BASE total shortfalls ($9.9 billion) and 
total shortfalls plus program costs with the FmHA-type program ($10.7 
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billion) is $758 million. Other buydown programs also have total 
shortfalls and program costs which exceed total shortfalls in the BASE 
program. This indicates the increase in losses resulting from keeping 
some severely stressed farms in operation. Additional accrued losses in 
other programs range from $756 million with the three-way buydown to 
$146 million with the targeted two-way buydown. 
Interest buydown programs primarily impact banks in two ways. 
First, if government agencies participate, the funds which are paid to 
the borrower and received by the lender reduce the lender's immediate 
loss of income. Second, if the bank participates in the buydown, the 
borrower's interest shortfalls are reallocated between interest 
shortfalls and interest written off. Because of this second impact, 
total long run costs of the program may be difficult to estimate. An 
interest shortfall may provide income to the lender in the future if the 
farm remains solvent. Interest written off, on the other hand, results 
in a permanent loss of income. With the FmHA-type interest buydown, 
banks absorb losses of $4.4 billion in interest and principal shortfalls 
and $4.2 billion in interest written off (the bank's interest buydown 
costs) over three years. The total income shortfall is $8.6 billion 
with the FmHA-type buydown, compared to $9.9 billion in total shortfalls 
in the BASE run. 
The interest rate buydown programs prevent the accumulation of 
interest over time on financially stressed farms. As a result, fewer 
assets may be sold, fewer debts may be liquidated, and fewer farms may 
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fail financially. Because of these indirect results, it is hard to 
estimate a value for the benefits of a program and is difficult to 
compare the total benefits of different programs. 
Land Holding Company 
Objectives 
The land holding companies proposed by Harl (1986), the Farm Credit 
Council (1985) and others insulate land and machinery markets from a 
glut of sales by debtors at or approaching insolvency. The land holding 
company acquires land from farmers subject to foreclosure or bankruptcy, 
from lenders holding land in inventory, or from farmers who are unable 
to service their real estate debt. Farmers who want to dispose of 
property thus have a ready buyer even in areas where asset sales have 
already flooded the market. The holding company could serve as a shock 
absorber, protecting collateral values and reducing the probability of 
serious "overshooting" in land prices (Harl, 1986). Overshooting 
becomes a problem when financially stressed farmers attempt to 
restructure by selling assets. Lower asset values mean more assets have 
to be sold to generate revenue to cover cash shortfalls. 
Description 
Harl*s (1985b) proposed federally chartered Agricultural Financing 
Corporation (AFC) has two major components. The first provides 
supplemental financing for "buying down" interest rates on farm loans 
for farms with the potential for positive cash flows. The second 
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provides a mechanism for btying assets given by farmers %±to are 
unable to project a positive cash flow without asset liquidation. The 
proposed AFC would acquire farmland at fair market value and rent the 
assets to farmers (with first preference to prior owners of the asset) 
at a fair rental rate. Lenders holding loans transferred to the AFC 
with the associated collateral would be e^sected to take a write down on 
the loan obligation or interest rate charged and could not charge an 
interest rate higher than the best interest rate charged best farm 
custoners. Prior owners of the assets vàio maintain continuous or near 
continuous rental of the asset would be eligible to repurchase the 
assets at fair market value. 
A similar entity, an Agricultural Conservation Corporation (ACC), 
was proposed by the Farm Credit Council and National Com Grower's 
Association (1985). The purpose of the proposed ACC was to stabilize 
farm asset values, provide distressed farmers a financial restructuring 
alternative, and provide for the conservation of fragile land resources*. 
Die ACC would be a federally chartered, limited-life, limited purpose, 
mixed ownership corporation «içowered to buy farm assets at fair market 
value from willing sellers. Seal estate acquisition would be primarily 
financed throu^ the issuance of government guaranteed ddst and sellers 
to the ACC would substantially capitalize it through required stock 
purchases. Operating expenses would be supported frcxn incone generated 
ly leasing acquired property. 
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Assets could be purchased by the ACC during a five year period and 
would be disposed of within the tai year life of the holding caipaiy, or 
at the time ^ en the market value of that property reached 115 percent 
of the acquisition value. Fanners selling property to the ACC would 
retain ri^t of first rental, would be protected against the sale of 
their former properly for a period of three years, and vrould retain the 
ric^it of first refusal on the sale of their former properly for an 
additional two year ped.od. The federal government would have first 
claim to aiy operating gains and net gain fran sale of the assets, thus 
providing further protection of the public investment. 
Model specification 
In the simulation of a land holding caipaiy (liK), the rudiments of 
the AFC and ACC are incorporated. (Hie IHC is assumed to be a limited 
life corporation entitled to purchase assets from financially stressed 
farm operators. Borrowers with a negative NCF vàio are unable to make 
interest payments are allowed to sell assets to the IH: and lease them 
back at reasonable cash rental rates. In the caiputer projections over 
time, "reasonable" means current rental rates if rates of return exceed 
cash rental rates or one percentage point less than the rate of return 
if rental rates exceed cash rates of return in the first year. With 
subsidized rental rates, farmer's may sell fewer assets into the IBZ 
than would have to be sold to project a positive cash flew with a 
sale/leasdsack. 
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The proceeds from a farm's sale of assets to the LHC are applied to 
debt reduction. Asset sales to the corporation are limited to half of 
the assets owned or $300,000 unless the operator is insolvent. 
Insolvent operators transfer all assets to the holding caipary. Sellers 
to the IHC are required to purchase stock in the IfiC equivalent to 10 
percent of the assets transferred to the LHC. 
Costs to the federal government of providing a IHC depend on the 
cost of funds used by the LHC to purchase assets and the incane earned 
by renting out assets purchased. Costs of funds were assumed to be 7.75 
percent in each year, a rate equivalent to the sale price of Farm Credit 
Systan bonds in F^ruary, 1986 (Waster, 1986). Total costs of the IHC 
include the costs of purchasing assets entering the LHC plus the costs 
of financing those purchases less rental income earned and less proceeds 
from sale of assets on or before the end of the entity's limited life. 
Results 
Almost 10 percent of the assets of commercial farm operators are 
sold, 2.5 percent more than in the BASE run (Table 25). More debt is 
liquidated in the first year than in the BASE run (29 percent as OK'osed 
to 24 percent) because of ddat retiraient from the proceeds of asset 
sales to the LEK. More ddst is written off vAim a stock purchase is 
required since failing farms have to apply some of the proceeds from 
sale of assets to stock purchases rather than debt retirement. 
Fewer operators fail given an (^aerating IHC because of financial 
prdslens over time — 9.5 percent of the coirtnercial farms fail in the 
first year and 12.4 percent of the total sairple operators liquidate 
Table 25. Information on effects of a land holding company 
over time 
Assets sold 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
Year 1 
9.69 
44.380 
Year 2 
1.53 
7.007 
Year 3 
1.57 
7.191 
Debt liquidated 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
28.85 
36.640 
5.71 
5.16 
6.18 
5.27 
Debt written off 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
6.58 
8.357 
0.29 
0.29 
0.19 
0.18 
Operators selling out 
Percent 
Number 
9.54 
60,718 
1.86 
10,491 
1.35 
7,473 
Operators with negative NCF 
before intervention 
Percent 
Number 
33.91 
215,824 
20.45 
115,343 
22.36 
123,771 
Operators with negative NCF 
who qualify for aid 
Percent 
Number 
67.58 
145,860 
41.47 
47,829 
35.54 
43,992 
Total costs ($B) 
Federal costs ($B) 
State costs ($B) 
Lender costs ($B) 
0.864 
0.864 
0.000 
0.000 
0.087 
0.087 
0.000 
0.000 
0.145 
0.145 
0.000 
0.000 
Average payment per farm $5,924 $1,817 $3,290 
Interest shortfall ($B) 
Principal shortfall ($B) 
Total shortfall ($B) 
1.537 
2.273 
3.810 
0.515 
1.292 
1.807 
0.009 
1.508 
1.517 
Assets purchased 
Percent 
Amount ($B) 
11.51 
52.699 
11.96 
54.777 
10.38 
47.540 
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conpletely in the three year period. Although many farms sell assets to 
the LHC, the average payment per farm is small since it is the costs of 
financing the program above rentals received on the assets sold to the 
corporation. Over three years, assets sold and d^t liquidated are 
approximately the same in the BASE and IflC simulations. With the lEC 
though, an estimated 33,349 operators renain in business vdio fail in the 
BASE scenario. Fewer operators sell out in the lEC simulation than in 
any of the interest buydown programs simulated. 
Annual maintenance costs of the program (Table 25) are less than 
the costs of most buydcwn programs examined. The cœbined LBC 
maintenance costs and interest and principal payment shortfalls are 
substantially less than in other scenarios. The sum of interest and 
principal shortfalls and IHC maintenance costs is actually less ($1.7 
billion) than the total shortfalls in the BASE scenario. However vdien 
total cost of asset purchases are considered, the costs of the IBC are 
hii^. A rou^ calculation of the present value of the IHC is made 
assuming: 
1. Assets are purchased only in the first year. 
2. The total amount of assets purchased is $77 billion (17 percent 
of the total assets of commercial operators). 
3. The life of the IHC is 5 years. 
4. Assets are sold at the end of the fifth year. 
5. The cash rental rate is 6 percent of the initial market value. 
The total costs given different assuirptions about discount rates and 
rates of asset appreciation are listed in Table 26. If the discount 
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rate is 10 percent and asset values appreciate 10 percent over the life 
of the LHC, costs are estimated to be $29.5 billion. Approximately $5 
billion of the costs is the present value of the differential between 
costs of money and rental income. The remaining $24.5 billion in costs 
is a result of the costs of a large cash outlay for asset purchases in 
the first year which is not recouped by sales of assets in the fifth 
year. If the discount rate is 2 percent and assets appreciate 10 
percent in five years, then the total costs of the LHC are estimated to 
be $6.6 billion (which is similar to the three year costs of an FmHA.-
type interest buydown program). 
The LHC meets Harl's criteria for financial intervention in several 
ways. As simulated, any farmer-borrower can sell assets to the LHC and 
so the program is as broad as the financial stress problem. By selling 
assets and retiring debt some farmers can project a positive cash flow, 
so both borrower and lender benefit from the LHC. As simulated, the 
amount of assets sold to the LHC is limited if the farm is not failing 
financially, thus providing some limit on the public's investment. The 
LHC provides a ready buyer for farm assets and so facilitates the 
market's handling of assets liquidated in the restructuring process. 
The biggest potential drawback of the program is the costs Imposed by 
large cash outlays for purchasing assets which may not be recovered if 
assets do not appreciate in value significantly over the life of the 
LHC. 
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Table 26. Costs of land holding company ($B) 
Annual land value appreciation rate 
Discount 0 % 1 % 2 % 
rate 
2 % 13.6 10.1 6.6 
5 % 16.4 19.4 16.4 
10 % * 34.3 31.9 29.5 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
An examination of the financial status of U.S. commercial farms 
suggests that stress on asset markets, agricultural lenders, and farm 
operators is not expected to abate soon. This paper has attempted to 
estimate the magnitude of change faced by the agricultural sector given 
current farm financial conditions. Estimates of the expected extent and 
duration of adjustment on farms in response to financial stress relate 
microeconomic responses to a sector response. 
Many farms have debt levels that are unsupportable at projected 
income levels and interest rates. Although higher rates of return to 
farm assets or lower interest rates diminish the cash flow problem, it 
is not a substantive change. Severely stressed farms, those with high 
debt-to-asset ratios, large negative net cash flows, and low farm 
equities may not be able to restruture debts and assets and will fail 
financially in the near term. Conditions are especially severe in the 
central region of the U.S. where a large number of farmers are expected 
to liquidate completely. 
Improved incomes increase debt servicing capability and reduce the 
amount of assets liquidated. Thus, creation of jobs in rural areas or 
off-farm job training for stressed farmers or their families could be 
valuable in terms of alleviating financial stress. Vocational school or 
programs to improve the management skills of farm operators could also 
prove beneficial in the short run. Expansion of the farm using asset 
rentals appears to provide little additional income given existing rates 
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of return and rental rates. The long term viability of financially 
stressed farms depends on their ability to improve cash flow and 
restructure debts and assets. Continued shifts in asset and debt 
holdings are expected as the sector moves toward a financial 
equilibrium. 
From analysis presented in this p^er, there might be some 
justification in considering financial policy initiatives. Simulation 
of the dynamics of agricultural firms responding to financial stress 
suggests that the adjustment may be very large. The financial 
transition will likely test the ability of markets, individuals, 
institutions, and communities to make these changes. Estimates of asset 
liquidations needed to stabilize the agricultural sector are larger than 
asset markets can efficiently handle in the short run. 
Financial policy can facilitate the transition process by buying 
time for operators and lenders to make needed long term adjustments and 
by ensuring that markets continue to operate efficiently. Interest rate 
buydowns and the land holding company are programs that aid the farm in 
meeting current expenses and help reduce interest accumulation while the 
operator attempts debt or asset restructuring. Both the speed and the 
magnitude of operator, asset, and debt liquidation can be reduced with 
these programs. 
Among the programs simulated, the volume of debts and assets 
liquidated is reduced most over a three year period by the FmHA-type 
buydown. Since the RnHA-type buydown is not limited to interest 
shortfalls, it is also the most costly interest buydown program 
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evaluated. The three-way and two-way interest buydown programs which 
were simulated are less effective in reducing the number of farms 
failing financially and in reducing the volume of assets and debts 
liquidated. The targeted interest buydown program was the least costly 
program simulated but did little to reduce liquidations. Although debt 
and asset liquidations are not reduced, simulationi of a land holding 
company indicates that it can significantly reduce the number of 
operators selling out over time because of financial programs. The land 
holding company benefits both financially stressed and financially 
healthy farm operators by helping to stabilize farm asset markets. 
An important attribute of financial intervention to alleviate 
stress is the sharing of costs imposed by financial stress among several 
entities. Since causes of financial stress include macroeconomic 
policies and lenders' and farmers' financial practices, it is reasonable 
to expect the cost of financial stress to be shared by government, 
lenders, and farmers. Different programs distribute the cost burden and 
risks associated with farm failure differently among farmers, lenders, 
and government. Interest rate buydown programs benefit directly both 
the farmer and lender by reducing cash shortfalls. The land holding 
company stabilizes the farmer as borrower, indirectly benefiting the 
lender. 
Simulation results indicate that intervention to alleviate farm 
financial stress could be expensive. The costs of programs depend on 
the extent of aid provided per individual and the number of operators 
qualifying for aid. Continuation of the current policy of "doing 
161 
nothing" though could result in costs — both in economic and human 
terms — that easily exceed the cost of intervention. 
Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Further Research 
Although the method is unique and the technique is unrefined, the 
model provides a basis for additional work. The model focuses on the 
effects of leverage, cash flow, and income on survivability. Changes in 
financial position are restricted to responses to stress for individuals 
with negative cash flows and to accumulation of assets for operators 
with positive cash flows. Operators do not otherwise change tenancy 
positions. The restructuring methods incorporated in the model were 
expected responses based on intuition, and were not based on responses 
elicited from farmers. Actual response hierarchies for different types 
and sizes of farm could be derived to note differences in strategies for 
responding to stress, if any. Further application of sociological 
methods to appropriate data to determine causality of financial stress 
on individual farms and to determine the significance of socioeconomic 
characteristics in identifying financially stressed operators would be 
useful. 
Ihe simulation results show the evolution in financial 
characteristics of farms surviving financial stress and reflect changes 
in the financial position of individuals in a fixed population. The 
projections are based on simulation of the behavior of a fixed random 
sample of the farm population. No new entrants to the commercial 
farming sector are included. 
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The results are based on a relatively small national sample of farm 
operators and it is not known to what extent the results may be an 
artifact of the data set. Since survey information did not indicate the 
degree to which the farm operator or family members are fully employed, 
restructuring bounds allowing increases in off-farm employment or 
increases in acreages operated were assumed to be reasonable. The 
robustness of the results should be tested using a different and 
preferably much larger sample of U.S. farmers. An especially useful 
undertaking might be to apply the model to a subset of the U.S.D.A.'s 
Farm Costs and Returns Survey sample population. With a larger sample, 
results could perhaps be estimated and compared for subsets other than 
•geographic region, for instance, farm type or operator age groups. 
Cash rates of return to operated assets were used to project income 
for farms of a given size and geogragAic region because attempts to 
improve on this method proved unsuccessful with the available data. 
Depreciation and coital replacement were ignored and taxes were only 
crudely estimated for farms with positive cash flows. The tax 
consequences of asset liquidations and debt discharged as part of the 
restructuring procees were ignored- Perhaps with other data, cash 
income equations analogous to per unit profit functions could be 
derived. It would be helpful to have income projections that were more 
farm specific, for instance, income as a function of farm type and size, 
farm operator characteristics and geographic location. With better 
means of projecting income, more confidence could be placed in the 
estimated restructuring needs for individuals and the sector over time. 
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If returns to different types of assets could be derived, this could be 
incorporated into the liquidation strategy — low return assets could be 
sold first with higher return assets liquidated last. 
Since this is a first attempt at modeling farm financial 
transition, many microeconomic and macroeconomic relationships are 
greatly simplified and most interaction and feedback relationships are 
ignored or only crudely included in the model. In the aggregate, 
individual choices affect market conditions which in turn affect the 
outcomes actually realized by economic units. Improvements on the basic 
framework of the model could be made by adding models of the financial 
sector and developing other feedback and interaction relationships 
explicitly. An important underlying assumption in the model is that 
financial and asset markets do not collapse and that the volume of 
assets and debt liquidated do not precipitate a "snowballing" 
effect. 
The percentages of debts, assets, and operators listed in tables 
are sample based, but, the amount of debt and assets being liquidated 
and the number of stressed operators or operators receiving aid depend 
on the assumed sectoral values. As indicated earlier, the sector 
estimates may be underestimated (or overestimated), which would lead to 
greater (or lesser) liquidations in dollar terms. %e aggregation 
technique may suffer from shortcomings. It would be useful to determine 
statistical reliability of aggregate values reported, if possible. 
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APPENDIX. OTHER MODELING ATTEMPTS 
To model the financial adjustment path of individuals within the ag 
sector, reliable estimates of cash incane for individual farms are 
needed for use in estimating net cash flow. Because of the enphasis on 
financial adjustment of financially stressed farms, the cash income 
equation should be able to reflect changes in income resulting from 
restructuring of debts and assets. Ideally, the equation would reflect 
the inccxne-generating capacity of assets of different types so that low 
yielding assets on a farm could be identified and sold first. The 
restructuring process could be directed using the cash incane equation 
and would then have an arpirical as well as a theoretical base. 
Per unit profit functions for farms, specified as a function of 
variable irçut prices and the level of fixed factors, have been 
estimated using duality theory (Lau and Yotopolous, 1972; Sidhu and 
Baanante, 1981; Garcia et al., 1982; Lopez, 1982). A one-to-one 
correspondence exists between a concave production function and its dual 
convex profit function. The profit function can be used in enrpirical 
analyses of the behavior of profit maximizing, price-taking firms. The 
functional forms for profit functions are those frequently used in 
estimating agricultural production functions; CoMo-Douglas, generalized 
Leontief, and translog. 
An attatpt was made to estimate an analogous equation to predict 
cash incane for farms using data from the Farm Journal Surv^. Cash 
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income above variable costs, or cash profit, was hypothesized to be a 
function of fixed inputs, namely, assets and management skills. A 
number of equations were estimated to project farm net cash income as a 
function of the real estate, machinery, livestock, and other assets, 
enterprise mix, geographic location, and socioeconomic characteristics 
of the farm operator. Dependent variables tested included cash profit 
(CPROFIT), net cash rate of return to owned assets (CPROFIT/total owned 
assets), net cash income per acre operated (CPROFITPA), and net cash 
income per acre owned. The two components of CPROFIT, gross sales and 
cash operating expenses were also estimated separately and on a per acre 
basis. Attempts were also made to estimate income by farm type and by 
sales class. Linear, quadratic, and Cobb-Douglas functions were 
estimated. 
Independent variables included at various stages and in various 
combinations included assets in four categories (real estate, machinery, 
livestock, and other), assets per acre operated, number of acres 
operated, number of acres owned, tenure (acres owned/acres operated) and 
dummy variables for farm type, O.S.D.A. production region, region-farm 
type interaction, asset-farm type interaction, census sales class, the 
number of years of operator's formal education, and the number of years 
in which farming provided most of the operator's income. Some variables 
had to be respecified for use in Cobb-Douglas functions because of zero 
values in survey data. 
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Farm types were assigned according to the operator's estimate of 
percentage of gross sales attributed to a particular enterprise. Seven 
types were identified : crop, beef, dairy, general livestock, pork, 
crop/beef and other. Crop (Tl), beef (T2), dairy (T3), and pork (T5) 
farms were those farms with mora than 50 percent of gross sales from one 
major enterprise. General livestock farms (T4) were farms with 70 
percent or more of sales from various livestock enterprises. Crop/beef 
farms (T7) were farms with 70 percent of gross sales from crop and beef 
enterprises, but with less than 50 percent of sales from either 
enterprise. Other farms (T7) was the catch-all category and included 
farms whose major enterprise was not crop, beef, dairy, or pork and 
farms with diverse operations or income from several significant 
enterprises. 
A region dummy variable (1-10) was assigned based on U.S.O.A. 
production regions.^ Education dummy variables were based on categories 
representing cumulative years of school ranging from elementary school 
to graduate school. Likewise, the number of years in which farm income 
has been the primary source of income for the operator was categorized 
in survey responses as none, under five, five to ten, and more than ten. 
Census sales class was determined by using the gross sales figure to 
classify a farm according to U.S.D.A. sales class. 
^Region 1 is the Northeast, region 2 is the Lake States, region 3 
is the Com Belt, region 4 is the Northern Plains, region 5 is the 
Appalachia, region 6 is the Southeast, region 7 is the Delta, region 8 
is the Southern Plains, region 9 is the Mountain states, and region 10 
is the Pacific region. 
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The cash farm income equations were evaluated for use in the model 
using goodness of fit (R-square), theoretical soundness (reasonableness 
of signs), and usefulness in predicting income and the transition path 
of farms making financial adjustments. The intended use of the equation 
in predicting cash flow from farms with a given asset base and from 
restructured organizations (farms selling and leasing back assets, 
liquidating debt, selling assets, renting additional assets) 
necessitated that certain variables (real estate, machinery, livestock, 
other assets, acres operated) be included in some form. The data set 
was "cleaned up" to eliminate outlying observations which affected 
parameter estimates and contributed to an artificially high R-square. 
Because of the heterogeneity of the farms, a single equation is 
limited in its capacity to explain the variability in cash income. Lack 
of data on input prices, flows of services from capital inputs (as 
opposed to stocks of inputs), labor and management used and labor 
available, and disaggregated input measures further constrain the 
explanatory power of the equation. The equation which gave the best fit 
using ordinary least squares and vrtiich could reflect potential changes 
in cash earnings due to changes in asset holdings and the size of the 
farm was (t-ratios are given in parentheses): 
CPROFITPA= 18.1 + 0.0143*RE + 0.109*MACH + 0.0951* LVSTK 
(4.00) (4.58) (5.92) (3.49) 
- 0.0000308*LVSTKSQ - 30.3*YRSF0 
(-3.28) (-4.11) 
- 0.0000275*IREaiAŒ +" 0.000335*IMACHLV 
(-5.18) (7.77) 
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- 0.116*T2MACH - 0.120*T30TH - 0.0469*T5RE 
(-2.79) (-5.72) (-2.61) 
+ 0.275*T5LVSTK - 0.278*T6LVSTK - 0.131*T60TH 
(3.25) (-2.37) (-3.37) 
- 0.00000359*T2RESQ + 0.00000798*T4RESQ 
(-4.29) (6.67) 
- 0.000741*T4MACHSQ + 0.00000646*T5RESQ 
(-3.08) (1.85) 
+ 0.0000310*T60THSQ + 20.6*T1R3 - 24.9*T2RW 
(4.55) (2.43) (-2.67) 
where RE = current market value of owned real estate (land and 
buildings per acre operated 
MACH = current market value of owned machinery assets per acre 
operated 
LVSTK = current market value of owned livestock assets per acre 
operated 
LVSTKSQ = squared value of owned livestock assets per acre operated 
YRSFO = dummy variable indicating that the years in which farm income 
has provided the majority of the operator's income is zero 
IREMACH = interaction term for RE and MACH 
T2MACH = machinery per acre operated for T2 (beef) farms 
T30TH = other assets per acre operated on T3 (dairy) farms 
T5RE = real estate assets per acre operated on T5 (pork) farms 
T5LVSTK = livestock assets per acre operated on T5 farms 
T6LVSTK = livestock assets per acre operated on T6 (other) farms 
T60TH = other assets per acre operated on T6 farms 
T2RESQ = squared value of real estate assets per acre operated on T2 
(beef) farms 
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T4RESQ = squared value of real estate assets per acre operated on T4 
(general livestock) farms 
T4MAŒSQ = squared value of machinery assets per acre operated on T4 
farms 
T5BESQ = squared value of real estate assets per acre operated on T5 
farms 
T60THSQ = squared value of real estate assets per acre operated on T6 
farms 
T1REG3 = dummy variable for T1 farms in region 3 
T2REGW = dummy variable for T2 farms in region 9 or 10 
IMACHLV = interaction term for RE and MACH. 
This equation estimating CPROFITPA has an R-square of 0.35 and is an 
improvement over using average cash rates of return because cash income 
projections vary by farm type and the contribution of a particular asset 
category to cash income can be identified. Both positive and negative 
farm cash incomes are predicted with the range on predicted CPROFITPA 
narrower than actual CPROFITPA. 
The CPROFITPA regression results are interesting both because of 
what is significant and what was not significant. Education variables 
did not contribute to the explanatory power of the equation. The tenure 
variable was not significant indicating no difference in cash income per 
acre operated when the proportion of rented land increases. The dummy 
variable for number of years in which farm income is the major source of 
operator income is significant and negative when years equals zero, that 
is, when farm income has never been the operator's primary source of 
income. The only type-region interaction terms which were significant 
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indicated that crop farms in the Com Belt are more profitable per acre 
in cash terms than other crop farms vdiile beef farms in the west provide 
less cash income per acre than beef farms in other regions. 
CPROFITPA is a linear function of RE on crop, crop/beef, dairy and 
other farms but is a quadratic function of RE on beef, general livestock 
and pork farms. MACH contributes positively to cash income on all types 
of farms except beef farms. The quadratic MACH term is significant only 
on pork farms. The LVSTK linear term is positive and the quadratic term 
is negative and significant for all farms except T6 farms. The variable 
for "other" assets owned is significant only on dairy and other farms. 
Unfortunately, more detailed checks indicated some inherent 
problems in the equation. In many cases, the effective change in income 
with an increase in the assets owned was negative given coefficient 
estimates on asset terms, interaction terms, and reasonable values for 
assets in a given category. This suggests that, on average, farms would 
increase their cash profits by selling assets. This might be reasonable 
on an individual farm but a one-way movement of assets for the sector is 
not reasonable. Given this equation farms in a simulation could not 
improve their cash flow by adding rented assets to increase farm income, 
which they often can in reality. Another result of estimating the 
income equation from crosssectional data in this manner is that if a 
farm experiences a cash loss in the first year of the projection, cash 
farm income projections in future years will also be negative. Because 
of these problems, research was redirected to improving estimated rates 
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of return to project average income earning potential of individual 
farms. 
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